







Beyond totalitarian nostalgia: a critical urban reception study 








This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of 
Westminster.  © The Author, 2012. 
 





The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of 
Westminster aims to make the research output of the University available to a 
wider audience.  Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or 
copyright owners. 
Users are permitted to download and/or print one copy for non-commercial 
private study or research.  Further distribution and any use of material from 
within this archive for profit-making enterprises or for commercial gain is 
strictly forbidden.    
 
 
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, 
you may freely distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: 
(http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/). 
 











BEYOND TOTALITARIAN NOSTALGIA: 
 
A Critical Urban Reception Study of Historical Drama  











A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements of the University of Westminster 











From the mid-1990s a wave of dramatic serials featuring the legendary figures of China‘s 
bygone dynasties has emerged in dramatic programming on Chinese primetime television. 
The commercialization of mass media and the rise of media consumerism in China since 
the early 1990s have fostered the emergence of these historical dramas on television. Set 
during the dynasty era, these television historical dramas have been at the forefront in 
articulating political and legal principles based on the Confucian-influenced traditional 
Chinese culture. Although media scholars have interpreted the popularity of the television 
historical dramas as a revival of Confucianism, virtually no empirical research has been 
done to explore how Chinese audiences relate their viewing experiences to the revival of 
Confucianism according to their own social and cultural conditions. This thesis presents a 
qualitative audience study of how the historical dramas are understood and socially and 
culturally valued in contemporary China, taking into account personal, social, historical 
and cultural issues that relate to viewers‘ engagement with this television genre. 
 
Between late September 2007 and early April 2008, the author carried out his fieldwork 
audience research in two urban settings in China, the city of Beijing and that of Changsha. 
10 focus groups and 11 in-depth interviews were conducted involving more than 60 
respondents from young adult and middle-aged audience groups. According to the author‘s 
fieldwork data analysis, the ways that the Chinese audience engages with the historical 
drama are far more complex than generally thought; rather than insist on a literal 
interpretation of the drama text, the audience engages with the historical television drama 
in quite a divergent way due to his or her age, gender, life stage and socio-cultural status. 
Meanwhile, informed by the Grounded Theory, the author identified two text-based 
interpretive frameworks that are adopted by the respondents across all the focus groups and 
in-depth interviews in their understanding and evaluation of the historical drama text. 
These two interpretive frameworks include the framework of fact/fiction and that of 
‗classic-ness‘. To conclude, the author argues that the Chinese audience‘s response to the 
historical drama goes beyond a literal, political sense of totalitarian nostalgia; it is 
characterised by an increasingly more liberal, diverse and indeed open-ended engagement 
with the historical drama text. Nevertheless, a critical re-evaluation of Maoist 
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1.1 The background context of the research 
 
This thesis looks at Chinese audiences‘ response to historical drama on contemporary 
Chinese television (dianshi lishiju). Dianshi lishiju here refers to a specific type of 
contemporary historical drama. In the mid-1990s a wave of dramatic serials featuring the 
legendary figures of China‘s bygone dynasties began to dominate dramatic programming 
on Chinese primetime television. The trend reached its height in the late 1990s and the 
early 2000s with saturation programming of palace dramas set in the Qing Dynasty (1644-
1911), what Chinese critics term ‗Qing Drama‘. From the early 2000s to date more dramas 
like these dealing with historical figures and events from a range of periods in ancient 
Chinese history have been produced and aired nationwide in China.  
 
According to the Report on Development of China‘s Radio, Film and Television in 2006 
(Li 2007), the historical drama genre has topped the list of Chinese audiences‘ favourite 
television genres. In the meantime, the Report shows that television historical dramas are 
the highest selling prime-time programmes on China Central Television (CCTV), the 
leading national television station in China. These historical dramas have a significantly 
different look from those of the 1980s; being more diverse in theme and style and more 
concerned with mass entertainment. Most importantly, they have popularised a rewriting or 
representing well-known historical events and figures driven by the commercialization 
process of Chinese media.  
 
Although the ways of defining the historical television drama are diverse, ‗the historical‘ 
has become an umbrella term in contemporary China, referring to television fiction 
concerning treatment of history (mainly pre-modern), explorations of key pre-modern 
events and figures as well as adaptations of classic novels. At the same time, the use of ‗the 
historical‘ as a term is not currently stabilized. ‗Serious drama‘ (zhengshuo ju) versus 
‗popular drama‘ (xishuo ju) is still the most common dichotomy made within Chinese 
popular press and academia about this rather broad genre of ‗historical television‘; the 
serious dramas refer to those representing historical figures and events in a more 
historically accurate way, whereas the popular ones are judged to feature a dramatic 
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representation loosely based on historical facts. 
  
The popularity of these television historical dramas has attracted the attention of both 
critics and audiences in China. Most media scholars in China mainly ascribe the popularity 
of television historical dramas to two reasons (e.g. Li & Xiao, 2006; Yin, 2002; Zeng, 2000, 
2002). First, the commercialization of mass media and the rise of media consumerism in 
China since the early 1990s have fostered the emergence of the popular historical drama on 
television. Although China‘s television production and transmission began in the late 1950s, 
it was not until the Deng-launched Economic Reform (starting in 1978) that the number of 
television stations as well as the number of television sets proliferated. According to 
Chinese media scholar Qingrui Zeng (2005), by the end of 2002 nearly every Chinese 
urban household had had its own set, with China‘s television network estimated to reach 78 
percent of the population. At the same time, the widespread use of the satellite television 
technology has encouraged a boom in the television content industry since the early 1990s. 
In the 1980s, China‘s broadcasting system was operating on the county, city, provincial and 
national levels. The aim of this so-called ‗Four Tier Operation of Radio and Television and 
Overlapping Coverage‘ (siji ban guangbo dianshi), which came as a result of the 
authoritarian politics, was to ensure that economy and political power would remain intact 
on the local level. At the time, CCTV One was the only satellite television channel. 
 
With the urbanization movement taking increasingly faster steps since the early 1990s, 
conflicts emerged between the old television broadcasting system and the rapidly growing 
market demand for popular culture products. In response to the conflict, Chinese 
government then adopted the ‗Get on Board the Satellite‘ (shangxing) policy in 1990. 
Under this policy, the major provincial television channels are permitted to be broadcast 
through satellite transmission. That is to say, each province has one television channel 
whose signal is able to reach the whole country through satellite technology. By the end of 
2003 there had had emerged around 50 satellite television channels in China. Thus, the 
introduction of the ‗Get on Board the Satellite‘ policy has led to the construction of a 
nationwide satellite television-broadcasting network in China. 
  
The establishment of the satellite television broadcasting network has been claimed as a 
milestone in the development of the Chinese television industry (e.g. Yin, 2002; Zeng, 
2005). On the one hand, it resulted in the rise of television consumerism, and on the other 
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hand, it allows us to witness the multifarious televisualization of the socio-cultural changes 
taking place in every corner of this post-socialist country. According to a survey conducted 
in 2002 (Zeng 2005),  the average television viewing time of a Chinese audience amounts 
to three hours in a day and one hour is spent in watching television dramas. Thus, watching 
television drama has become a significant leisure activity for ordinary urban households in 
contemporary China. In the meantime, the fragmentation of television audiences as the 
consequence of the television consumerism has been stimulating the diversity of television 
drama productions. 
  
According to Yin (2002), the emergence of the television historical dramas reflected the 
rise of the popular culture in cotemporary China which was the result of the decline of the 
Communist ideologies and the public desire for mass entertainment. Nevertheless, as he 
claims, ‗historical dramas provided intellectuals with a mean of expression and certain 
rhetorical strategies‘ (Yin, 2002, p34). For example, the forty-four-episode serial 
Yongzheng Dynasty (1998), produced by Beijing Tongdao Cultural Development Company, 
used more than one hundred characters in over more than 600 scenes to narrate the 
political struggles in the Qing Dynasty from the period of Kangxi (1662-1722) to 
Yongzheng (1723-1735). It drew upon historical allegories and historical rewritings to 
explore the history and power relations of contemporary Chinese society. Using the past to 
mirror the present, and drawing upon the past to satirize the present are complementary 
historiographical traditions in China. These dramas clearly inherit this intellectual tradition; 
they are not a rewriting of existing historical accounts as such, but their significance lies in 
the fact that we can shed light on the present by reviewing the past. It can thus be argued 
that these historical dramas offer audiences a dramatised account of the past and traditional 
Chinese society at a time when major change is going on in contemporary China.  
 
Second, the popularity of the television historical dramas should be considered as a revival 
of Confucianism. Confucianism (rujia sixiang) is a Chinese ethical and philosophical 
system developed from the teachings of the Chinese philosopher Confucius (551BC-
479BC). The origin of Confucianism dated back to China‘s Spring and Autumn Period 
(771BC-476BC) when an ethical-sociopolitical teaching emerged. Following the 
abandonment of Legalism (fa jia) in China after the Qin Dynasty (221BC-207BC), 
Confucianism became the official state ideology of China. It developed metaphysical and 
cosmological elements in the Han Dynasty (206BC-220AD). As it is widely accepted, the 
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dominant strain of Confucianism stresses avoidance of conflict, a social hierarchy that 
values seniority and patriarchy, a reliance on sage leadership that locates its safeguards 
against the abuse of power not in political situations but in the moral commitment of 
leaders, an anti-commercial attitude that disparages trading for profit, an emphasis on 
moderation in the pursuit of all forms of human pleasure that subordinates entertainment to 
moral enlightenment, and finally the overarching notion of humanity. 
 
Over the last two decades, many Chinese cultural scholars in China and abroad have 
pointed out that Confucianism owed its revival to the intellectual and general public‘s 
responses to the great changes taking place in contemporary Chinese society and culture 
(e.g. Bell, 2008; Liu, 2004; Wang, 1996; Zhang, 2008). The end of the Cold War not only 
greatly eased the political and military stand-off between China and the western world; it 
also witnessed increasing Chinese-related human, cultural and economic mobility at both 
regional and transnational levels. China, as one of the longest continuous civilizations, re-
emerged into the international community after nearly a century of impotence, frustration 
and humiliation. The most prominent change within China‘s political landscape in the post-
Tiananmen era has been the revival of Confucianism. The tragedy and controversy of the 
Tiananmen Protests resulted in the Chinese public‘s strong distrust of Chinese government. 
Unlike the Maoist period, where the Party-state ideologies forcefully served as the moral 
standard in the public realm, the post-Tiananmen era witnessed the crisis of the Communist 
ideologies in ordinary people‘s lives. In the last two decades, this moral crisis has been 
solved in some cases by other belief systems and ideologies such as Christianity, Falun 
Gong and popular nationalism of all kinds. But, as Daniel Bell (2008), a Canadian born 
professor of political philosophy at China‘s Tsinghua University rightly observes, Chinese 
government worries that such moral alternatives ‗threaten the hard-won peace and stability 
that underpins the country‘s development, so it has encouraged the revival of China‘s most 
venerable political tradition: Confucianism‘(p8). 
  
The media scholars holding this opinion argue that these television historical dramas set 
during the dynasty era have been at the forefront in articulating political and legal 
principles based on the Confucian-influenced traditional Chinese culture (Li & Xiao, 2006; 
Yin, 2002; Yin & Ni, 2009; Zeng, 2000, 2002; Zhu, 2008). US-based Chinese media 
scholar Ying Zhu (2008b), in her book Television in Post-Reform China: Serial Dramas, 
Confucian Leadership and the Global Television Market, argues that in their effort to 
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engage audiences who detest rampant political corruption and society‘s loss of moral 
grounding, the historical dramas have presented exemplary emperors of by-gone dynasties. 
In her view, the search for model leaders is rooted in Chinese cultural tradition that has 
been dominated by Confucianism from the second century to the late Qing Dynasty and the 
early twentieth century. 
 
Although these scholars have interpreted the popularity of the television historical dramas 
as a revival of Confucianism, virtually no empirical research has been done to explore how 
Chinese audiences relate their viewing experiences to the revival of Confucianism 
according to their own social and cultural conditions. Media scholars have failed to closely 
investigate how these television historical dramas are perceived, discussed and criticised 
by the audiences. American media scholar Robert Allen (1985), in his discussion of soap 
opera in the western world, claims that the study of soap operas had been conditioned 
within two related supervisory discourses: ‗criticism (aesthetic discourses) and sociological 
research‘ (p10). For an extended period, the media scholars in China have interpreted these 
historical dramas mainly by using textual analysis, but little academic effort has been made 
to explore the meaning of these dramas from a sociological perspective. The chronic lack 
of sociological consideration for television dramas in China, in my opinion, is because that 
most of the media scholars in China come from literature background and so give more 
attention to the textual elements of television drama than its contextual meaning. For this 
reason, this thesis tries to fill this knowledge gap by looking at the Chinese audience 
response to the historical drama. 
 
1.2 The aims of the research and its proposed contribution to knowledge 
 
As has been introduced so far, research on historical dramas has mainly focused on the 
drama texts themselves. As far as the existing research literature on Chinese television is 
concerned, there is nearly no empirical data about how viewers value these dramas and 
how this relates to their interaction with social changes. Furthermore, there are no audience 
studies in this field that provide knowledge of how television historical drama as a cultural 
category can be deconstructed based on the social and cultural situations in China. Within 
this thesis, I thus present a qualitative audience study of how television historical dramas 
are understood and socially and culturally valued in contemporary China, considering 
personal, social, historical and cultural issues that relate to viewers‘ engagement with this 
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television genre. The thesis intends to address three crucial questions concerning the 
reception of the historical dramas on contemporary Chinese television. The three questions 
are as stated below:  
 
1) How do Chinese audiences respond to the issues of ancient Chinese history 
represented within the selected drama texts? 
 
2) To what extent do audiences, through their viewing practice, relate the historical 
representations to the tremendous socio-cultural changes in contemporary Chinese 
society? 
 
3) How do the audiences evaluate the historical dramas as a popular culture 
phenomenon? 
 
In a general sense, this thesis provides empirical research that can contribute to a broader 
understanding of contemporary Chinese television audiences. Specifically speaking, its 
original contribution to knowledge involves three aspects. By looking at an East Asian 
local television phenomenon and how it is received in its nation-state context, this thesis, 
first of all, provides a case study for the field of East Asian television studies; it generates 
many thoughts on how the Chinese viewing public deal with mediated forms of ‗traditional 
culture‘ in a globalizing world. Second, it tests the constructionist approach of audience 
research suggested by Finnish media scholar Pertti Alasuutari (1999) in the Chinese 
context. According to Alasuutari (1999), ‗one of the gradual developments in cultural and 
media studies has been to reflect upon and to take distance from the cultural concerns 
embedded in the way we conceive of contemporary society and its characteristic new 
phenomena‘ (p9); it will be fascinating to see how this increased reflexivity is practiced by 
the Chinese audiences in contemporary Chinese society. I shall return to this 
constructionist approach of audience research in my methodological discussion in Chapter 
4.  
 
Third, the last ten years has seen the maturing of critical Chinese media studies in an 
international context (see Zhu 2008b); for nearly all the scholars of Chinese media, the 
most central problem confronted with mass communication in China involves the 
ambiguities and contradictions arising from the relationship between continued state 
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control and economic reform (e.g. Lee 2000, 2001; Pan, 2009; Sparks 2008; Wang 2001; 
Zhao 1998, 2008).  It therefore takes a great deal of empirical effort and in-depth analysis 
to study the ambiguities and paradoxes of Chinese media in relation to the Chinese state. In 
my opinion, that is also an important goal for a critical Chinese media studies. This thesis 
wishes to make some contribution to the achievement of that goal as well. 
 
1.3 Thesis outline 
 
This thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter Two conducts a literature review on the key 
themes and theories in relation to this project. The literature review is focused on three 
strands of scholarship; first, theoretical approaches to the analysis of contemporary 
Chinese television, second, genre issues concerning contemporary Chinese historical 
television drama, and finally, changing paradigms in critical Chinese television reception 
studies. Each aspect will be discussed in a separate section. Within each section, an attempt 
will be made to critically examine relevant themes and approaches drawn from both 
Chinese and non-Chinese academia. An integrated review on both Western and Chinese 
literature on television communication like this, as I argue, serves two purposes. On the 
one hand, it creates a dialogue between many Western-originated media and 
communication theories and the issues concerning contemporary Chinese television. On 
the other hand, it puts both the Western and Chinese theories under scrutiny discussing 
their feasibility in a global-local field of knowledge production about contemporary 
television culture. The expected fulfillment of these two purposes should lead to the 
formation of a more nuanced theoretical framework for dealing with my research subject.  
 
The third chapter moves on to look at the contextual issues concerning the rise of the 
historical drama on contemporary Chinese television since the mid-1990s. It consists of 
three independent sections where each section deals with one of the movements; these 
movements also cover three main areas of the transformation of contemporary Chinese 
popular culture. The first section introduces the wave of traditional culture ‗fever‘ in China 
first instigated by overseas Chinese intellectuals, notably the Harvard scholar Wei-ming Tu, 
and then overseen and promoted by Chinese government. In this case, historical drama as a 
whole television genre often performs a controversial ideological function in ‗building a 
harmonious society‘ as advocated by the current Hu-Wen Administration. The second 
section focuses on literary transformation by revisiting the rise of the new historical novel; 
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it uses Chinese historical novelist Er Yuehe and his well-known Qing emperor trilogy 
which was turned into several successful historical television dramas, as an example to 
illustrate this transformation. By tracing the development of historical television drama that 
deals with anti-corruption initiatives, the final section discusses the transformation of 
contemporary Chinese television content. In this respect, it has been widely acknowledged 
that the hybridisation of social criticism and historical realism has contributed to the 
particular dramatic style of historical drama in China (e.g. Li & Xiao, 2006; Yin, 2002). It 
is against the backdrop of this cultural transformation that historical drama has changed 
into its current manifestation on contemporary Chinese television.  
  
Chapter 4 presents a report on the issues concerning the methodology and methods of my 
thesis. It is comprised of four parts. In the first part, I shall briefly explain the reasons why 
my particular qualitative research approach is adopted to deal with my research questions. 
The second part provides a detailed discussion on the use of the research methods 
including cultural genre analysis, focus groups, in-depth interviews and document analysis. 
Part three concentrates on my process of research data analysis towards writing up the 
findings; the main purpose of this part is to highlight the significance of reflexivity in two 
aspects of the qualitative data analysis: on the one hand, using grounded theory informed 
analytical techniques (Strauss 1987), and on the other hand, rethinking the use of focus 
groups in researching Chinese society and culture. The last part summarises the gains and 
limitations of my qualitative research practice. 
 
Influenced by American media scholar Jason Mittell‘s (2004) cultural approach to 
television genre, Chapter 5 focuses on the generic characteristics of the historical drama 
and deals with the category of ‗the historical‘ itself. This chapter consists of four sections. 
The first section is devoted to briefly introducing three sample drama series including The 
Bronze Teeth (tiechi tongya jixiaolan) (2000- ), The Great Emperor Hanwu (hanwu dadi) 
(2005), and The First Emperor (qin shi huang) (2006). The storylines and major theatrical 
features of the series are provided as indicative of contemporary Chinese historical 
television drama as a whole genre. These sample series will be used as case studies in 
discussions of the genre issues which arise. Section Two is focused on the Chinese 
television drama industry. The aim of this section is to look at how the Chinese television 
drama industry categorizes and evaluates historical drama through its production, 
regulatory, marketing and scheduling practices. The third section turns to television 
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scholarship on the genre issues of the historical drama. It revisits the relevant work done by 
four important television scholars in China. Importantly, these television scholars approach 
the genre issues mainly from a textual perspective. The final section summarises the whole 
chapter and lays the foundations for the next stage of analysis, which concentrates on 
audience responses to the historical television drama. 
  
Chapters 6-8 present a data analysis based on my fieldwork research conducted between 
October 2007 and April 2008. My data analysis involved two stages. The sixth chapter 
reports on the first stage of the data analysis. This chapter analyses three important issues 
concerning the historical representations within the drama texts from the point of view of 
the audience. These issues, including the significance of historical accuracy, totalitarian 
nostalgia and contemporary use of the historical representations, are drawn from the long-
term debate of historical dramas that can be easily found both within the Chinese television 
drama industry and academic debates. Standing from a perspective of reception studies, I 
find that the ways that the audience engages with the historical drama are far more 
complex than generally thought; rather than insist on a literal interpretation of the drama 
text, the audience engages with the historical television drama in quite a divergent way due 
to his or her age, gender, life stage and socio-cultural status.  
 
Informed by the Grounded Theory, which has been discussed in Chapter 4, I conducted the 
second stage of my data analysis. Through manual data processing, I identified two text-
based interpretive frameworks that are adopted by my respondents across all the focus 
groups and in-depth interviews in their understanding and evaluation of the historical 
drama text. They include the interpretive framework of fact/fiction and that of ‗classic-
ness‘. They also serve as the two most significant categories of findings from my audience 
research. 
 
In the seventh chapter, the findings in relation to the fact/fiction framework are presented 
in two sections. The first section introduces diverse ways of defining the historical drama 
by my respondents. I find that their defining practices work as points of departure for my 
respondents to articulate a broad range of public and personal meanings from the 
fact/fiction complex. The second section moves beyond the ways of genre definition and 
concentrates on the major attitudes adopted by the respondents towards China‘s 
historiographical traditions inherent in the historical drama text. Based upon their attitudes 
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towards the historiographical traditions which take their character from contemporary 
China‘s system of television historical drama production, I divide my respondents into 
three types including conservatists, culturalists and realists. Arbitrary as it may look, this 
dividing practice methodologically reflects certain cultural and social identities that 
potentially constitute my respondents‘ cultural citizenship.  
  
Chapter 8 examines the interpretive framework of ‗classic-ness‘. It consists of three 
sections. The first section offers a reappraisal of the meanings of classic television drama 
based on my audience research. Against the background of commercialization and trans-
nationalization of China‘s television drama production, the way a certain respondent 
evaluates the authenticity issues concerning the historical drama remains co-determined by 
his or her gender, generation as well as social position. To follow upon a reappraisal of the 
discourse of classic television drama, Section Two examines my respondents‘ reflexive 
attitudes towards the changing nature of the ‗classic‘ discourse in the case of the historical 
drama. Within this section, an emphasis has been put on the crucial influence of a 
television viewer‘s social position on his or her treatment of popular historical 
representation on contemporary Chinese television. Based upon all the factors discussed 
throughout this chapter that determine how my respondents evaluate the discourse of 
classic historical drama, the concluding section refers back to American anthropologist 
Lisa Rofel‘s suggestion (1994) of taking a close look at how state power in China operates 
through the way the state creates itself as an imagined entity, which I have mentioned in 
Chapter Two.  
 
In the final chapter I shall provide a summary of the key findings of this study. The 
findings are summarised in three parts. The first part reviews the major cultural and 
political forces behind the generic production of the historical drama. It points out that, the 
Party-state apparatus remains the ultimate power in historical drama production and 
broadcasting, as the commercial and transnational management of the Chinese television 
drama industry is one of the driving forces behind the evolution of the genre. Part Two 
focuses on how my respondents understand and evaluate the selected historical drama texts. 
Based on the two interpretive frameworks adopted by my respondents discussed in 
Chapters 7 and 8, I argue that the interaction between the audience agency and the state 
power means that history becomes a body of popular cultural knowledge itself to be 
challenged and subverted. The third part extends the Chinese audience‘s response to the 
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historical drama to a wider Chinese popular cultural arena. It identifies new tendencies in 
contemporary Chinese television culture that go beyond Confucianism-influenced 
totalitarian nostalgia. Finally, taking this study as a starting point, I shall propose a number 









































 has undergone tremendous changes in the past thirty years, so has the field 
of Chinese media studies. With the Deng Xiaoping-led economic reform affecting all levels 
of Chinese society since the early 1990s, the functions of Chinese mass media are 
changing. For nearly all the scholars on Chinese media, the most central problem 
confronted by mass communication in China involves the ambiguities and contradictions 
arising from the relationship between continued state control and economic reform (e.g. 
Lee 2000, 2001; Pan, 2009; Sparks 2008; Wang 2001; Zhao 1998, 2008). Briefly speaking, 
although the state is still highly authoritarian, it has to be compatible with market forces.  
 
In terms of Chinese television studies, there has emerged a diversity of research subjects 
and conceptual frameworks since the late 1990s. The most active scholars involved in the 
field not only come from mainland China and Hong Kong but also from the English 
speaking world, mainly North America and Australia (e.g. Fung & Ma 2002; Keane, 1999, 
2001, 2003; Yin 2002; Zeng, 2000, 2002; Zhu, 2008, 2009). They have addressed a wide 
range of prominent topics connected with Chinese television. The key examples include 
televisual imagination and Chinese modernity (Fung & Ma 2002), Chinese broadcasting 
policy and the civil society (Keane 2001a), Chinese television drama industry (Yin 2002) 
as well as Chinese television and Confucian leadership (Zhu 2008).  
 
My literature review is focused on three strands of scholarship; first, theoretical approaches 
to the analysis of contemporary Chinese television, second, genre issues concerning 
contemporary Chinese historical television drama, and finally, changing paradigms in 
critical Chinese television reception studies. Each aspect will be discussed in a separate 
section. Within each section, an attempt will be made to critically examine relevant themes 
and approaches drawn from both Chinese and non-Chinese academia. An integrated review 
on both Western and Chinese literature on television communication like this, as I argue, 
serves two purposes. On the one hand, it creates a dialogue between many Western-
                                                        
1 In this thesis, the term ‗Chinese media‘ mainly refers to the issues of media production, distribution, consumption and 
regulation in the Chinese mainland, not including those in Hong Kong and Macao unless otherwise stated. 
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originated media and communication theories and the issues concerning contemporary 
Chinese television. On the other hand, it puts both the Western and Chinese theories under 
scrutiny discussing their feasibility in a global-local field of knowledge production about 
contemporary television culture. The expected fulfillment of these two purposes should 
lead to the formation of a more nuanced theoretical framework for dealing with my 
research subject. Towards the end of this chapter, some concluding remarks will be 
provided to address the possibility of how that theoretical framework can help inform the 
research process and thereafter develop a rationale for the whole thesis. 
 
2.2 Theoretical approaches to the analysis of contemporary Chinese television 
 
China‘s Socialist Market Economic Reform2 has given a post-socialist face to Chinese 
television. From an industry point of view, the last thirty years witnessed a 
commercialization process of Chinese television industry; different from a western liberal-
market model, the commercialization of Chinese television is under strict control and 
regulation by the bureaucratic-authoritarian Chinese state. From a content point of view, 
Chinese television content assumes a complex outlook, which is between commercialism 
and propaganda, or simply, as some say, a trend towards pluralism. If one wants to study a 
particular phenomenon of contemporary Chinese television (within this thesis, historical 
television drama and its audiences), one needs to acquire some background knowledge 
about existing theoretical approaches to the analysis of contemporary Chinese television. 
 
As previously mentioned, quite a few important scholars of Chinese media (some of whom 
are of Chinese origin) are based in North America and Australia. However, many more 
active ones come from China (e.g. Meng 2003; Shi 2003; Yin 2001, 2002; Zeng 2000, 
2002); these mainland Chinese media scholars are under the dual influence of the domestic 
academic disciplinary tradition and Western-originated media and social theories. Unlike 
media work in Britain, media studies, particularly television criticism
3
, in China is not 
                                                        
2
 National Plenary Session of the Communist Party of China Central Committee held in Beijing in 1987 stated that ‗the 
Socialist economy is a kind of planned commercial economy‘ and the ‗state should have ―macro-control‖ over the market, 
with the market guiding the production of enterprises‘. As is said, though not all of these economic policies could be 
applied in the media and communications industries, the impact of commercial forces began to be felt (see Yin 2002). 
3 Within China, television criticism (dianshi piping) comes out of three different but related disciplines. First, it comes 
out of Chinese language (zhongwen) and literary (and the film) studies (wenxue he dianying yanjiu), which feature 
historical and rhetorical analysis. Second, it is partly drawn from Marxist aesthetics studies (makesizhuyi wenyimeixue 
yanjiu), to do with the Marxist political and aesthetical critique of literary production. Third, it starts being developed in 
the recently established field of journalism and communication studies (xinwen chuanbo xue). It is also worth noting that 
journalism as a university major did not get detached from Chinese language and literature departments in most of the 
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grounded in a tradition of sociology and political science; it is always theoretically-based, 
suspicious of empiricism and obsessed with textual analysis of meaning and value. At the 
same time, television criticism in contemporary China, as I would argue, is derived from 
diverse intellectual practices in addressing the politics of ‗post-socialism‘ or ‗post-
reformism‘ in relation to Chinese media.  
 
Tongyu Shi (2003), for example, in his book Television Criticism (dianshi piping), 
proposes to use relevant theories drawn from the Frankfurt School, the Birmingham School 
and the American sociology of mass communication to critically examine the Chinese 
television industry. He also introduces Habermasian public sphere theory, Pierre Bourdieu's 
concept of field and Daniel Bell‘s thesis on post-industrial society to a study of the 
commercialization of Chinese television and its consequences. In the book, he expresses a 
deep concern about the rise of entertainment content on Chinese television due to the 
Economic Reform, which encouraged the marketisation of Chinese television. Although he 
does not argue for social science research to evaluate post-Reform television culture, he 
calls for more effort to be made by Chinese intellectuals to criticize the rise of commercial 
culture in the media. 
 
Coming from a neo-Gramscian position, Fanhua Meng (2003), in his book The Media and 
Cultural Hegemony (chuanmei yu wenhua lingdaoquan), discusses the challenges facing 
contemporary Chinese popular culture. He claims that ‗the end of the Cultural Revolution4 
in 1976 witnessed a restructuring of Chinese socialist cultural hegemony, a restructuring 
from a strong pursuit of socialist morality to an accumulation of material wealth‘ (Meng, 
2003, p26). He observes that the Communist Party of China (CCP) gained tight control of 
literary production in the PRC from the 1950s, but it has failed to stop the rise of consumer 
culture in the wake of the Economic Reform; as far as Chinese television industry is 
concerned, Meng argues, that celebrity culture and the advertising industry have turned 
television into a hegemonic institution, which ‗has not only become the dominant force in 
the Chinese public‘s cultural lives, but also created a new life politics‘ (ibid. p196). As a 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Chinese universities until the mid 1980s. Communication Studies was not recognized as a university major by the 
Chinese Ministry of Education until the late 1990s.  
4 The Cultural Revolution was a period of widespread social and political upheaval in the People‘s Republic of China 
between 1966 and 1976. It was launched by Mao Zedong, the then chairman of the Communist Party of China, on May 
16, 1966. Mao alleged that ‗liberal bourgeois‘ elements were permeating the party and society at large and that they 
wanted to restore capitalism. He insisted that these elements be removed through post-revolutionary class struggle by 
mobilizing the thoughts and actions of China's youth, who formed the Red Guard groups around the country. 
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conclusion, he suggests looking for ‗a new cultural approach which neither belongs to the 
past nor to the west through criticising any form of injustice in the globalisation process‘ 
(ibid. p264). Interesting as this suggestion is, he does not point towards any particular 
direction to investigate or achieve it. 
 
Although television criticism within China is somewhat ambivalent in addressing the 
relationship between state control and television communication, a much more radical 
voice can be found within the field of international Chinese media studies (e.g. Berry 2009; 
Keane 1999, 2001; Sun and Zhao 2009; Zhao 2008; Zhu 2008). These scholars explicitly 
raise the problems of Chinese television in relation to state power. 
 
Wanning Sun and Yuezhi Zhao (2009), in their provocative article Television Culture with 
‘Chinese Characteristics’, take China Central Television‘s (CCTV) ‗emotionally powerful 
and morally lifting‘ coverage of the Sichuan earthquake5 that took place in 2008 as their 
starting point (p96); they view that kind of ‗television storytelling and subject making‘ as 
something that ‗articulates with the broad political economy of China‘s ongoing social 
transformation during the era of a worldwide ―neoliberal revolution‖‘ (ibid. p97). It is the 
production of the neoliberal subject in the current Chinese socio-political climate that they 
find deeply problematic here. They point out that Chinese television always treats ‗human 
tragedies as either incidental or inevitable‘, and avoids touching upon ‗the social and 
political causes of individual‘s suffering‘ or the flaws of China‘s social welfare system 
(ibid. p104).  
 
Chris Berry (2009), in his work on Shanghai Television‘s Documentary Channel, 
interrogates the Documentary Channel as a specific kind of public space in the culture of 
Shanghai and China. He argues that Chinese televisual public space exists under the 
conditions of the party-state apparatus and global marketization. On the one hand, there 
has been much effort made by the journalists of the Documentary Channel to make the 
channel a public space using their programming, but the party-state apparatus still ‗has 
ultimate control over what gets aired‘ and ‗the collaboration between the journalists and 
                                                        
5 On Monday, May 12, 2008, a deadly earthquake that measured at 8.0 Ms and 7.9 Mw occurred in Sichuan province of 
China, killing an estimated 68,000 people. It is also known as the Wenchuan earthquake, after the location of the 
earthquake's epicenter, Wenchuan County in Sichuan province. The epicenter was 80 kilometres west-northwest of 
Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan, with a focal depth of 19 kilometres. The earthquake was also felt in nearby countries 
and as far away as both Beijing and Shanghai—1,500 kilometres and 1,700 kilometres away—where office buildings 
swayed with the tremor. 
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viewers must fit in with its values‘ (Berry, 2009, p83). On the other hand, like the United 
States and the United Kingdom, as Berry comments, ‗the reconfigurations pursuant upon 
the new multi-channel environment and the increased emphasis on market dynamics and 
the trading in audience-as-product‘ have become the same important factors ‗in shaping the 
ways in which both journalists and viewers can participate in televisual public space‘ as the 
state (ibid. p86). 
 
Similarly, in his 2001 work on broadcasting policy and civil society in China, Michael 
Keane has pointed out that the model of the Habermasian public sphere is inadequate for 
contemporary Chinese society. He argues that ‗Whereas citizens in liberal democracies 
seek to influence the formulation of policy by force of ideas, by interest group activities 
and ultimately through the ballot box…Under the Chinese socialist tradition, we find…the 
balance shifts towards interpretation of policy‘ (Keane, 2001a, p783). That is to say, in 
western societies, cultural policy is manifested and enforced as law, which is inflexible, 
whereas in China the tendency is for regulation, which is not ironclad law but subject to 
negotiation that takes place between Chinese Party officials and cultural producers in an 
interpretation of the administrative language of policy. In order to understand the 
complexity of quasi-commercialized culture in Chinese broadcasting, in his previous work, 
Keane (1999) has suggested that Foucauldian notion of governmentality could provide the 
methodological tools. According to him,  
 
the notion of governmentality was used by Foucault to critique ‗reason of state‘, a form 
of government rationality that predated the birth of liberalism in 19th-century Europe…a 
modern type of government exemplified by liberalism, came to displace the utopian idea 
that the social body could be penetrated, known and directed by political authorities 
(Keane, 1999, p248).  
 
Using Chinese television drama production and reception as an example, Keane suggests 
that an application of the notion of ‗governmentality‘ could be useful for understanding the 
policy ramifications that impact on Chinese television.  
 
However, using this western-originated approach to study Chinese cultural policy is 
challenging. US-based Chinese cultural studies scholar Jing Wang (2001), for example, 
casts much doubt that ‗the Foucault effects‘ (see Bennett 1998) happen in China in the 
same way as they do in the modern liberal state and neo-liberal state in Europe and 
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America. She reminds us that the Chinese state has ‗its 50 year old tradition of state 
monopoly socialism on the one hand‘ and ‗its deeply ingrained Confucian prototype of 
―state-family‖ on the other‘ (Wang, 2001, p44). For this historical reason, she believes that 
a western paradigm that emphasises the `elimination of the family as a model‘ (Foucault, 
1991, p98) for the development of the art of government from the eighteenth century 
onward is incompatible with the Chinese context. She goes on to argue that the Chinese 
state apparatus remains the ultimate power in Chinese cultural production and its 
rationality is the real art of Chinese government. Instead, she proposes ‗critical 
policy/culture studies‘ to ‗anticipate an alternative model emerging out of socialism‘s 
utopian character while remaining vigilant over the contemporary variations of post-
socialism‘s Medusa persona‘ (ibid. p49). 
  
From the above-mentioned, it can be seen that a wave of post-socialist television criticism 
has emerged in the field of Chinese media studies. The main argument of the media 
scholars involved in this wave of television criticism is concerned with the negotiation 
between market forces and the Party-state power. A study of the historical television drama 
should primarily engage with as well as make a contribution to this wave of television 
criticism. Having introduced the theoretical approaches at the macro-level, I now move on 
to examine the genre issues concerning the historical television drama. 
 
2.3 Genre issues concerning contemporary Chinese television historical drama 
 
US-based Chinese scholar David Der-wei Wang (1992), in his work Fictional Realism in 
Twentieth-Century China, argues that one of the most remarkable literary phenomena in 
the Post-Mao China is the resurgence of historical fiction. As he points out, compared to 
the historical novels of the Maoist period, which were characterised by an old belief in 
official historiography in the new guise of Communist ideologies, the Post-Mao historical 
fictions
6
 demonstrate four new tendencies in historical interpretation.  
 
The first tendency, represented by Dai Houying‘s novels, is an emergence of ordinary 
                                                        
6 The works that Wang mentions include Dai Houying‘s Ren, ah, ren! (Man ah, man!, 1981) and Shiren zhisi (Death of a 
Poet, 1982), Feng Jicai‘s Yihequan (The Boxers, co-authored with Li Dingxing, 1977) and Yibairen de shinian ( One 
Decade, One Hundred People, 1987), A Cheng‘s 1984 three ‗king‘ novellas, Qi Wang (Chess King), Shuwang (Tree King) 
and Haiziwang (Child King), Han Shaogong‘s 1986 novellas Bababa (Papapa) and Nununu (Woman women women), 
and Yu Hua‘s Yijiu bailiu nian (Nineteen eighty-six, 1987), Shishi ruyan(The Past is like smoke, 1987) and Wangshi yu 
xingfa (Past and Punishment, 1990). 
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people in a narrative format; it is focused on ‗ordinary people‘s changing consciousness 
and behavioral patterns over a tumultuous time span‘ while openly questioning ―the nature 
of what is history‘ (Wang, 1992, p294). The second and third tendencies can be found in 
Jicai Feng‘s novels. In the early 1980s, a series of novels were published on late Qing 
political events led by Feng; the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) went through tremendous 
chaos and devastation as the last Chinese feudal empire, so it provides a rich selection of 
uncertainties and doubts not only similar to but also associated with those of contemporary 
China. At the same time, using fictionalised individual interviews or testimonies, Feng 
became a pioneer in writing novels on the Cultural Revolution;
7
 through his novels, he 
attempts to make a confession about the ‗fanaticism, cruelty and irrationality shaped by 
people in the Cultural Revolution‘ (ibid. p298).  
 
The fourth tendency lies in the writer‘s more ‗radical and self-reflexive‘ attitude towards 
history than that which existed before the Cultural Revolution (ibid. p300). This kind of 
attitude is manifested in two literary styles. On the one hand, it features a root-searching 
movement (xungen yundong); the writers involved in this movement, represented by 
Cheng A and Shaogong Han, try to avoid an immediate historical interpretation and shift 
their attention to trivial, mysterious and even primitive parts of history. On the other hand, 
this attitude entails an experimental style. As Wang comments, this experimental style, of 
which Hua Yu‘s work is a great example, not only places doubts on ‗the epistemological 
basis of traditional writing‘, but also ‗questions the very linguistic medium with which 
history makes itself intelligible‘; it treats history as something distorted, illogical and full 
of ‗abrupt and irreparable disappearance and loss‘ (ibid. p300). From Wang‘s observation, 
it can be seen that at least three new literary modes are embedded in the Post-Mao Chinese 
historical fictions: individualization, trivialization and experimentalization. These literary 
modes constitute a new way of writing history; whatever genre or subject this new way of 
writing history concerns, these three literary modes provide a basis for the construction of 
History as a fictional reality that awaits to be demystified. 
 
These literary transformations, to a large extent, set the scene for the rise of the ‗new‘ 
historical drama on Chinese television in the mid 1990s; the textual properties of Post-Mao 
historical fiction have greatly influenced the television historical drama. According to 
                                                        
7 The well-known novel of Feng‘s on the Cultural Revolution is the unfinished Yibairen de shinian (One Decade, One 
Hundred People, 1987), which is a combination of reportage literature and historical fiction. 
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Chinese media scholar Hong Yin (2002), the emergence of the ‗new‘ television historical 
drama, as part of popular culture in contemporary China, should be seen as a result of the 
collapse of Maoist ideologies and the public yearnings for mass entertainment. In the 
example of the forty-four-episode serial Yongzheng Dynasty (1998), Yin claims that, 
‗historical dramas provided intellectuals with a means of expression and certain rhetorical 
strategies‘ (2002:34); produced by Beijing Tongdao Cultural Development Co., Yongzheng 
Dynasty used more than one hundred characters in over more than 600 scenes to narrate 
the political struggles in the Qing Dynasty from the period of Kangxi (1662-1722) to 
Yongzheng (1723-1735). It drew upon historical allegories and historical rewritings to 
explore the history and power relations of contemporary Chinese society. For Yin, using 
the past to mirror the present, and drawing upon the past to satirize the present are 
complementary historiographical tradition in China.  
 
On the other hand, the popularity of the television historical drama is considered as a 
revival of Confucianism. Over the last decade, many Chinese cultural scholars in China 
and abroad have attributed the revival of Confucianism to the intellectual and general 
public‘s responses to the great changes taking place in contemporary Chinese society and 
culture (see Bell 2008); media scholars holding this opinion argue that these television 
historical dramas set during the dynasty era have been at the forefront in articulating 
political and legal principles based on the Confucian-influenced traditional Chinese culture 
(e.g. Wang, 1996; Zhu, 2008). US-based Chinese media scholar Ying Zhu (2008a, 2008b), 
in a series of discussions on the popularity of the Qing drama, points out that in their effort 
to engage audiences who are fed up with rampant political corruption and society‘s 
apparent loss of moral grounding, these historical dramas have presented exemplary 
emperors of by-gone dynasties.  
 
For an ideological critique of the Qing drama, she (2008a) suggests that one examine ‗the 
symbolic link between Neo-authoritarianism‘s justification of the Tiananmen crackdown 
and the drama‘s ideological positioning‘ (p30). By that, she reminds us that, the revisionist 
Qing drama emerged at a time when Chinese society was undergoing rapid economic 
growth due to the Xiaoping Deng-led economic reform in the aftermath of the Tiananmen 
Square protests of 1989; as the Chinese people were fed up with ‗corruption and the 
society‘s perceived loss of its moral grounding‘ along with the economic development, 
these dynasty dramas attempted to ‗present exemplary emperors from bygone dynasties 
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and ‗capitalize on the popular yearning for models of strong leadership‘ on Chinese 
television (ibid. p32). According to her, the search for model leaders is rooted in Chinese 
cultural tradition that has been dominated by Confucianism dating back to the second 
century and down to the late Qing Dynasty and the early twentieth century. 
 
Although contemporary Chinese television historical drama shares similar literary 
characteristics with Post-Mao historical fiction, the relationship between the writing of 
history and historical television drama programmes is far from simple. A historical 
television drama is shaped primarily within the categories of television rather than the 
needs of historical knowledge; it is an institutional media phenomenon, which is associated 
with a specific set of regulatory, production, distribution and scheduling practices. In the 
meantime, the writing of history and the production of historical television programmes are 
not completely autonomous activities; according to British film and television scholar 
Colin McArthur (1978), they ‗take their character from the system of production 
relationships in the social formation they inhabit‘ (p15).  
 
Here, the question of social formation is an important one; it reminds us that looking at the 
issues concerning the particular political, social and economic context in which the 
television historical drama exists is central to an understanding of what kind of historical 
interpretation this televised historical genre constructs. For example, the ways of defining 
the television historical drama are diverse, but ‗the historical‘ has become an umbrella term 
in contemporary China, referring to a full range of television dramas connected with the 
treatment of history (mainly pre-modern), explorations of key pre-modern events and 
figures as well as adaptations of classic novels. At the same time, as mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, the use of ‗the historical‘ as a term is highly unstable; ‗serious history‘ 
(zhengshuo lishi) versus ‗popular history‘ (xishuo lishi) remains the most common 
dichotomy made within the Chinese popular press and academia towards this rather broad 
genre of ‗historical television‘.  
 
Chinese media scholars Shengli Li and Jinghong Xiao (2006), for instance, in their book 
Researching into television historical drama, critically examine the distinction between the 
serious and popular historical drama. According to them, this distinction not only concerns 
the extent to which a historical drama is based on historical record; it is also a matter of 
artistic style. They go on to claim that, the serious type mostly refers to normal serious 
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drama in a historically realistic fashion, whereas the popular type always incorporates 
comedian elements. I shall return to this when I analyse the generic characteristics of the 
historical drama later in Chapter 5.  
 
American media scholar Jason Mittell (2004) provides an inspiring cultural genre approach 
to addressing the question of social formation in relation to the tele-history. According to 
Mittell, television genre is ‗a process of categorization‘; it is ‗not found within media texts, 
but operate across the cultural realms of media industries, audiences, policy, critics, and 
historical contexts‘ (ibid. xii). Within traditional genre studies, exploring textual 
assumptions is the key to an understanding of the formation and operation of a given genre; 
an interpretive textual analysis is considered as a primary critical practice in a study of the 
genre. Although a genre is a category of texts operating within a given context, it is the text 
not the category that is treated as the point of departure for traditional genre studies. 
Following Foucault‘s historical model of genealogy, however, Mittell‘s cultural genre 
analysis represents an analytical focus shift. According to Foucault, genealogy is: 
 
a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, 
domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either 
transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness through the 
course of history (Foucault, 1980, p117).  
 
For Mittell, therefore, discursive formations of genres should not be studied through 
‗interpretive readings or deep structural analysis‘; rather, they should be studied ‗in their 
surface manifestations and common articulations‘ (ibid. p13). Meanwhile, the categorical 
rubric, not the textual property of a given genre, should be the primary site and material for 
genre analysis. By re-focusing on the category, not the individual text, Mittell 
reconceptualizes the relationship between a single text and its social context; that is, in my 
understanding, to situate the single text into a larger system of power relations. In this 
system, a given genre is surrounded and characterised by a group of discourses, which 
constitute generic categories; those discourses, as Mittell argues, are ‗the practices that 
define genres and delimit their meanings, not media texts themselves‘ (ibid.). That is to say, 
one has to rely on a grasp of particular generic discourses to make sense of and categorize 
a given genre. Also, if we accept that genres are constituted by generic discourses, we need 
to acknowledge that these discourses are circulating around within larger systems of power 
as well as located within ‗the common process of generic evaluation‘ (ibid. p27). For 
30 
 
Mittell, these larger systems of power can be also understood as systems of ‗cultural 
hierarchies‘ (ibid. p26) or ‗hierarchies of cultural value‘ (ibid. p27). A cultural genre 
analysis is incomplete without taking the value issues into account; the evaluation process 
is, therefore, crucial to an understanding of a given cultural genre.  
 
In my opinion, a re-examination of the value issues in the example of Mittell‘s approach 
also represents two important theoretical moves within international media studies in the 
last decade or so (see Alasuutari 1992; Brunsdon, 1990, 1997; Corner, 1999, 2007a; 
Geraghty, 2003: Gray, 2003, 2008). On the one hand, largely due to the influence of Pierre 
Bourdieu, the tension between the popular and the elite which enjoys a strong tradition 
within media studies has become much eased with an extended consideration of the socio-
political context that produces a given media text. On the other hand, greatly inspired by 
Michel Foucault, instead of looking at it in isolation, media scholars perceive the media as 
a component of power relations. 
 
In his discussion on the new trend of television criticism, Corner (2007a) rightly observes 
this emergence of value judgment; he terms the judgments on television programmes 
themselves as ‗primary judgments‘ and those on ‗the broader culture and politics that the 
programmes evidence and perhaps support‘ as ‗secondary judgments‘ (Corner, 2007a, 
p367). As far as the audience is concerned, Corner points out that he or she ‗might be 
regarded as variously wittingly or unwittingly affiliated to‘ those second judgments within 
a new round of television criticism (ibid.). Corner‘s mention of the audience provides me 
with a useful position on the relationship between television genres and the audience 
response; audiences‘ ‗various witting or unwitting affiliation‘ to the value judgment on a 
particular television genre can be seen as the way(s) that they may contribute to the 
discursive formation of the genre as a cultural category.  
 
From this, it can be seen that Mittell mainly argues for an open rather than a closed 
analytical attitude towards a given television genre and its generic function, whereas 
Corner proposes to bring the value judgment into that analysis; therefore, a juxtaposition of 
Mittell‘s television genre theory and Corner‘s idea of second judgment on television 
programmes would lead to a multi-dimensional analysis on the audience response to 
television genres. Back to my own study, adopting a cultural genre analysis on the 
historical television drama would generate a full range of social, cultural and political 
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discourses; at the same time, it would provide the audience with many more interpretive 
opportunities than could a closed textual approach. As for the existing theories of audience 
activity, it is the task for the next section. 
 
2.4 Changing paradigms in critical Chinese television reception studies 
 
The debate about the historical television drama within the Chinese popular press has 
covered many political and aesthetical issues, but the issue of audience engagement with 
this particular television genre has been largely neglected. American media scholar Robert 
Allen (1985), in his discussion of American soap opera, claims that the study of American 
soap opera had been conditioned within two related supervisory discourses: ‗criticism 
(aesthetic discourses) and sociological research‘ (p10). In China, however, aesthetic 
criticism (see 2.2) serves as the main theoretical discourse for those media scholars who 
study the historical television drama (e.g. Li & Xiao, 2006; Wang, 2008); there are few 
studies that explore the meaning of these dramas from a sociological perspective.  
 
The lack of sociological consideration of television drama in China, as I have noted earlier, 
is due to the very fact that most of the media scholars in China come from a literature 
background and they tend to give much more attention to the textual assumption of 
television drama than its contextual meaning. At the same time, the last twenty years have 
seen a boom in audience research in China‘s media and communications studies. Chinese 
media scholar Baohua Zhou (2006), in an analysis of three major Chinese journalism and 
mass communication journals from 1985 to 2002, reveals that Chinese media scholars have 
begun ‗to use scientific theories and methods to study Chinese audience other than political 
analysis or rhetorical studies‘ (p129); during this period of 18 years, according to him, 
Chinese media scholars to a significant extent inherited ‗structural and behaviorist 
traditions‘ from the American sociology of mass communication to study the Chinese 
audience(e.g. Liu & Meng, 1999; 2007; Womack, 1986), but the important theoretical 
approaches, such as literary criticism, cultural studies, and reception analysis, which are 
commonly used in the field of international media research, are generally absent in Chinese 
journals (ibid.). In order to develop theories of media and communications in an 
increasingly globalized media environment, Zhou suggests that Chinese media scholars 
‗could employ western theories to analyse Chinese audience‘ as well as ‗develop their own 
theories to explain and predict the media use, media effects, and audience understanding of 
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meaning of texts‘ based on ‗China‘s illustrious history and cultural traditions‘ (ibid. p130). 
  
Here, Zhou rightly emphasises two potential theoretical areas that could help in developing 
a better understanding of the Chinese television audience under the current climate of 
globalisation of knowledge. First, as China gains an increasingly significant status within 
global geo-politics, it becomes equally significant for Chinese media studies not only to 
apply a western-originated approach to the study of the Chinese audience, but also to take 
both the global/local or western/China theoretical and epistemological issues into 
consideration in the study.  
 
Second, there is a great need for critical television reception studies to deal with the rapid 
changes taking place in contemporary Chinese culture and society in relation to television 
communication. As I have argued elsewhere (2010), in contemporary Chinese society, any 
kind of social and economic reform is illegitimate unless it is ultimately approved or led by 
the Communist Party of China, even though there may exist disagreement and conflict 
about it among the senior Party officials; the ‗party-state‘ plays a dominant role in 
controlling and mobilizing political, social and economic resources. Pervasive as it is, 
party-state intervention is becoming increasingly complex and tactical in China; this is 
often reflected in the mass communication sphere. I, therefore, propose that it takes much 
empirical effort and critical engagement to study the ambiguities and paradoxes of Chinese 
media in relation to the Chinese state, which is sustained by both socialist legacies and 
neoliberal strategies; that is also where my thesis intends to make some original 
contribution. In the field of Chinese television studies, a critical study of production-
consumption relationship can offer an insight into those ambiguities and paradoxes, as the 
individual has gained more cultural autonomy in the marketplace than before. 
 
When speaking of this, I need to introduce Hong Kong media scholar Eric Ma‘s article 
Rethinking media studies: the case of China (2000) here. The last section of this article 
highlights the possibilities of applying the concept of the active audience to contemporary 
Chinese society. According to Ma, first of all, the Chinese audience at home and abroad 
has learnt the skills of reading between the lines when he or she deals with the censored 
media text under a long-term ideological control; this was proved to be the case during the 
1989 Tiananmen Protest, where many Chinese newspaper readers adopted an oppositional 
reading strategy towards the propagandist message conveyed by the government. Second, 
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the Chinese media‘s commercialization process has endorsed all sorts of active decoding 
practices along with the emergence of the civil society in China. Here, Ma (2000) identifies 
two kinds of discrepancies in terms of how media content is perceived; on the one hand, 
‗the discrepancies between mediated and social discourses‘, and on the other, ‗a 
differentiation between the reading zones in office and at home‘ (p30); that is to say, 
although media content is subordinated to strict censorship by the party-state, the Chinese 
audience knows how to understand and talk about them under different social 
circumstances.  
 
Third, Ma believes that the rise of the Internet society will provide the Chinese audience 
with more freedom of speech in the near future. Nevertheless, based on his observation, 
Ma claims that the Chinese audience shows a more skeptical attitude towards political 
news than entertainment content in the media. Therefore, he questions if popular 
communication will have any political consequence in China; referring back to the ‗benign 
market capitalism thesis‘ discussed in the earlier part of his article, he argues that ‗whether 
the reorientation towards the personal and the domestic of the Chinese media can foster 
political demands for a more participatory polity is a theoretically and politically 
significant issue for further empirical investigation‘ (ibid. p31). 
 
Ma‘s arguments on the application of the theory of the active audience in China surely 
deserve much academic attention, but what he fails to mention in this particular article is 
the fact that the theory itself has been used, contested and renewed in the field of 
international Chinese media studies since it started being circulated as academic discourse; 
the three milestones in the field, as far as I am concerned, include James Lull‘s work China 
Turned On (1991), Anthony Fung and Eric Ma‘s research article Satellite Modernity (2002), 
and Anthony Fung‘s recent studies on fandom and Chinese youth (2009). It needs to be 
pointed out that all of these scholars drew theoretical inspiration from ‗western theories‘, 
but they made great attempts to bring China‘s social and cultural specificities into their 
discussions. In the next part of this section, I shall revisit these three ‗milestones‘ in critical 
Chinese television reception studies as well as three important paradigms of reception 
studies, as each work has more or less built upon a paradigm respectively. The aim of 
concentrating on these paradigms is to provide background knowledge for an up-to-date 
investigation of the Chinese audience-hood using the historical television drama as cultural 
resource. As David Morley (2007) recently argues, in his discussion on the question of 
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intellectual progress, ‗it is always necessary to appreciate the value of previous analytical 
work in the context in which it was produced‘ (p33). 
 
2.4.1 James Lull’s China Turned On and British Cultural Studies in the 1980’s 
 
American media scholar James Lull‘s book China Turned On: Television, Reform and 
Resistance (1991) is an ethnography of culture and communication in contemporary urban 
China. The analysis presented in the book is developed from detailed discussions during 
two phases of the ethnographic research. The first phase was in 1986, when Lull and his 
research partner, Se-Wen Sun had interviewed nearly 100 urban Chinese families 
altogether in four big cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Xi‘an as well as 
television executives. The second phase was in October 1989, four months after the 
Tiananmen Protest; in this phase, from similar contacts to the first phase, they had 
interviewed scholars, students, citizens and broadcasters.  
 
It is worth noting that Lull has captured an interesting historical moment in modern 
Chinese history; it was the time when the Socialist Market Reform was officially adopted 
by the Xiaoping Deng Administration less than a decade ago and also the time when the 
Tiananmen Protests happened. In the preface of the book, Lull makes it clear that it is the 
role of television at this time that he finds fascinating. He says: 
 
I place the role of television within the nation‘s cultural, economic, and political 
development in the communist era and emphasise what has taken place during the 
modernization period, beginning roughly at the start of the last decade [the 1970s], 
when television entered the everyday lives of Chinese family (Lull, 1991, ix). 
 
From this, it can be seen that Lull closely associates the role of television with China‘s 
development as a nation. Thus, he establishes a concrete link between television 
communication and the widely-acknowledged Chinese ‗modernization‘ (xiandaihua) 
movement.  
 
From the perspective of media studies, Lull‘s work is influenced by a corpus of important 
work at the time. First, there is Newcomb and Hirsch‘s article Television as a cultural 
forum (1987), where the two authors argue that television ‗presents a multicity of meanings 
rather than a monolithic dominant view‘ (p62); Lull applies this concept of ‗multiplicity of 
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meanings‘ into an understanding of television encoding practices in China‘s television 
industry. Second, of course, there is Stuart Hall‘s piece Encoding/Decoding (1980), on 
which the whole idea of cultural resistance in the book is based. Third, there is David 
Morley‘s work Family Television (1986); it is used by Lull for a comparative purpose in his 
work. Although the subject of Lull‘s book is on television and Chinese culture and society, 
one could argue that, in terms of theoretical framework, this work still falls into the 
category of British cultural studies in the 1980s; Lull‘s discussion of the active Chinese 
television audience demonstrates an ambiguous ideological critique, which is always 
judged to be a common feature of British Cultural Studies in the 1980s (see Curran 1990). 
Before making any further comment on Lull‘s research findings presented in the book, I 
think it necessary to briefly review the formation of this ambiguous ideological critique. 
 
In his 1987 article on television and ideology, American media scholar Douglas Kellner 
provides his explanation about the relationship between ideology and television 
communication. He proposes that:  
 
We view ideology as a synthesis of concepts, images, theories, stories, and myths 
that can take rational systematic form…or imagistic, symbolic, and mythical form 
(in religion, the cultural industries, etc.) Ideology is often conveyed through images 
(of country and race, class and clan, virginity and chastity, salvation and 
redemption, individual and solidarity). The combination of rational theory with 
images and slogans makes ideology compelling and powerful (Kellner, 1987, p472). 
 
Quite a few British scholars have also made constant contributions to a debate about 
ideology and modern culture from the late 1970s onwards (e.g. Eagleton 1991; Larrain 
1979; Thompson 1984, 1990). However, coming from an English literature background 
and later serving as the spiritual figure within British cultural studies in the 1970s, Stuart 
Hall puts ideology in a less determinate sense. His influential position on ideology in 
relation to the media is well reflected in many of his articles written in the 1970s and early 
1980s, of which Encoding and decoding (1973, 1980) paves a new way to studying 
audience interpretation of television programmes.  
 
In Encoding and decoding, Hall goes against the then widely-accepted social scientific 
approach to the media which was heavily influenced by the American sociology of mass 
communication; he views the production of media output, its transmission, and its 
reception as a model of the social relations of cultural production involving producers, 
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programmes and audiences. According to this model, the meaning of a particular message 
is articulated rather than imposed between the producer and the audience; from encoding to 
decoding is a complex social, cultural and political process rather than a deeply 
deterministic model of powerful media which injects passive media consumers with their 
messages.  
 
In the study of the Chinese audiences‘ response to the prime-time television drama New 
Star (xin xing), Lull finds it useful to employ Hall‘s Decoding model to identify a 
polysemic reading. New Star, a 12-episode series, was aired on China Central Television 
(CCTV) in 1986, and told a story of China‘s ‗socialist reform‘ (shehuizhuyi gaige). The 
protagonist Xiangnan Li, a newly-appointed young male party cadre (ganbu) tries to fight 
against the muddled bureaucracy in a small Northern Chinese city; although this young 
cadre has managed to improve the situation to some extent after much effort, the story ends 
with his being forced to leave his post due to his controversial working style.  
 
According to Lull, there is an interpretive battle going on between the young and old 
audience in the concept of ‗reform‘ represented in the drama text. Lull finds that the young 
audience often compares the situation in China with the realities of the West and Japan; for 
them, ‗reform means a fast and dramatic change‘ (ibid. p123). On the contrary, for the old 
audience, reform should be a gradual and stable modernization process led by the 
government. In some extreme cases, as Lull goes on to claim, some young people even 
‗completely distrust the motives behind China‘s government-sanctioned reform‘ while their 
parents seem to be very supportive of it (ibid.). Based on his interviews, Lull argues that 
oppositional reading exists in the Chinese audience‘s response to television programmes; it 
signifies different social, cultural and political positions.  
 
Although Stuart Hall‘s version of Marxist cultural studies gained wide popularity in both 
Britain and abroad, notably the U.S. and Australia throughout the late 1970s till the mid 
1990s, it also triggered much criticism within British academia during the same period. 
The most prominent criticism came from those who were in favor of the sociology of mass 
communication and political economy (e.g. Garnham 1983; Connell 1978, 1983; Curran 
1990; Murdock & Golding 1977; Philo, 1993; Philo & Miller, 1997; Sparks 1996). These 
media sociologists and political economists point out two general weaknesses of cultural 
studies in a systematic theoretical investigation of ideology. On the one hand, Cultural 
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Studies promoted a decentring of cultural and media research; as British media sociologist 
James Curran (1990) claims, this was due to its Foucauldian legacy that considered power 
as diffused and discursive. On the other hand, Cultural Studies is ambivalent in its analysis 
of a concrete social formation; the major problem here lies in, as Sparks (1996) argues, ‗its 
Althusserian parent‘ that ‗its increasingly baroque structure had less and less internal 
stability‘ (p88).  
 
This internal instability can also be found in Lull‘s discussion of the Chinese audience. As 
previously mentioned, Lull suggests that the Chinese audience adopts a polysemic reading 
of television‘s messages; this was especially the case during the 1989 Tiananmen Protest, 
when the government tried to impose a single meaning or produce only government-
intended effects through government media manipulation (also see Calhoun 1994). Lull 
claims that it is ‗the macrosocial factors‘ that made the Chinese audience interpret 
television messages in a polysemic way; by that, he means ‗the economic, political and 
cultural conditions that impinge upon their [viewers‘] lifeworlds‘ (ibid. p216). Interestingly 
though, Lull also attributes the Chinese audiences‘ interpretive practices to ‗certain basic 
characteristics of Chinese culture and communication‘, most importantly, the Chinese 
language (ibid. p218). He reminds us that, in spoken Chinese, each sound has four tones, 
so the listeners have to be careful in dealing with subtle shifts of stress, and in written 
Chinese, the same character carries different meanings in different linguistic circumstances. 
Therefore, Lull suggests that ‗Chinese language is more ―aesthetic‖ – metaphorical and 
poetic – than it is ―efficient‖, in the purely functional sense of the world‘ (ibid.).  
 
Here, a sense of ambiguity can be felt in Lull‘s argument. This ambiguity, as I argue, is 
generated by his affinity with the cultural studies approach to studying the Chinese 
audiences and their imagination of a modern China; in a cultural sense, Lull identifies a 
public yearning for modernization in urban Chinese society due to the crisis of Communist 
ideology, whereas in a structural sense, he believes that ‗certain basics characteristics of 
Chinese culture‘ still play a crucial role in formulating the audience‘s viewing strategies.  
 
To conclude the introduction to his China Turned On, I would argue that Lull‘s use of the 
Encoding/Decoding Model can be still inspiring for the study of a production-consumption 
relationship in contemporary China. As Hall (1994) later reminds us, the Decoding Model 
was developed ‗in the context of a particular debate with the dominant mass-
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communication models of the time‘ (discussed by Morley, 2007, p33); although it maybe 
has become outmoded in today‘s western democratic countries, where the media is 
becoming personalized and fragmented, the Decoding Model continues to fit well with the 
Chinese context, where the government still occupies the dominant position in supervising 
the media. On the other hand, Lull‘s understanding of the role of television in China‘s 
modernization movement seems reductionist; as the last twenty years have witnessed the 
transformation of Chinese television from the mouthpiece of the state-socialism to that of 
state-capitalism. One might argue that it is the project of Chinese modernity itself that 
James Lull needs to rethink; this also brings us to Anthony Fung and Eric Ma‘s work on 
Satellite modernity. 
 
2.4.2 A revised cultural approach and Anthony Fung and Eric Ma’s Satellite 
modernity 
 
The last three decades saw a heated debate between those scholars of political economy 
and those working in cultural studies within British academic media studies. In the debate, 
the issue at the stake was an intellectual engagement with meaning, value, social structure 
and power. Looking back, this debate has effectively led to an increasing recognition of 
pluralism in British media and cultural studies (e.g. Corner 2001; Garnham 1995; Mosco, 
1996; Morley 2007). It is in this academic climate that, as I would like to term it, a ‗revised‘ 
cultural approach to the media emerges in parallel with a renewal of ideological critique. 
 
This revised cultural approach has two main characteristics. First, it involves a rethinking 
of cultural studies as theoretical and methodological practice. As David Morley (2007) 
recently claimed ‗…it seems, we are back again, if in a more theoretical vein, with the 
question with which I began, concerning the construction of common sense and its 
changing historical limits…‘ (p27). Facing this old question of ‗common sense‘, many 
scholars help reinvent the wheel of cultural studies by reviving its important but neglected 
theoretical heritage (e.g. Abercrombie & Longhurst, 1998; Blackman 2006; Couldry 1999, 
2000,2003; Ellis 2000; Toynbee, 2008). Second, thanks to many Northern European 
scholars for whom there is a strong tradition of political science in communication studies, 
this revised cultural approach introduces popular culture to discussions about the media 
and democracy (e.g. Dahlgren, 1995; Hermes, 2005; Van Zoonen, 2005, 2007). This 
discussion to a great extent, as Couldry (2006b) comments, encourages a closer 
39 
 
investigation of the ‗uncertainties about what constitutes the ―culture‖ (or cultures) of 
citizenship‘ (p321). Within this section, I shall focus on the first characteristic of this 
revised cultural approach, as it is more relevant to the work of the Chinese television 
audience-hood during the same period. 
 
British media scholar John Ellis (2000), in his book Seeing Things: Television in the Age of 
Uncertainty, defines the current era of television broadcasting as the ‗age of plenty and 
uncertainty‘ (a multi-channel broadcast environment, replete with remote controls, time-
shift videos and audience fragmentation). Drawing on from his long-term committed field 
of psychoanalysis (see Coward and Ellis, 1977), Ellis proposes the term ‗working through‘ 
to describe the process where television in the age of uncertainty turns into ‗the material of 
the witnessed world into more narrativized, explained forms‘ (ibid. p78-p79). He situates 
the application of this term into a postmodern condition which is complex, open and 
indefinite. In order not to devalue the overused term ‗postmodernism‘, he refers to a 
relevant definition given by the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (1993). As Ellis observes: 
 
He [Bauman] sees contemporary society since the collapse of Communism as a 
culture that has no alternative to itself. The certainties that went with the divided 
world of the Cold War are no more. This also makes it a culture that has everything 
except dreams; a society with no utopias. Yet at the same time, it is a culture which 
promises that everything will be available, everything can be obtained, all desires can 
find a satisfaction in the market-place (Ellis, 2000, p84). 
 
As I understand it, Ellis‘s notion of ‗working through‘ can be seen as a continuation of an 
exploration of the discourses of mediation from the early 1970s (e.g. Corner, 2001; Martin-
Barbero, 1993; Silverstone, 1993, 1994). According to Silverstone (1994), mediation 
theories are ‗those that privilege the medium itself as the critical site for the construction of 
the audience‘ (p134). Unlike the idea of decoding, which wrestles with a rigid relationship 
between meaning and social structure, the notion of mediation refers to wider social 
processes focused around the media which extends our understanding of media 
consumption to incorporate a broader range of cultural participation.  
 
The last three decades also witnessed Chinese television‘s entry into its own age of plenty 
and uncertainty. Since 1978, China has been gradually integrating into the world market 
due to its adoption of an Open-up Policy advocated by Xiaoping Deng. The actual 
outcomes of the policy lie at both the regional and global level. Regionally, the policy gave 
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a great push to the rise of the ‗Greater China‘ area (linking mainland China, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and the South-East Asian Chinese diaspora), which has become the fifth major area 
of intra-regional trade in the twenty-first century. Globally, with its accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2002, China became committed to an international business 
exchange. As a result of all that, the landscape of Chinese television is changing. On the 
one hand, foreign television programmes and formats, mainly from the U.S., Japan and 
South Korea, are imported into the country on a frequent basis. On the other hand, 
collaboration in television production has become common in mainland China, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and even Singapore.  
 
Scholars of Chinese as well as East Asian media studies have made much effort to engage 
with these changes (e.g. Chua, 2004; Curtin, 2005, 2007; Dirlik; 2005; Fung & Ma, 2002; 
Keane, 2003; Keane, Fung & Moran, 2007b; Kim, 2009; Leung, 2008; Lim, 2008; Sinclair 
& Harrison, 2004; Tay, 2009; Thomas, 2004; Weber, 2003). This corpus of work, 
especially that on mainland Chinese media, in my opinion, is characterised as a theoretical 
formulation with mixed socio-cultural imaginaries including post-socialism, nationalism, 
trans-nationalism and globalism. When it comes to audience research in particular, Hong 
Kong media scholars Anthony Fung and Eric Ma‘s work (2002) deserves special attention. 
 
Before I discuss Fung and Ma‘s work, it has to be mentioned that US-based historian 
Benedict Anderson‘s path-breaking work Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism (1983) became a key reference for media and cultural 
scholars on China in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Anderson‘s work is based on the idea 
that nationalism is less of a political ideology and more of a cultural system that gives rise 
to an imagined community. According to him, the sense of ‗nation-ness‘ is historically 
enabled by the development of print technologies. Although he paves a new way to 
analyzing the problematic of nationalism as a cultural system, Anderson fails to address the 
particular ways that nations have been imagined.  
 
In her critique of Anderson‘s approach to studying Chinese nationalism in the era of 
popular culture, American anthropologist Lisa Rofel (1994) argues that ‗his (Anderson‘s) 
theory can explain the origin of imagined communities but not plots, climaxes, or 
denouement‘ (p701). She goes on to claim that a simple description of the administrative 
structure of the party-state China is inadequate for an understanding of how official power 
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works in the post-Mao era. Rather, she suggests we need to take a close look at how state 
power in China operates, not merely through its institutions, but ‗through the way the state 
creates itself as an imagined entity‘ (ibid. p704). 
 
Going beyond a geographically constrained state level, Fung and Ma‘s work extends 
Anderson‘s thesis of imagined community to study a televisual imagination of the ‗satellite 
community‘ of Chinese modernity; they critically examine a phenomenon of trans-border 
television communication between Hong Kong and mainland China. As they realize, 
although ‗impacts on mainland China by the Hong Kong media have been studied on 
institutional, reception, and contextual levels‘, the conclusions remain quite general (2002a: 
68). However, the fact that Hong Kong is a liberal capitalist society as a result of long-term 
British rule, whereas mainland China is still governed by an authoritarian government 
offers them an opportunity to interrogate the issues concerning the modernity project of 
post-socialist China.  
 
Fung and Ma identify a question of, what they term, ‗television colonization‘ in mainland 
China‘s coastal regions near Hong Kong, of which Guangzhou, the capital city of 
Guangdong Province in southern China is a perfect example; since the early 1990s, the 
television audiences in Guangzhou have been regularly watching ‗Hong Kong TV 
programmes which have ―spilled over‖ across the border‘ through satellite transmission 
(ibid. p69). Compared to mainland Chinese television programmes, Hong Kong television 
programmes, especially popular television dramas tend to be more entertaining and free of 
political messages. The local Guangzhou residents, therefore, have established a pattern of 
‗watching Hong Kong television only‘ throughout the years. Facing this phenomenon of 
television colonization and drawing on Appadurai (1996), Fung and Ma argue that ‗the 
Hong Kong mediascape is superimposed on the socioscape of Guangzhou‘ (ibid.); it is 
against this backdrop that they decide to look at the televisual imagination of the 
Guangzhou television audience who watch Hong Kong television programmes regularly. 
 
In their research, they find ‗four modes of imaginative configurations‘ through 15 case 
studies. First, there is a pragmatic mode; this mode is reflected in an example of a young 
male salesman who works in a shopping mall, watches more than three hours of Hong 
Kong television everyday and earns the lowest income amongst all their respondents. As 
Fung and Ma explain, ‗in the pragmatic mode, the imaginative configuration domesticates 
42 
 
the Hong Kong mediascape within realist social routines‘ (ibid. p79). That is to say, this 
young salesman does not necessarily perceive his favourite characters on Hong Kong 
television dramas as ‗modern‘; rather, he regards them as ‗serious, motivated and living in 
a casual lifestyle‘ (ibid.). The second one is a modernized mode. A typical person within 
this category is a sales manager in his thirties, who is single, lives alone, watches one and a 
half hours of television everyday and earns the highest salary amongst all the respondents. 
In this mode, ‗imaginative configuration lies in the overlaps between a concrete experience 
of modern city life in Guangzhou and similar experiences as represented in the Hong Kong 
mediascape‘ (ibid.).  
 
Third, there is a conspicuous mode, which refers to an aspiration to a consumerist and 
modernized life. Fung and Ma identify this mode from a female owner of a beauty salon, 
who is in her late twenties, watches three and a half hours of television everyday and earns 
the second highest income in their study; according to them, this type of person uses the 
Hong Kong mediascape as ‗a reference frame‘ and then attempts to ‗move forward and 
keep line with the aspiration embodied‘ in it in the reality (ibid. p73). The last one is a 
vicarious mode. The respondents within this category are represented by a clerk in her late 
twenties, who watches three and a half hours of television every day, earns the second 
lowest income bracket in the study and prefers watching local television programmes 
‗because they are more familiar and contextual‘ (ibid. p74); these respondents, for Fung 
and Ma, are quite aware of their different experiences of fictional and everyday worlds, but 
they still pursue much escapism and pleasure in watching Hong Kong television.  
 
Based on these four modes of imaginative configurations, Fung and Ma point out that ‗a 
postmodern implosion‘ exists in the project of Chinese modernity (ibid. p77); in the case of 
Guangzhou, it cannot be simply argued that Guangzhou is less modern than Hong Kong 
for its residents, as there is an unevenness between their televisual imagination of 
modernity. This ‗unevenness‘, as Fung and Ma argue, is ‗of course exacerbated by the 
actual pace of economic development; by welfare collapse, and by daily financial 
disappointments‘ (ibid. p77). Fung and Ma‘s work seems to fit well with Bauman‘s 
discussion of contemporary society since the collapse of Communism as I have quoted 
above; one might argue that it marks a postmodern turn in the study of the Chinese 
television audience. More importantly, it brings to the fore both the questions of Chinese 
nationalism and modernity in the study. Compared with the Encoding/Decoding model, 
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their research treats the individual as ‗the point at which a multitude of shifting social and 
cultural determinations converge‘ (Jordin & Brunt, 1988, p234) rather than a social atom 
divorced from its social context.  
 
2.4.3 The theories of cultural citizenship and Anthony Fung’s fandom and youth 
studies 
 
As previously mentioned, the revised cultural approach also brought the issues of popular 
culture to a discussion about the media and democracy in Anglo-American and Nordic 
media studies. The scholarship within this cultural approach to television communication is 
interested in formal political processes and their relationship to popular television culture 
(e.g. Butsch, 2008; Corner & Richardson, 2008; Dahlgren 1995; Hermes, 1995, 2005; 
Marcus, 2002; Miller, 1993, 2007; Schroder & Philips 2007; Van Zoonen, 2005, 2007). 
This, according to John Corner (2008), also demonstrates that the study of politics has 
extended its reach to acknowledge the constitutive power of ‗political culture‘. As he 
continues to define, political culture as a term suggests ‗a broader context within which 
political structures develop and operate and formal political processes happen‘ (ibid. p387). 
The recognition of political culture in the study of politics provides much possibility of 
studying the cultural mechanism of political operation.  
 
The scholars of television involved in this area point to two main research directions. First, 
there is a continuing urge for the study of ‗democratic mediations‘ (Dahlgren 1995). 
According to Dahlgren, it is essential to focus attention on the public sphere, but ‗it is also 
imperative that efforts at enhancing democracy – from micro-situation to macrosocial 
structures – incorporate a public sphere perspective‘ (ibid. p147). Dahlgren claims that 
television as a sociocultural experience that provides symbolic ‗raw materials‘ may evoke 
viewers‘ ‗democratic imaginary‘, although this kind of imaginary is mediated and 
constrained ‗in present historical circumstances‘ (ibid. p148-p155). Second, in a bit less 
ambitious way, Corner meticulously adopts his mediation analysis in his famous ‗public 
knowledge and popular culture‘ project.8 Within the public knowledge project, television 
programmes, no matter whether they are factual or fictional or sources of information or 
entertainment, can be perceived as forms of public knowledge. Furthermore, the audience‘s 
                                                        
8 For a thorough knowledge about this long term project, see Corner‘s work in 1991, 1995, 2008 and 2009. 
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interpretation and its social determinants are connected with how the programmes function 
to organize and disseminate public knowledge. 
  
For British media scholar Nick Couldry, these theoretical moves therefore generate a new 
paradigm for television studies, a paradigm of studying television and cultural citizenship 
(1999, 2003, 2004, 2006). Couldry‘s own book Media Rituals: A Critical Approach (2003) 
serves as a pioneer in the formation of this paradigm. In the book, he launches a careful 
critique of the neo-Durkheimian type of functionalism notably represented in Dayan and 
Katz‘s work on broadcasting events (1992); he puts forward a crucial assertion that, as 
Buonanno (2008) summarises, ‗shared values emanating from the ―core‖ of society find 
elements in televisual events that have…a ―coagulating‖ effect, in that they keep the 
diverse and disunited parts of society together‘ (p46). Nevertheless, as Couldry himself 
argues, media rituals are not something universal; they are social forms ‗which legitimate a 
fact that about the current organization of mediation, in most parts of the world, that is 
contingent, not necessary‘ (ibid. p135). The current organization of mediation, as he goes 
on to remind us, is ‗the intense concentration of society‘s symbolic resources in centralized 
institutions that we call ―the media‖‘ (ibid.). Compared to Ellis‘s rather philosophical 
approach, Couldry‘s mediation analysis reintroduces a sociological perspective to Cultural 
Studies. What he attempts to do is to provide a missing link between the cultural and the 
social by reexamining the symbolic dimension of social life. 
  
When it comes to the study of television entertainment and cultural citizenship in particular, 
the Dutch media scholars Joke Hermes and Liesbet van Zoonen‘s work deserves special 
introduction here. Their contribution comes from a critical examination of television 
entertainment and its political value. This ‗critical‘ examination entails a postmodern move 
beyond many dichotomies: men-women, emotional-rational, personal-political, 
entertainment-information, and so on.  
 
Hermes (2005), in her book Re-reading Popular Culture, treats popular culture as both a 
modern and postmodern genealogy. In the book, she argues for a new understanding of 
popular culture, that is, an understanding of how ‗politics and pleasure are both articulated 
at the level of everyday life and are reciprocally involved in how we constitute ourselves in 
relation to society‘ (ibid. p152). Therefore, watching television, as she argues, involves ‗a 
process of comparison and evaluation that is helped and inspired by popular media texts‘ 
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(ibid. p12). This process reflects on a sense of bonding and community building, which is 
by no means directly a political voice. In her recent study of audience reactions to the 
Dutch multicultural reality show WestSide, she and her colleague (Müller & Hermes 2010) 
provide a working definition for the term cultural citizenship. According to them,  
 
Cultural citizenship, like all other forms of citizenship, is constituted by a process of 
continuous performance rather than a set of abstract legal rules. The performance of 
cultural citizenship can be defined as the struggle over the norms, practices, 
meanings, and identities through which groups and individuals are socially included 
and excluded in society. In short, it involves the negotiation of the role of cultural 
difference in everyday life. (Müller & Hermes, 2010, p194)  
 
Similarly, van Zoonen, who is influenced by Weberian political philosophy as well as 
deeply committed to an academic position of political communication, considers popular 
culture as a resource for ‗political citizenship‘. In her 2005 work Entertaining the Citizen: 
When Politics and Popular Culture Converge, she provides a systematic discussion on the 
role of television in political communication. Through an online forum study of American 
audience‘s reaction to political dramas like Mr. Smith, Dave or The West Wing, van Zoonen 
finds that ‗people seem to apply the same frames to make sense of fictional and true 
politics‘ (ibid. p137). These ‗frames‘ including description, realism, judgment, reflection 
and utopia, according to her, cannot be seen as the ways that people understand and 
evaluate concrete political issues, but they provide opportunities for people to ‗sharpen 
their overall angle on politics and express an overall sense of utopia‘ (ibid. p139). Thus, 
she argues that popular culture is a resource for ‗political citizenship‘; it produces 
‗comprehension and respect for popular political voices that allow for more people to 
perform as citizens…in other words, a resource that can entertain the citizen‘ (ibid. p151). 
 
In the international field of Chinese media and cultural studies, some academic effort has 
also been made to address the question of cultural citizenship in contemporary Chinese 
context (e.g. Chu, 2007; Fong, 2006; 2007; Keane 2001b, 2007; Yu, 2006, 2009).  For 
example, Michael Keane (2001b), in his article Redefining Chinese citizenship, rightly 
observes that the nature of Chinese citizenship has undergone a fundamental change in the 
past two decades. Although the concept of citizen still intends to modify social conduct to 
the Chinese socialist spiritual civilization template, contemporary citizenship and civic 
awareness in China need to be, as Keane (2001) points out, ‗contextualized within the twin 




When it comes to Chinese television studies, a large proportion of debate on television and 
cultural citizenship studies has yet to be formulated; this, in my opinion, has to be referred 
back to the debate between Jing Wang and Michael Keane in the application of the 
Foucauldian theories into the Chinese context, where the state apparatus remains the 
ultimate power in cultural production. However, the recent years saw a boom in the study 
of youth culture and fandom in Chinese media and communication research (e.g. Chang, 
2007; Fung, 2003, 2009); these scholars have made great critical efforts to analyse the 
liberal values and public discourses generated by the rise of popular culture and 
consumerism. Anthony Fung is undoubtedly the most active scholar in writing on this topic. 
Here, I shall discuss his two recent journal articles dealing with two Chinese popular 
cultural icons respectively.  
 
The first article Fandom, youth and consumption in China (2009a) is based on Fung‘s 
ethnographic study of youth culture and fandom in China in the case of the most popular 
Taiwanese singer, Jay Chou. Inspired by Maurizo Lazzarato‘s distinction of material and 
immaterial labour (1996), Fung (2009a) aims to critically examine the interaction between 
Chou and his fans that is reflected in the process of ‗youth labour, performativity and 
culture in China, as well as their current challenges to the state‘ (p286). Fung and his 
research team conducted the ethnographic study of the fandom activities of Jay Chou 
between 2003 and 2005 in different cities in China; they interviewed media disc jockeys, 
Chou‘s concert promotion teams and the managing director and executive of his music 
label. Also, they participated in the fan club and its activities.  
 
In conclusion, Fung presents two interesting findings. First, he argues that ‗fandom – a 
spontaneous, ―bottom-up‖ populism – has replaced politics already as the centre for values 
and lifestyles‘ (ibid. p300); as Fung realizes, the party-organs like the Communist Youth 
League (gongqingtuan) have lost control of Chinese young people and the young fans have 
the potential to constitute ‗a civic space to challenge authoritarian rule‘ (ibid.). Second, the 
performativity of the young fans is mostly cultural but also can be political; it, according to 
Fung, has proved a powerful social force that fastens the speed of social reform. 
  
Within the other article Faye and the fandom of a Chinese diva (2009b), Fung concentrates 
on the issue of a middle-class female fandom; using ethnographic methods and in-depth 
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interviews over a six-year period, he intends to explore the fans of Chinese Cantopop diva 
Faye Wong. Influenced by Bourdieu‘s work Distinction (1984), Fung (2009b) defines Faye 
Wong‘s culturally uncompromising performativity as a kind of cultural capital; it is by 
appropriating Faye‘s persona and engaging ‗in independent trajectories and various 
struggles against existing cultural norms and gendered family values‘ that Faye‘s fans 
create a middle-class femininity (p252). Differently from the first article, this one 
addresses the question of fandom from the perspective of gender politics; it reminds us that 
fandom activities offer opportunities to investigate the process of social differentiation by 
looking at a particular social group, being it the youth or the middle-class female. 
  
Having discussed Fung‘s fandom studies, I think it is worth introducing US-based 
Canadian media scholar Jonathan Gray‘s renewed fandom studies. In his work on the 
viewers of The Simpsons (2003), Gray rightly observes that many of the anti-fans and non-
fans can also provide a lengthy and impressive in-depth analysis of the cartoon. He 
proposes that ‗we must look to anti-fans and non-fans as well, and study how the text 
changes as it meets different audiences and viewing environments‘ (ibid. p79). He goes on 
to argue that this way should lie the future of audience research. In his recent work 
Television Entertainment (2008), Gray relates the study of fans, anti-fans and non-fans 
with that of many basic structuring principles of modernity. These principles, according to 
him, include ‗how we create identity, how we relate to each other, why we watch so much 
television entertainment, how we envision a better society, and so forth‘ (ibid. p49). It can 
be seen that, instead of framing fandom/non-fandom activities by using postmodern or 
aesthetic discourse, Gray positions them in a central role in the creation of social realities. 
As he states towards the end of the book, it is ‗the nature of those realities, their ideological 
underpinnings, and their inclusion or exclusion of a broad public in turn‘ that ‗either grant 
or deny citizenship‘ (ibid. p155). 
 
 Although both of the scholars deal with fandom activities, what they are concerned with 
through their own research remains different. Anthony Fung highlights the political values 
surrounding China‘s fandom activities. In the case of the singer Jay Chou, he suggests that 
a ‗spontaneous, bottom-up‘ populism is generated by fan culture, which can replace 
existing party-organs for liberal values and styles, whereas in the case of Faye Wong, he 
shifts his attention to gender politics, which, as he argues, can help to shape a middle-class 
femininity. Differently from Fung‘s explicit political critique, Gray‘s fandom studies rely 
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on ‗the basic structure principles of modernity‘, based on which our sense of social 
realities are constructed; Gray believes that it is the nature of those realities that matters the 
citizenship. In comparison, I come to realize that the treatment of ‗the political‘ 
differentiates the work by Fung from that by Gray. Fung still feels urged to endorse a 
radical populism with a view to fight against the authoritarian state power. As a Western 
scholar, however, Gray goes beyond a political critique and moves to question the 
changing nature of western modernity instead.  
 
2.5 Concluding remarks: towards the relationship between the historical and the 
post-socialist Chinese audience-hood 
 
To conclude, I would suggest that the relationship between the historical as a cultural 
category and the post-socialist Chinese audience-hood should be the key area of 
investigation for this thesis.  As has been introduced previously, a wave of post-socialist 
television criticism has emerged in the practice of theorizing the nature of contemporary 
Chinese television. The transformation of ideological control is identified in the field of 
Chinese television studies; the rise of market forces has reconfigured the Party-state power 
that has impinged on television production. At the same time, the study of Chinese 
television‘s audience-hood since the 1980s has been an academic effort to reposition 
Chinese audience-hood in China‘s post-socialist social and cultural context. For example, 
Anthony Fung‘s fandom and youth studies have pushed the political values of audience 
activity into a new stage; he considers fandom activities as alternative political actions 
against China‘s mainstream authoritarian politics.  
 
It is under this background of ideological transformation of Chinese television that the 
historical drama has been produced and consumed. What is more, due to the 
commercialization and transnationalization of Chinese television production, the use of 
‗the historical‘ as a term has become highly unstable here; ‗serious history‘ versus ‗popular 
history‘ remains the most common dichotomy made within the Chinese television industry 
and academia towards this rather broad genre of ‗historical TV‘. I therefore argue that an 
empirical investigation into how Chinese audiences unpack this increasingly complicated 
cultural category of ‗the historical‘ will generate thoughts on how new forms of 





Having said that, I shall move on to closely examine contemporary China‘s social, political 



































The rise of ‘new historical drama’ on contemporary Chinese Television 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Having discussed the theoretical framework for the whole thesis, I now move on to look at 
the contextual issues concerning the rise of the ‗new historical television drama‘. My 
rationale of addressing the ‗contextual‘ question within this chapter is formulated under 
two major analytical influences. First, as previously mentioned, historical television 
programmes, according to McArthur (1978), ‗take their character from the system of 
production relationships in the social formation they inhabit‘ (p15). That is to say, for a 
production study of any historical television programme, one needs to situate the question 
of production within a specific social formation process; this process is characterised as a 
series of interconnections, contradictions as well as negotiations taking place among all the 
parties involved for an actual production.  
 
The second analytical influence comes from Jostein Gripsrud‘s work The Dynasty Years: 
Hollywood Television and Critical Media Studies (1995). In his comprehensive 
investigation into the then popular American television soap Dynasty in Norway, Gripsrud, 
from the beginning, considers the programme 'as a complex media phenomenon, 
comprising both its origins in the US, its text, and its public and domestic reception in 
Norway‘ and aims at ‗reaching a historical understanding‘ of the phenomenon (ibid. p2). 
By ‗a historical understanding‘, Gripsrud defines the production and reception of Dynasty 
as part of cultural history that involves ‗more general socio-cultural forces at play in the 
ongoing shaping of our lives and life worlds‘ (ibid.). 
 
Those two analytical influences combined provide me with an insight into the contextuality 
of the rise of the historical drama on contemporary Chinese television since the mid-1990s; 
it has to be conceptualized at two levels. On the one hand, it is crucial to examine three 
prominent cultural and aesthetical movements that have taken place in contemporary 
China‘s governmental-ideological, literary and television media spheres respectively, 
following upon which the new historical drama emerged; they include the wave of 
enthusiasm for traditional culture ‗fever‘ (chuantong wenhua re), the rise of the new 
historical novel (xin lishi xiaoshuo) and the popularity of anti-corruption television drama 
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(fan tanwu dianshiju). On the other hand, one needs to critically understand those 
movements against the background of past/present, traditional/modern, and local/global; 
this goal is to be achieved through a hermeneutic approach, by which I mean 
contextualizing a full range of relevant factors into a wider social-historical formation 
process.  
 
This chapter therefore consists of three independent sections where each section deals with 
one of the movements; these movements also cover three main areas of the transformation 
of contemporary Chinese popular culture. The first section introduces the wave of 
traditional culture ‗fever‘ in China first instigated by overseas Chinese intellectuals, 
notably the Harvard scholar Wei-ming Tu, and then overseen and promoted by Chinese 
government. In this case, historical drama as a whole television genre often performs a 
controversial ideological function in ‗building a harmonious society‘ as advocated by the 
current Hu-Wen Administration. The second section focuses on literary transformation by 
revisiting the rise of the new historical novel; it uses Chinese historical novelist Er Yuehe 
and his well-known Qing emperor trilogy which was turned into several successful 
historical television dramas, as an example to illustrate this transformation. By tracing the 
development of historical television drama that deals with anti-corruption initiatives, the 
third section discusses the transformation of contemporary Chinese television content. In 
this respect, it has been widely acknowledged that the hybridisation of social criticism and 
historical realism has contributed to the particular dramatic style of historical drama in 
China (e.g. Li & Xiao, 2006; Yin, 2002). It is against the backdrop of this cultural 
transformation that historical drama has changed into its current manifestation on 
contemporary Chinese television. Next, I shall move on to the first section. 
 
3.2 The governmental-ideological sphere: the rise of traditional culture ‘fever’   
 
As previously mentioned, the popularity of the television historical dramas should be 
considered as a revival of Confucianism. Over the last two decades, many Chinese cultural 
scholars in China and abroad have pointed out that Confucianism owed its revival to the 
intellectual and general public‘s responses to the great changes taking place in 
contemporary Chinese society and culture (e.g. Bell, 2008; Liu, 2004; Wang, 1996; Zhang, 
2008).  It is therefore worth taking a close look at this revival of Confucianism and its 




The end of the Cold War not only greatly eased the political and military stand-off between 
China and the western world; it also witnessed increasing Chinese-related human, cultural 
and economic mobility at both regional and transnational levels. China, as one of the 
longest continuous civilizations, re-emerged into the international community after nearly a 
century of impotence, frustration and humiliation. In response to China‘s changing 
situation, Wei-ming Tu, then Professor of Chinese history and philosophy at Harvard 
University, published a famous and influential essay entitled Cultural China: the Periphery 
as the Centre in 1991.  
 
In the essay, Tu ambitiously uses the concept of cultural China (wenhua zhongguo), which, 
according to him, was coined in intellectual journals outside the mainland in the 1980s as 
opposed to the concept of geopolitical China based on size and sphere of influence that 
was over-emphasised during the period of the Cold War to evaluate the future global 
impact of Chinese culture. ‗The meaning of being Chinese‘ is the key question that Tu 
attempts to interrogate in the essay. He starts out by pointing out that ‗the meaning of being 
Chinese is intertwined with China as a geographical concept and Chinese culture as a 
living reality‘ (Tu, 1991, p1) and proposes a ‗thinking and reflective‘ way of being Chinese 
in ‗an increasingly alienating and dehumanizing world‘ (ibid. p2). By critically examining 
China‘s modernization process from the late twentieth century, Tu challenges the notion of 
comprehensive westernization as a precondition for China‘s modernization process. Also, 
leaving out the impact of mainland China, Tu positively discusses the remarkable 
economic achievements of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole where Chinese diasporic 
populations have always played an important role.  
 
In a major academic contribution, Tu suggests three symbolic universes of cultural China; 
the first is comprised of mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, ‗the societies 
populated predominantly by cultural and ethnic Chinese‘, the second is ‗Chinese 
communities throughout the world‘, and the third ‗consists of individuals, such as scholars, 
teachers, journalists, industralists, traders, entrepreneurs, and writers who try to understand 
China intellectually and bring their conceptions of China to their own linguistic 
communities‘ (ibid. p12-p13). It is worth noting that, throughout the whole essay, Tu uses 
the concept of cultural China in an anthropological and ethical sense. What is more, 
although he mentions the influence of Confucian tradition on cultural China, Tu by no 
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means treats Confucianism as a set of fixed political principles that guide all Chinese 
societies. As He argues towards the end of the essay, ‗the meaning of being Chinese is 
basically not a political question; it is a human concern pregnant with ethical-religious 
implications‘ (ibid. p28). 
 
As it came out two years after the Tiananmen Protests, Tu‘s essay made an immediate 
impact on Chinese intellectuals both inside and outside China. It provided them with an 
opportunity to recover from the painful memory of the Protests and rethink Chinese culture 
in a globalizing world. At the same time, although manifested in different ways in different 
popular cultural forms, ‗traditional Chinese culture‘ (chuantong zhongguo wenhua) as a 
corpus of historical and symbolic resources began to be constantly used and appropriated 
by China‘s media practitioners for the purpose of critical self-reflection. Within the 
Chinese public realm, this obsession with traditional Chinese culture is often labeled as 
‗the fever of national studies‘ (guo xue re). ‗National studies‘ here refers to a learning of 
classic ancient Chinese philosophical works. The word ‗fever‘ suggests that an interesting 
psychological dimension is embedded in this cultural phenomenon. However, China‘s 
political landscape in the post-Tiananmen era, which was more controlled and focused on 
maintaining power for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), effectively turned this ‗fever‘ 
of national studies into a political manifesto for sage leadership (see Zhu 2008). More 
importantly, Chinese government started to act as both the initiator and the negotiator 
during this process by exerting its authoritarian power in determining cultural policy. 
 
The most prominent change within China‘s political landscape in the post-Tiananmen era 
has been the revival of Confucianism. The tragedy and controversy of the Tiananmen 
Protests resulted in the Chinese public‘s great distrust in Chinese government. Unlike the 
Maoist period, where the Party-state ideologies forcefully served as the moral standard in 
the public realm, the post-Tiananmen era witnessed the crisis of the Communist ideologies 
in ordinary people‘s lives. In the last two decades, this moral crisis has been solved in some 
cases by other belief systems and ideologies such as Christianity, Falun Gong and popular 
nationalism of all kinds. But, as Daniel Bell, a Canadian born professor of political 
philosophy at China‘s Tsinghua University rightly observes, Chinese government worries 
that such moral alternatives ‗threaten the hard-won peace and stability that underpins the 
country‘s development, so it has encouraged the revival of China‘s most venerable political 




Zemin Jiang, the former Chinese President, for example, took a series of unprecedented 
actions to endorse the rise of new Confucianism. By so doing, Jiang attempted to advocate 
a central leadership with Confucian moral principles and thus maintain the legitimacy of 
the CCP‘s rule. Under Jiang‘s Administration, for example, the China Millennium 
Monument (zhonghua shiji tan) was set up in Beijing in 2000 to celebrate the coming of a 
new millennium. This grand monument combines the spirit of traditional Chinese culture 
with modern architectural art and integrates architecture, landscaping, sculpture, mural 
painting, and various other art forms. It stands along a north-south axis in the Capital City, 
occupying an area of 4.5 hectares and a total floor space of about 42,000 square metres. 
Furthermore, Jiang himself launched a large-scale research project on the history of the 
Qing dynasty at Renmin University (or the People‘s University) in Beijing, one of China‘s 
top universities in Humanities and Social Sciences. The Qing dynasty was the last Chinese 
feudal empire, so it is always considered a crucial period for a critical examination of 
traditional Chinese culture. I shall return to this when discussing the historical novel and 
the Qing dynasty later.  
 
After Jintao Hu, the current Chinese President, came into office in 2002, new 
Confucianism, as a state ideology, was pushed to a higher level. Along with the Prime 
Minister Jiabao Wen, Hu advocates that the building of ‗a socialist harmonious society‘ 
should be the new leitmotiv for Chinese society. According to the Hu-Wen Administration, 
as the most important principle of Confucianism, harmony should be implemented and 
mobilized by China‘s major cultural and educational institutions. At this point, I want to 
further explain the social background for the Hu-Wen Administration‘s calling for this 
harmony.  
 
The collapse of Maoist ideologies in China marked the end of crude domestic class 
struggles as well as the beginning of an era of so-called ‗socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics‘ (you zhongguo tese de shichangjingji). By ‗Chinese 
characteristics‘, briefly speaking, it means that although the market-based mechanism was 
introduced to China‘s economic system, the Party-state still plays a dominant role in 
controlling and mobilizing political, social and economic resources. However, as economic 
growth continued under this one-party authoritarian rule, rampant political corruption 
became a pressing issue in Chinese society. Concerns about corruption were also behind 
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the outbreak of student protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Calls for stricter anti-
corruption (fan fubai) measures, among others, was the most important appeal from the 
protesters. The Tiananmen Protest was notoriously put down by the CCP in the end, but 
political corruption remains a challenge to the legitimacy of CCP rule. It is at this historical 
point that a school of thought labeled as ‗the New Left‘ (xin zuo pai) began to take shape in 
the mid-to-late 1990s within the Chinese intelligentsia.  
 
As the US-based Chinese media scholar Ying Zhu notes (2008b), China‘s intellectual 
journal The Scholar (xue ren) which calls for independent critical thinking provided the 
forum for the formation of the New Left in late 1991. Chinese literary scholar Hui Wang, 
one of the journal editors, later became known as the leading figure of the New Left. 
According to Wang, the western version of liberal democracy is not necessarily the only 
route for societal progress; he maintains that ‗instead China can find a way to modernize 
itself that avoids the pitfalls of capitalist society modeled on the West‘ (cited by Zhu, 
2008b, p25). Wang and his colleagues, notably the political scientist Zhiyuan Cui who 
trained at the University of Chicago in the US and is currently based in China‘s Tsinghua 
University, argues for a strong central government with the aim of turning contemporary 
China into a welfare society.  
 
Therefore, the New Left brings to the fore the issue of moral and responsible central 
leadership into discussions about contemporary Chinese politics. Faced with the legitimacy 
crisis of the CCP due to political corruption, China‘s President Jintao Hu is said to have 
accepted ‗the New Left‘s politically reserved diagnosis‘ and welcome their call for 
‗shifting the State‘s economic focus from fast growth towards more balanced development‘ 
(ibid. p36). At the same time, it was under the influence of the New Left that Jintao Hu, as 
Ying Zhu observes, ‗initiated a new round of campaigning against corruption‘ after he 
came to power in 2002 (ibid.). I shall not go into any detail about this campaign itself, but 
it needs to be pointed out that the rise of the anti-corruption television drama was triggered 
by the intensified campaign against corruption.  
 
At the opening ceremony of the 8
th
 Congress of China Federation of Literary and Art 
Circles (CFLAC) and the 7
th
 Congress of the Chinese Writers Association (CWS) in 
November 2006, Hu urged Chinese artists and writers to devote themselves to promoting 
‗cultural harmony‘. Under this political climate, China‘s cultural industries including 
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printing and television were certainly expected to play their usual roles in support of the 
state‘s propagandist purposes. However, unlike the Maoist period, they have also 
experienced a privatization and commercialization process. The next two sections will 
address how the literature and television industries gave a push to the rise of the new 
historical drama in changing political, cultural and economic circumstances.     
 
3.3 The literary sphere: the emergence of new historical novel 
 
As previously discussed in the literature review, one of the most remarkable recent literary 
phenomena in Post-Mao China has been the resurgence of historical fiction (see Wang 
1992). Moreover, one of the tendencies in this new wave of historical interpretation can be 
found within a series of novels dealing with political events during the late Qing period, 
which is notable because it allows for an interrogation of all the aspects of China‘s last 
feudal society and thus offers a particular representation of Chinese identity and 
nationalism. For example, The Boxer (yi he quan), a historical fiction written by the well-
known novelist Jicai Feng and his co-author Dingxing Li in 1977, is often regarded as the 
earliest one of the series (also see Wang 1992). This fiction is based on the Boxer 
Rebellion Movement9 that took place in northern China between 1898 and 1901. Instead of 
repeating the over-cited official version of the event, Feng and Li drew inspiration in 
writing the novel from an oral history report released by the Department of History at 
China‘s Nankai University as well as their personal investigations conducted in the old 
quarter of the City of Tianjin in northern China where the Movement was born.  
 
In his recent interview (XinhuaNet 2010) talking about the novel, Feng comments that the 
message that got conveyed through the novel was that ordinary people were the heroes in 
fighting against feudalism and imperialism. The novel therefore seemed at first sight to 
more or less fall rather neatly into the official Marxist philosophy of historical materialism 
at the time. However, as he adds, the novel attempts to tell the story of the Movement 
                                                        
9 The Boxer Rebellion, also called ‗The Boxer Uprising‘ or ‗the Righteous Harmony Society Movement‘ by some 
historians, was a proto-nationalist movement by the ‗Righteous Harmony Society‘ or ‗Righteous Fists of Harmony‘ or 
‗Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists‘ (known as ‗Boxers‘ in English) opposing Western imperialism and 
Christianity. The uprising took place in response to European ‗spheres of influence‘ in China, with grievances ranging 
from opium traders, political invasion, economic manipulation, to missionary evangelism. In China, popular sentiment 
remained resistant to Western influences, and anger rose over the ‗unequal treaties‘, which the weak Qing state could not 
resist. There existed growing concerns that missionaries and Chinese Christians could use this decline to their advantage, 
appropriating lands and property of unwilling Chinese peasants to give to the church. This sentiment resulted in violent 
revolts against Western interests.  
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against the background of folk culture; that is to say, ordinary people involved in the event 
were driven by their own belief systems rather than superficial political slogans. It is this 
spiritual dimension of ordinary people, according to Feng, that to a large extent reflects the 
historical truth of the Boxer Rebellion Movement (ibid.).  
 
Here, the notion of historical truth proposed by Feng is an interesting one, which may have 
implications for other historical representations such as television drama; it challenges 
China‘s communist historiography during the Maoist period. Chinese literary scholars 
Shengli Li and Jinghong Xiao (2006), in their co-authored book Researching on Historical 
Television Drama, document this literary transformation in contemporary Chinese fictional 
history writings. For them, this transformation is represented by two characteristics. First, 
compared to historical novels written between 1949 and 1976 (see Wagner 1990), China‘s 
mainstream historical novels since the early 1980s have tended to reconsider the role of the 
individual in any historical event, rather than the role of the ambiguous ‗people‘.  
 
According to Mao‘s revolutionary agenda, the petty-bourgeois intellectuals should, first of 
all, live and labor with the workers, peasants and the soldiers, and thereby familiarize 
themselves with the latter‘s language, lifestyle and thoughts. More importantly, as the 
Chinese media scholar Anbin Shi (2000) introduces, ‗the intellectuals should subjugate 
themselves to the ideological reform of the people‘ (p204). That is to say, intellectual 
elitism should be abandoned and the sanction of the proletariat hegemony should be 
adhered. However, in defining the historical writings like The Boxer as ‗new historical 
novels‘, Li and Xiao attempt to distinguish them from the Maoist ones. They argue that, 
according to Maoist historical understanding, ‗human suffering is caused either by external 
social and political systems or internal human consciousness‘, whereas in the new 
historical novels, ‗the realm of human unconsciousness becomes the focal point for an 
interrogation of historical development‘ (ibid. p211). In the case of Feng‘s novel The Boxer, 
one can easily identify this ‗new‘ way of representing ordinary people involved in the 
Boxer Rebellion Movement because he focuses on individual experience rather than 
focusing on events through an ideological lens.  
 
Second, the new historical novel is characterised by the re-emergence of emperors as 
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heroic protagonists in historical representations. During the Cultural Revolution 10 , the 
emperors of China‘s by-gone dynasties were generally depicted as anti-revolutionary 
feudalist remnants (fangeming fengjian canyu) in literary works. Under the Maoist 
ideology, which prevailed until the early 1980s, it was always the ordinary people (renmin 
qunzhong) not a particular hero that were treated as the ultimate force in the making of 
history. Even in the late 1970s and early 1980s, most mainstream Chinese historical novels 
including The Boxer, as Li and Xiao rightly observe, were still guided by the idea of 
‗ordinary people as history makers‘ (ibid. p212).  
 
However, the early 1990s witnessed a boom in Chinese historical novels depicting 
emperors and high officials (diwang jiangxiang) in the Qing dynasty. Notable examples 
include Li Ling‘s The Young Son of the Heaven (shaonian tianzi, 1987) and Evening Drum, 
Morning Bell (mugu chenzhong, 1991), Haoming Tang‘s Zeng Guofan (1990-1992), and Er 
Yuehe‘s Great Emperor Kangxi (kangxi dadi, 1985-1989) and Emperor Yongzheng 
(yongzheng huangdi, 1991-1994). Interestingly enough, unlike the 1980s‘ historical novels 
which were mostly written by young adult authors, the writers of those Qing ‗emperor‘ 
novels were all born in the 1940s and were middle-aged at the time when they wrote the 
novels. One could therefore argue that, having survived the Maoist period, those middle-
aged historical novelists had discarded an ideological mindset based on class-struggle and 
come to terms with a more revisionist understanding of historical development, which 
highlighted the actions of the ruling classes. 
 
The Chinese novelist Er Yuehe, among those historical writers, is worth special attention 
here. Born in Shanxi Province in north China in 1945, Er Yuehe was originally named 
Jiefang Ling. He is best known for his biographical novels of three Qing dynasty emperors, 
Kangxi (1654-1722), Yongzheng (1678-1735) and Qianlong (1711-1799), all of which 
have been adapted into award-winning television series11. It is generally acknowledged 
within both the Chinese and western fields of Chinese history studies that the Qing dynasty 
experienced its most prosperous period under the rule of these three emperors. This period, 
which lasted for about 110 years, is also known as High Qing or the Age of Kang-Qian 
Prosperity (kangqian shengshi). This period started with Emperor Qianlong‘s success in 
                                                        
10 For an explanation on the Cultural Revolution, see the previous chapter. 
11 These three television series are Kangxi Dynasty (China International Television Corporation, 50-episode, 2001), 
Yongzheng Dynasty (Beijing Tongdao Cultural Development Corporation, 44-episode, 1997) and Qianlong Dynasty 
(CCTV & Hunan TV, 40-episode, 2002). 
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suppressing a massive anti-Qing separatist rebellion in 1667 which involved three local 
autonomous regions (san fan zhi luan). After the crack down, the country‘s economy began 
to prosper and the Qing dynasty reached its highpoint between the Yongzheng and the mid-
Qianlong periods. However, this so-called High Qing period is not without controversy. 
Contemporary Chinese historians often point to the issue of strict censorship and 
repression in the Qing dynasty12 (e.g. Dai, 2002; Zhou, 2008).  
 
The historian Siyuan Zhou (2008), for example, questions whether any kind of real 
prosperity was achieved under the authoritarian rule of the Kang-Qian periods. He argues 
that the economic development of the Kang-Qian periods was attributable less to any new 
means of production or forms of technological advancement than relative societal peace 
and stability compared to the late periods of the previous Ming dynasty (ibid.). On the 
other hand, from a different critical position, the historian Yi Dai (2004) disagrees with 
Zhou‘s complete denial of the Kang-Qian Prosperity. Instead of a reductionist analysis of 
the means of production, he suggests a more nuanced approach to the study of China‘s 
feudalism and its specific characteristics of different periods. In other words, according to 
Dai, although the Kang-Qian period was prosperous but ultimately repressive, one needs to 
look at this period in a more considered way.   
 
It is within this intellectual climate that Er Yuehe contributed to the heated discussion 
about the history of Qing with his Qing emperor trilogy. Inspired by classic Chinese 
literature, in particular the famous novel Dream of the Red Chamber13, Er Yuehe not only 
introduces a serialized narrative to his works, but also tries to incorporate traditional 
Chinese folk cultural elements into his story-telling. In order to get hold of more first-hand 
materials, he made great efforts to research into the many unofficial historical records 
including folklores and some intellectuals‘ diaries written in the Qing periods. It should be 
                                                        
12 The most notorious way of censorship and repression was literary inquisition, which refers to the official persecution 
of intellectuals for their writings in Imperial China. It took place under each of the dynasties ruling China, although the 
Qing dynasty was particularly extreme. Such persecutions could occur even as a result of a single phrase or word which 
the ruler considered offensive. Some of these owed to the naming taboo. By that, it referred to a cultural taboo against 
using, speaking or writing the given names of the emperors. In serious cases, not only the writer but also his immediate 
and extended families would be killed.  
13 Dream of the Red Chamber (hong lou meng), composed by Xueqin Cao, is one of China's Four Great Classical Novels. 
It was composed in the middle of the 18th century during the Qing Dynasty. It is considered to be a masterpiece of 
Chinese vernacular literature and is generally acknowledged to be a pinnacle of Chinese fiction. ‗Redology‘ (hong xue) is 
the field of study devoted exclusively to this work. The Red Chamber is believed to be semi-autobiographical, mirroring 
the rise and decay of author Cao's own family and, by extension, of the Qing Dynasty. As the author details in the first 
chapter, it is intended to be a memorial to the women he knew in his youth: friends, relatives and servants. The novel is 
remarkable not only for its huge cast of characters and psychological scope, but also for its precise and detailed 
observation of the life and social structures typical of 18th-century Chinese aristocracy.  
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explained here that folklores are characterised as vernacular forms of fictional writing, 
which are based on ordinary people‘s oral storytelling of captivating and colorful stories. In 
these stories, the boundary between reality and the odd or fantastic is blurred.  
 
The four-volume novel Emperor Yongzheng, for instance, took him more than two years to 
collect and select raw materials before he started writing it. Compared to the historical 
novels of other writers in the 1970s and the early 1980s, Er Yuehe‘s Qing emperor trilogy 
has at least three features, which make it stand out from other works that had been written 
from a Maoist perspective. First, it takes a positive and sympathetic attitude in its treatment 
of the emperor figures. Unlike Maoist historical novels, where ‗ordinary‘ working people 
took the leading roles, Er Yuehe‘s Qing emperor trilogy brings the emperors back to the 
centre stage and re-emphasises their importance in maintaining national unity and social 
stability.  
 
Second, it attempts to provide a more comprehensive picture of royal history by revisiting 
some neglected historical figures. Take his novel Kangxi Dynasty, the Empress Xiaozhuang, 
the grandmother of Emperor Kangxi is portrayed in a much more vivid and detailed way 
than before. The Empress Xiaozhuang (1613-1688), known for the majority of her life 
under the title ‗Grand Empress Dowager‘, was the concubine of Emperor Huangtaiji, the 
mother of the Shunzhi Emperor and the grandmother of the Kangxi Emperor during 
China‘s Qing Dynasty. She wielded significant influence over the Qing court during the 
rule of her son and grandson. Known for her wisdom and political ability, Xiaozhuang has 
become a largely respected figure in Chinese history. Because Er Yuehe successfully re-
introduced Princess Xiaozhuang into the historical novel, this figure has now also become 
a popular character for many historical television productions ever since then.  
 
Third, Er Yuehe‘s Qing trilogy reaffirms the continuity of the Han culture throughout the 
entire Qing period. From his novels, it is clear that although the Qing dynasty existed 
under Manchurian rule, it was in fact the increasing integration of Han and Manchurian 
cultures that allowed the Qing dynasty to last for nearly three centuries. Nevertheless, Er 
Yuehe‘s optimistic view of traditional Han culture coincides with the rise of new 
Confucian ethos in contemporary Chinese society. In the Qing dramas adapted from his 




3.4 The television mediasphere: anti-corruption television drama and new historical 
drama 
 
Apart from the emergence of the new historical novel, the rise of the new historical 
television drama should be also explained by the transformation of content on 
contemporary Chinese television. Generic changes and the hybridisation of television 
historical drama were made possible by state-led innovation and regulation of Chinese 
television industry. The content of Chinese television drama has undergone great changes 
since television drama as a genre appeared on Chinese television in the 1950s. Chinese 
media scholar Hong Yin (2002) contends that Chinese television drama has experienced 
three phases of development: the experimental period (1958-1978), the transitional period 
(1978-1987) and the commercial period (1987 to the present). In using the ‗three phases of 
development‘, Yin examines Chinese television drama primarily from a technological and 
ideological starting point.  
 
According to Yin, in the experimental period (1958-1978), television was not a mass 
medium because China had only one television station ‗with a limited broadcast range‘. 
Only ‗a very small number of government officials and senior intellectuals‘ had access to it 
(Yin, 2002, p28). Furthermore, television dramas at the time were all single plays (dan ben 
ju) in black and white, which served the strong propagandist purposes of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).  
 
In the transitional period (1978-87), as noted earlier, the end of the Cultural Revolution 
was followed by the Deng-led Economic Reform; the CCP changed its main policy from 
class struggle to economic construction with a view to speeding up the process of China‘s 
so-called four modernizations (sige xiandaihua)14. Serial dramas (lianxuju) emerged on the 
television screen during this period. As Yin rightly observes, ‗the production of domestic 
drama series was influenced by productions from abroad‘ (ibid. p30). In the late 1970s, 
popular television dramas started to be imported from foreign countries and regions, 
mainly the United States, Japan and Hong Kong15; these popular cultural products became 
                                                        
14 In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution in 1981, Xiaoping Deng, along with his closest collaborators, such as 
Ziyang Zhao and Yaobang Hu, took the reins of power and their purpose of advancing the ‗China‘s four modernizations‘ 
(economy, agriculture, scientific and technological development and national defense) put up an ambitious plan of 
opening and liberalization of the economy. 
15 It is worth reminding that Hong Kong was not handed over to the People‘s Republic by Britain until 1997. 
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examples for the transformation of Chinese domestic television drama from ‗a mere 
expression of political and cultural tendencies into popular entertainment‘ (ibid.). As a 
result, the themes and genres of Chinese television drama began to multiply and flourish in 
this period.  
 
On the one hand, a wave of Chinese dramas adapted from classical and modern literary 
works were produced; notable examples include Four Generations under One Roof
16
 (sishi 
tongtang, 1985), the Dream of the Red Chamber (1986), Journey to the West17 (xiyouji, 
1987) and The Last Emperor
18
 (modai huangdi, 1988). On the other hand, along with the 
rise of the previously mentioned literary works reflecting on political and personal 
conflicts during the Cultural Revolution, television dramas that critically portray social 
reality also gained wide popularity. New Star (1986), the 12-episode series, which tells a 
story of China‘s ‗socialist reform‘ in a small Northern Chinese city that has been discussed 
in the literature review, was an important example. Nevertheless, these dramas involving 
social criticism, according to Yin, included several important sub-genres, such as the 
‗drama of pain‘ (shang hen ju) or ‗retrospective dramas‘ (fan si ju) which took a 
contemporary reflexive attitude towards past political turmoil and ‗reform dramas‘ (gaige 
ju) which were based on the changing political and social situation in post-Reform Chinese 
society.  
 
The commercial period (1987 to the present) saw television genres develop into more 
diverse and hybridized types of programming. As the CCP officially replaced a centrally 
planned economic system with a market one in the early 1990s, China‘s mass 
                                                        
16 Four Generations under One Roof, written by the late Chinese novelist Lao She between 1944 and 1950, is a novel 
based on the life of ordinary and local people in Beijing during the Japanese Occupation in the 1930s. Lao She (1899-
1966) was one of the most significant figures of 20th century Chinese literature, and is perhaps best known for his novel 
Rickshaw Boy (luotuo xiangzi) and the play Teahouse (cha guan). 
17 Written by Chengen Wu in the 16th century during the Ming Dynasty, Journey to the West is one of the Four Great 
Classical Novels of Chinese literature. In English-speaking countries, it is also often known as Monkey. The novel is a 
fictionalised account of the legendary pilgrimage to India of the Buddhist monk Xuanzang, and loosely based its source 
from the historic text Great Tang Records on the Western Regions and traditional folk tales. The monk travelled to the 
‗Western Regions‘ during the Tang Dynasty, to obtain sacred texts. The bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara (Guanyin), on 
instruction from the Buddha, gives this task to the monk and his three protectors in the form of disciples including 
Wukong Sun, Bajie Zhu and Wujing Sha together with a dragon prince who acts as Xuanzang's steed, a white horse. 
These four characters have agreed to help Xuanzang as an atonement for past sins. 
18 The last emperor here refers to Pu Yi (1906 -1967) who was the last Emperor of China, and the twelfth and final ruler 
of the Qing Dynasty. He belonged to the Manchu Aisin Gioro clan and ruled as the Xuantong Emperor from 1908 until 
his abdication on 12 February 1912. From 1 to 12 July 1917 he was briefly restored to the throne as a nominal emperor 
by the warlord Zhang Xun. In 1934 he was declared the Kangde Emperor of the puppet state of Manchukuo by the 
Empire of Japan, and he ruled until the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1945. After the People's Republic of 
China was established in 1949, Pu Yi was a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference from 1964 




communication system as a whole embarked on a commercialization process from then on. 
Although it was (and still is) under government supervision through the State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), the production and broadcasting 
of television drama in China was increasingly funded by advertising and produced by both 
overseas and domestic companies. In order to provide a necessary industry background for 
my cultural genre analysis of the historical drama later, I shall go into some length on the 
important policy and regulatory changes of China‘s television drama industry in this period 
here.    
 
The Xiaoping Deng-led socialist market economy reform, which officially started in 1992, 
has transformed the nature of Chinese television industry from a governmental institution 
(shiye) to a state-owned enterprise (qiye). During this process, as Chinese media scholar 
Liu summarises (2010), Chinese television organizations ‗have evolved their operation to 
embrace commercial management through the business of advertising and program rights‘ 
(p73). The commercial management of Chinese television was technologically made 
possible by the adoption of cable and satellite technologies in the entire country which 
reinforced China‘s national television market from the early 1990s.  
 
According to a 2009 report released by China‘s State Administration of Radio, Film and 
Television (SARFT), by 2008, there were 277 television stations at city, provincial and 
central level, and 1969 radio and television stations at local level (in rural areas, radio and 
television stations are combined), operating thousands of television channels and 
broadcasting 14 million hours annually (SARFT, 2009, p185, p186). These channels 
covered 96.95 percent of the Chinese population and included 164 million cable users (ibid. 
p186). This huge proliferation of television channels led to severe shortages of content on 
Chinese television. On the one hand, content production within the state-owned television 
studio system was ‗unable to satisfy demand‘, so television stations ‗sought programs from 
outside the system‘ (Liu, 2010, p74). On the other hand, there was a fast growing demand 
from the public for innovative quality television programmes, which were less imbued 
with governmental propaganda and were also informative and entertaining. 
 
Facing this content crisis, the Chinese television industry underwent three major changes 
to meet the challenges. In the case of television drama, first of all, leading state-owned 
television stations managed to strengthen production and distribution capabilities. For 
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example, the Television Drama Production Centre of China Central Television remains the 
largest television drama producer in mainland China. At the same time, China International 
Television Corporation (CITVC), the commercial arm of CCTV, is the largest seller of 
television programmes as well as the largest importer of programming.  
 
Second, as commercialization of Chinese television industry continued, independent 
television companies appeared in China and the practice of outsourcing production grew 
from the early 1990s. As Beijing-based media scholar Hong Yin (2002) writes, hundreds of 
non-governmental television drama production companies began to emerge from 1990 
onwards and by 2001 there were 800 registered television drama production companies in 
China. Today, independent production companies are the main content providers for 
China‘s television market. According to Liu (2010), ‗independent production accounted for 
80 percent of content in television drama‘ in China in 2010 (p76).  
 
Third, the last 15 years saw the arrival of the golden age of television co-production and 
programme exchange among East Asian countries. As a result, television drama including 
imports from East Asia flourished on Chinese television and competition became much 
fiercer for mainland Chinese television drama producers. Early in the mid-1980s, popular 
television drama produced by Hong Kong television organizations, comprising mainly 
martial arts programmes, started to be shown on mainland Chinese television. Meanwhile, 
immediately after the lifting of martial law (jiechu jieyan) in Taiwan19 in 1987, television 
co-productions mainly of romance costume drama, between Taiwan and mainland China 
took off and achieved huge success across the Taiwan Straits. The exchange of television 
drama therefore became quite common in the Greater China region.  
 
In addition, Japanese and South Korean television programmes also began to enjoy great 
popularity in China. For instance, romantic dramas (langman ouxiang ju) from both 
countries are prominent in China‘s television viewing market, and South Korean costume 
dramas, most notably the serial  Jewel in the Palace (Dae Jang Geum), also began to have 
                                                        
19 After World War II, the United Nations transferred rule of Taiwan to the Republic of China, which then initiated the 
longest period of martial law in modern history at the time. In the aftermath of the 2.28 Incident of 1947, which was a 
uprising of the native Taiwanese people (ben sheng ren) fighting against the authoritarian rule of the Chiang Kai-shek 
Administration, martial law was declared in 1948 despite the democracy promised in the Constitution of the Republic of 
China. In 1949, the Nationalist-led Republic of China government lost control of its possessions in mainland China to the 
Communist Party of China and retreated to Taiwan. The perceived need to suppress Communist and Taiwan 




a considerable presence on Chinese television from 2004. In the year, Dae Jang Geum 
(DJG) was introduced to mainland China via Hunan Satellite Television Channel with high 
ratings; this came after its huge success in South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. The 
drama is based on the real historical figure Jang-geum (played by Lee Youngae), who 
became the first female head physician to the King in the patriarchal Confucian society of 
the Chosun Dynasty of Korea in the mid-sixteenth century. The success of DJG ignited a 
heated debate about the quality of Chinese television dramas and that of South Korean 
ones within Chinese popular press as well as the general public (see Kim 2009). 
  
In parallel with the commercialization of Chinese television, China‘s television regulatory 
climate began to change as well. For example, the SARFT, as China‘s top visual media 
regulatory body, changed its way of control of domestic television production. In dealing 
with the rise of independent television producers, for example, Liu (2010) suggests that 
since 1994 SARFT‘s regulatory approaches ‗can be divided into three stages: banning, 
acquiescence and approval‘ (p76). Briefly, having experienced these stages, China‘s 
independent drama producers are now afforded certain freedoms in managing the business 
aspects of production and distribution. However, they must still have their shooting 
proposals censored and approved by the SARFT. When it comes to foreign television 
programmes, as Hong Kong media scholar Joseph Chan (2009) reminds us, ‗China is still 
wary of alien forces coming from Hong Kong, Taiwan and the West that may undermine 
the socialist system‘ (p33). In other words, Chinese government still has serious 
ideological concerns about the impact of television and the media generally. More 
importantly, the Communist Party would argue that the role of the nation-state remains 
critical in regulating Chinese communication across national boundaries and indeed the 
development of China‘s national cultural industry and this role cannot be left to the market 
alone. 
 
After almost three decades of commercialization, therefore, according to Australia-based 
Chinese media scholar Michael Keane (2005), the content of contemporary Chinese 
television drama now falls into three broad groupings: ‗historical/political‘, ‗social (or 
reform) issues‘, and ‗contemporary popular culture‘(p84). It is within the first and second 
groupings that there emerged a new genre of anti-corruption television drama. Earlier in 
this chapter, I have introduced that contemporary China‘s anti-corruption campaign has 
been endorsed by current Chinese President Jintao Hu starting from the early 2000s as 
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context.    
 
In a general sense, the anti-corruption drama belongs to the broad grouping of 
social/reform issues genres proposed by Keane. Through the narration of political 
corruption and power struggles in particular fictional settings (mostly governmental 
organizations), this type of drama is always meant to allegorically criticize the abuse of 
power and political bribery that widely exists in Chinese society. According to Ying Zhu 
(2008b), the anti-corruption drama debuted with the 20-episode literary adaptation, Heavy 
Snow Leaves No Trace (daxue wuhen) which was produced and aired by state broadcaster 
CCTV in 2001.Written by Tianming Wu, a veteran author of several novels dealing with 
the rise and fall of officials during the reform era, Heavy Snow starts with the homicide of 
an employee in the office of a municipal government. This employee was later found out to 
have been involved in a bribery case that implicates high-ranking officials in the city and in 
the province. This drama serial thus tells a story of how two protagonists Yulin Fang, a 
male detective at the city‘s police bureau and Hongyu Liao, a female medium-ranking 
factory official attempt to reveal the truth behind the homicide. It depicts a series of crimes, 
hypocrisies and scandals within both the city and provincial governments. Heavy Snow 
Leaves No Trace was a huge success on Chinese television; it was one of the most popular 
television shows in 2001. After Heavy Snow, more anti-corruption dramas were produced 
and aired on state television. According to Zhu ‗contemporary anti-corruption dramas took 
over dynasty dramas‘ place as the new primetime audience favourite in the early 2000s‘ 
(ibid. p38).  
 
The fact that dynasty dramas were superseded in popularity by contemporary anti-
corruption dramas proved only temporary. The emergence of anti-corruption drama only 
came after a forced elimination of the dynasty genre and its later development largely 
reshaped the historical drama as a whole. In the early 2000s, the production of previously 
popular Qing dramas was ordered to be reduced by the SARFT. As Zhu notes, the over-
saturation of Qing dramas in the early 2000s ‗had raised eyebrows among policy makers, 
literary and cultural critics, and even audiences‘ (ibid. p37). In March 2001, the SARFT 
brought together quite a few influential television dramatists and held a forum on the 
theme of ‗TV Dramas of Contemporary Subjects‘ in Beijing. The aim of holding this forum 
was to encourage those television practitioners to directly engage with contemporary social 
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and reform issues, rather than historical ones. In the end this forum more or less spelled a 
ban by the SARFT on dynasty dramas. 
 
However, the arrival of anti-corruption drama offered new reference points for the 
transformation of the historical drama; the icon of the incorruptible ‗clean official‘ (qing 
guan) proved to be the most important one. Ruoyun Bai, another US-based Chinese media 
scholar, in her 2008 article, discusses the image of the ‗clean official‘ in anti-corruption 
drama. She traces back the so-called ‗clean official ideologies‘ to traditional Chinese 
Confucianism informed by contemporary political morality; that is, ‗society is bettered and 
justice restored by ―clean officials‖, a minority of officials who are honest, fair, and who 
care for social underdogs‘ (Bai, 2008, p49). In Heavy Snow, for example, neither Fang nor 
Liao occupies high governmental positions but both of them behave as ‗clean officials‘; 
they demonstrate heroic spirit in fighting against immorality and irresponsibility in official 
places for the benefit of the general public. 
 
More importantly, the icon of the clean official was also introduced to the historical drama. 
Although serious Qing drama had passed its heyday, popular historical drama did introduce 
the idea of ‗clean officials‘. As a matter of fact, earlier in 1996, Hunchback Liu the Prime 
Minister (zaixiang liuluoguo), a 40-episode costume drama produced and distributed by 
Shanghai Hairun Film and Television Production, had already achieved massive popularity. 
A comedy-style television satire, Hunchback Liu was greatly influenced by Taiwanese 
popular  television imports.  
 
The story of Hunchback Liu is centered around the conflicts between two famous senior 
officials during the Qianlong period of the Qing dynasty. Yong Liu (or Hunchback Liu) is 
an honest and caring official and Shen He is a notoriously corrupt and evil-hearted one. 
With the rise of the anti-corruption drama in the early 2000s, popular historical drama went 
out of its way to prioritize the theme of the clean official as well. The well-known costume 
drama serial The Bronze Teeth (tiechi tongya jiaxiaolan) also represented this new trend. 
With similar storylines to Hunchback Liu as well as using almost the same cast, The 
Bronze Teeth staged conflicts between Xiaolan Ji, a well-known senior literary official in 
the Qianlong period and, Shen He in a comedic manner. Initiated in 2000, The Bronze 
Teeth ran for four seasons. I shall explain this in detail in my cultural genre analysis of 




At the same time, anti-corruption drama began to change because of market pressures. As 
Zhu notices, ‗the transformed anti-corruption drama sensationalizes politics and business 
in its drive for ratings, mixing in schemes rife with sex and violence‘ (ibid. p39). In other 
words, the anti-corruption drama partly transformed itself into a crime genre in order to 
survive fierce competition in the television viewing market. Interestingly enough, in April 
2004, the SARFT banned the broadcast of crime dramas in primetime and re-scheduled 
them after 11pm. As a result, the anti-corruption drama began to go down hill from then on. 
It had lasted less than five years. The sudden impact of the primetime ban caused the 
revival of dynasty dramas. According to Zhu, most of China‘s local television stations 
returned to ‗historical and costume dramas‘ for their dramatic programming and ‗new 
productions were slated for costume dramas of varying periods‘ (ibid.) It is important to 
note that unlike earlier dynasty dramas which had concentrated on the emperor‘s heroic 
deeds, this new wave of productions made serious efforts to properly represent traditional 
elements of Chinese culture.  Hence, media representation of traditional Chinese culture as 




In this chapter, attention was given to the political and cultural contexts under which the 
new historical drama emerged in China since the mid-1990s. The first section has briefly 
reviewed the significant political and literary moments that contributed to the formation of 
China‘s traditional culture ‗fever‘ since the early 1990s. The next two artistic movements 
put forward the question of the representation of traditional Chinese culture in 
contemporary China‘s cultural practices. On the one hand, as far as Er Yuehe‘s Qing trilogy 
is concerned, it highlights the fact that the Han culture not only survived more than 250 
years of Manchurian rule but also integrated many other ethnic cultures; to borrow 
McArthur‘s words (1978), it offers contemporary readers a past but ‗buoyant and 
optimistic‘ self-image of the Chinese society (p40). On the other, from the interconnection 
of the anti-corruption dramas and popular historical ones, strong rhetoric links can be 
identified between the traditional Chinese clean official and nowadays Party heroes in 
China‘s market-oriented reforms.  
 
From the discussion, it was also demonstrated that what distinguishes Chinese historical 
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drama since the mid-1990s resides in its vivid narration of contemporary political and 
social issues in the guise of historical representation. As far as its sub-genres are concerned, 
the new historical drama mainly includes emperor drama (like The Last Emperor), anti-
corruption satirical costume drama (like Hunchback Liu the Prime Minister) and period 





































This chapter reports on the issues concerning the methodology and methods of my thesis. 
It is comprised of four parts. In the first part, I shall briefly explain the reasons why a 
qualitative research approach is adopted to deal with my research questions. The second 
part provides a detailed discussion on the use of the research methods including cultural 
genre analysis, focus groups, in-depth interviews and document analysis. Part three 
concentrates on my process of research data analysis towards writing up the findings; the 
main purpose of this part is to highlight the significance of reflexivity in two aspects of the 
qualitative data analysis: on the one hand, using grounded theory informed analytical 
techniques, and on the other hand, rethinking the use of focus groups in researching 
Chinese society and culture. The last part summarises the gains and limitations of my 
qualitative research practice. 
 
4.2 Research methodology 
 
As discussed in the literature review, the study of the historical television drama has been 
mainly conducted within the area of literary studies in China since the late 1990s (e.g. Li & 
Xiao, 2006; Wang, 2008; Yin, 2002); this corpus of work is focused on the textual 
conventions and artistic styles of the drama text. The aim of my research project, however, 
is to look at how the television historical drama is understood and socially and culturally 
valued in contemporary China, considering personal, social, historical and cultural issues 
that relate to viewers‘ engagement to it. In order to address the question of understanding 
and value judgment, I need to take a qualitative approach; it is only through conducting 
qualitative audience research that I am able to identify the ways in which the Chinese 
audience understands and evaluates historical television drama in relation to the enormous 
social-cultural changes taking place in Chinese society. 
 
As discussed in the literature review, the paradigm of Chinese audience research has 
shifted from an Encoding/Decoding model (see Lull 1991) to a reflexive sociological 
approach that addresses issues concerning the question of cultural citizenship of particular 
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social groups (see Fung 2002b, 2003 & 2009). This paradigmatic shift suggests a crucial 
trend in conducting critical audience research in contemporary China. That is, moving 
beyond Lull‘s use of the Encoding/Decoding model, which was based on the thesis of 
cultural resistance by the Chinese television audience, we now adopt a more nuanced and 
multidimensional approach to examine the articulation and disarticulation of contemporary 
China‘s authoritarian politics and their interpretation by Chinese audiences. 
 
Specifically speaking, the research methods utilized in this project are cultural genre 
analysis, semi-structured focus groups and in-depth interviews. The reason why I chose to 
do interviews is because I expected to reveal how audiences understand and value 
television historical dramas by analyzing how they ‗talk‘ about them. Finnish media 
scholar Pertti Alasuutari (1999), in an introduction to three phases of reception studies, 
rightly observes the relationship between increased reflexivity and cultural concerns in 
contemporary media reception studies. He writes:  
 
One of the gradual developments in cultural and media studies has been to reflect upon 
and to take distance from the cultural concerns embedded in the way we conceive of 
contemporary society and its characteristic new phenomena, such as mass 
communication and mass culture…to be ‗critical‘ in the analytic sense requires that in 
one‘s perspective to the phenomena under scrutiny one is not led or blindfolded by 
culturally given concerns (Alasuutari, 1999, p9). 
 
By ‗reflect on‘ and ‗take distance from‘, Alasuutari suggests a renewed interaction between 
the individual and social reality. For example, as far as a television programme or genre is 
concerned, according to him, one ‗does not necessarily analyse the programme or genre 
―itself‖ at all‘ (ibid. p16). Rather, one has to treat it as a historical phenomenon, around 
which public debate and discussion are developed and media policy decisions are made. 
By using focus groups, then, I can bring audiences together, divide them into groups and 
invite them to a debate about these dramas. As a focus group features group consensus, it 
to some extent mimics real social situations in which certain social and cultural values are 
shared or contested. Nevertheless, as ‗talk‘ can be seen as a process of sense-making, 
comprehension as well as critique, focus groups and in-depth interviews, which are both 
based on talk, provide an insight into how television historical drama as a genre with 





4.3 The use of the research methods 
 
My research data was collected during a period of one and a half years between October 
2006 and October 2008. The data collection process consists of two stages. The first stage 
relied on cultural genre analysis. Although the cultural genre analysis was carried out 
throughout the two-year period, the second stage was mainly the audience research, which 
involved semi-structured focus groups and in-depth interviews respectively. I shall 
introduce the use of them next. 
 
4.3.1 Cultural genre analysis 
 
In order to investigate Chinese audiences‘ responses to historical television drama, the first 
task I should do is to unpack the genre of the television historical drama itself. Inspired by 
Jason Mittell (2001), I adopted a cultural approach to researching historical television 
drama. According to Mittell, television genre is ‗a process of categorization‘; it is ‗not 
found within media texts, but operates across the cultural realms of media industries, 
audiences, policy, critics, and historical contexts‘ (ibid. c). Thus, Mittell‘s cultural genre 
analysis incorporates a wide range of areas associated with the formation of a given 
television genre; it treats a television genre as an open, flexible cultural process rather than 
a closed text. In my research, the cultural genre analysis is realized through textual 
interpretation, document analysis and industry interview. 
  
Textual interpretation still plays a crucial role in my cultural genre analysis. The textual 
interpretation here is comprised of narrative analysis and textual analysis. Narrative 
analysis concerns not only the structural characteristics of a particular text that provide ‗a 
sense of a beginning, a middle, an end, with endless junctions in between these three major 
time points‘,  but also the discourse characteristics of the text that can be unraveled as 
‗how is what told by who‘ (Thornham and Purvis, 2005, p31). As for textual analysis, in 
the study of television drama, it is aimed to deconstruct the audio-visual elements that 
constitute a particular text, such as shots, camera angles, sequences, character perspectives, 
narrations, dialogues, monologues, natural sound and music. These two aspects of textual 
interpretation, as a whole, cannot be separated in the analysis of a drama text – their 





The method of textual interpretation, as I argue, is of unique importance in the study of 
television drama in contemporary China. First, as discussed previously, the clashes 
between the state and the market are inserted into the construction of the television drama 
text; the Chinese television drama text can thus be seen as a site, where the institutional 
forces like cultural policy and the textual practices like individual‘s narrative co-exist. In 
dealing with the social inscriptions of the historical television drama text, therefore, one 
needs to unfold the particular social, cultural, political and historical conditions of a given 
text by textual interpretation.  
 
Second, as the US-based Chinese film scholar Ning Ma (1989) argues in his discussion of 
Chinese family melodrama of the early 1980s, ‗since ancient times, Chinese cultural 
production has tended toward a fusion of history and fiction with emphasis on didacticism‘ 
(wenyizaidao) (p83). This cultural production tradition has thus led to the formal quality of 
the Chinese narrative text that is suggested by Ma as ‗the textualization of the context‘ 
(ibid.). Ma‘s argument of ‗the textualization of the context‘ in the Chinese narrative text, 
according to my understanding, is derived from the fact that the authoritative politics in 
China generates the discursive power relations between the dominant political discourse 
and the text. Hence, it can be argued that analyzing the textual contradictions of a drama 
text can result in one‘s grasp of the socio-political conditions of its context. 
 
I chose three historical television series as my case studies, including The Bronze Teeth 
(tiechi tongya jixiaolan) (2000- ), The Great Emperor Hanwu (hanwu dadi) (2005), and 
The First Emperor (qin shi huang) (2006).The reasons why I chose them are two-fold. 
First, they well represent a range from the serious drama to the popular drama, which is 
considered the most important distinction when it comes to the sub-genre question of the 
historical television drama. The First Emperor largely relies on historical record, 
presenting itself in a historically realistic style. Although based on historical record in 
terms of its characters and storyline, The Great Emperor Hanwu is characterised as a 
strong melodramatic style. Differently from those two so-called serious dramas, The 
Bronze Teeth is a widely-recognized popular historical series. Second, from a chronological 
point of view, these dramas reflect the changing nature of the historical television drama; 
by looking at the continuities and discontinuities of artistic styles and content features of 





The second aspect of my cultural genre analysis is based on a two-year long document 
research. The sources of my document research are diverse both offline and online. First of 
all, two official reports on China‘s television drama industry, Annual Report on the 
Development of China TV Drama 2005-2006 (Li 2007) and China’s Development of Radio, 
Film and Television released by the SARFT in 2009, provide important information on 
regulatory policy, quantity of production, market share as well as ratings of the historical 
television drama during a four-year period. Also, I used available internet and print sources 
to assess the scheduling of the television historical drama over the past ten years as well as 
in the present in China. At the same time, I used secondary academic/non-academic 
sources as background knowledge about how the mass media and academia, mainly 
historians, portray the critics and audiences‘ responses to these dramas. 
 
The third part of the genre analysis concerns a consideration of the production side of the 
historical television drama. According to my original research plan, I planned to interview 
at least one senior production member of each one of my case studies. Hard as I tried to 
contact them through my personal network, I only managed to interview one person who is 
directly related to my cases: Mr. Shucheng Chou, the executive producer of The Bronze 
Teeth. I conducted a one-hour sit-down interview with him in March 2008 during the 
period of my field work in Beijing. It was not until I started my field work in October 2006 
that I realized that nearly all of the production people I planned to interview were busy 
with their shooting projects and would be unable to take any non-press interviews until six 
months later, so I decided to approach other television professionals. The other industry 
interview I undertook was a one-hour long one by telephone in December 2007 with Mr. 
Le Fu, a senior executive producer at the Drama Unit of Hunan Television, a provincial 
television production organization. Although he was not involved in any one of my cases, 
he offers me invaluable insight into how the industry defines the historical television drama. 
 
4.3.2 Focus group 
 
Having introduced the genre analysis, I shall move on to the audience research. My 
fieldwork audience research was conducted from late September 2007 till early April 2008; 
as planned, it was carried out in two urban settings in China, the city of Beijing and that of 
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Changsha. Ten focus groups including two pilot ones were conducted involving 53 
respondents in total ranging from 4 to 6 persons in each group. Six focus groups including 
the pilot ones were done in Beijing, all with mixed gender and among two age groups, 
young adult and the middle-aged. The remaining four groups using the same recruitment 
criteria were conducted in Changsha. The detailed focus group features are stated in the 
table below. 
 
Table 1:  
Beijing Changsha 
Young Adult 1 (three males, one female) Young Adult 1 (two males ， three 
females) 
Young Adult 2 (two males, three females) Young Adult 2 (three males ， three 
females) 
Middle-aged Adult 1 (two males, two 
females) 
Middle-aged Adult 1 (three males, three 
females) 
Middle-aged Adult 2 (three males, three 
females) 
Middle-aged Adult 2 (three males, two 
females) 
﹡Two pilot focus groups involving 12 respondents are not stated here 
 
The focus group method is probably the most frequently used in qualitative audience 
research. It involves collecting a group, or more often, a series of groups of people together 
to discuss an issue in the presence of a moderator. For the American sociologist Robert 
Merton (1956), a pioneer in the use of focus groups, the purpose of the focus group is to 
generate new research questions and hypotheses to be tested using quantitative methods. 
On the contrary, many recent media scholars see the method as simulating ethnographic 
processes of talk and argumentation (e.g. Liebes & Katz, 1990; Livingstone & Lunt, 1994; 
Morley, 1980; Philo, 1993). Peter Lunt and Sonia Livingstone, in their article on the focus 
group written in 1996, have argued against some of the views of Merton by suggesting that 
‗in contemporary research practice the focus group is regarded as a simulation of various 
aspects of social communication‘ (p79). As they rightly point out, the focus group has an 
autonomy from quantitative methods unanticipated by Merton, although undoubtedly 
research can only benefit from a triangulated approach. It can be seen that the focus group 
as a research method has gone through different periods in history, from being used first 
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for critical, then mainstream, and now, again critical research. 
 
However, although the use of focus groups as a research method for critical media studies 
is recognized, the recruitment criteria for focus group research remains debatable; it may 
vary according to different research projects and questions. The reason that I selected two 
cities is because these two cities represent two major types of social and political situation 
in China; Beijing is the capital and one of the most developed cities in China, whereas 
Changsha is a local region and fast-developing one. Because the adults (18-39) and 
middle-aged adults (40-55) are considered as the two major groups of target audiences of 
the television historical drama, my focus groups were conducted with those who define 
themselves as regular viewers. Here, choosing ‗regular viewers‘ as focus group 
respondents is a methodological decision; it is based on an emphasis on an affective textual 
consumption in contemporary television audience studies.  
 
Annette Hill, for example, in her work Restyling Factuality (2007), conducts a series of 
comparative reception studies of news, documentary and reality genres in Britain and 
Sweden. Unlike traditional cultural studies audience research, Hill and her colleagues 
adopt both quantitative (national survey) and qualitative (semi-structured focus groups) 
methods for the project. In terms of her use of focus groups, there are two main 
characteristics that are worth special attention. First, the focus groups that she and her 
colleagues conducted in both countries are all mixed gender. Second, instead of choosing 
those who express extreme like or dislike towards reality genres, they recruited the people 
who defined themselves as regular viewers of the programmes. The selection of the 
respondents for Hill‘s project, in my opinion, re-emphasises ordinary viewers‘ engagement 
with reality television; by choosing those viewers who do view a broad genre, but not with 
any intense involvement, the researchers try to find a different type of textuality – not 
through gazing at or immersion in a particular text, but through a fragmented and 
distracted textual consumption. 
  
It is under the influence of this wave of ‗regular‘ audience studies that I conducted my 
focus group research. As for the recruitment, I took a snow-balling approach in both of the 
cities, but I encountered different recruiting problems. While I was doing research in 
Beijing from late September to late December 2007, I had to accept the fact that it was not 
an easy task to gather together four to six people who are strangers to each other at one 
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time from different parts of a big city like Beijing. I had two research assistants helping me 
with recruiting suitable respondents. Three of us would have a meeting once a week 
keeping each other updated about the ‗fresh people‘ we found and discussing possible 
times and locations convenient for all the respondents in a particular group. My research in 
Changsha was done between early January and late March 2008. Compared to that in 
Beijing, the recruitment in Changsha turned out to be less difficult but needed more 
selection. This is due to the fact that Changsha is a much smaller city, so there is greater 
risk of getting over-homogeneous audience samples. Therefore, I had to be cautious in 
selecting respondents for each group.  
 
As far as the pattern of focus groups is concerned, it remains the same for all the groups. 
First, each respondent would be asked to fill in a questionnaire concerning his or her 
personal information and daily viewing preferences. Second, a group discussion, which 
lasts for at least one and a half hours, would take place; the discussion is centred around 
four questions detailed below:  
 
1. How do you define the historical television drama?  
2. How do you deal with the relationship between ‗history‘ and ‗drama‘ in the sample 
historical television drama texts? 
3. What do you think of the quality of the Chinese historical television drama? 
4. How do you associate the contents of the historical television drama with 
contemporary Chinese society? 
 
In order to help the respondents to answer these questions, three clips would be shown in 
the middle of the discussion. All of the clips are taken from the three historical television 
dramas that I use as case studies. The first clip is a family gathering scene from The Great 
Emperor Hanwu, where the Queen mother of the Emperor Wu tries to persuade the 
Emperor himself into making his brother his successor; because the Emperor distrusts his 
brother, he showed his disagreement and thus argued with his mother. The second clip is 
from The Bronze TeethⅠ; it is a gift presentation ceremony at the birthday party for the 
Queen mother of the Emperor Qianlong, where one of the protagonists, Xiaolan Ji, an 
official with great integrity, plays a practical joke on Shen He, a notoriously corrupt official 
in the Qianlong Period. The third one is the scene of Jing Ke‘s attempted assassination of 
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the Emperor Qin from The First Emperor. According to China‘s mainstream official 
historical interpretation, Jing is widely known as a historical symbol for loyalty and 
bravery for his attempt to assassinate Emperor Qin in order to protect his own country of 
Yan from being invaded and unified by the Kingdom of Qin. It is also worth noting two 
important reasons for choosing this particular scene: on the one hand, the story of Jing Ke‘s 
attempted assassination of the Emperor Qin is one of the most well-known events of 
ancient Chinese history, which has been adapted into quite a few television and film works; 
on the other hand, The First Emperor was being repeatedly broadcast on Chinese television 
during the time of my field work. Due to these two reasons, I argue that the respondent 
would find it easy to take the scene as a reference point to touch upon relevant issues. I 
shall introduce these three case-study drama texts in some detail in my cultural genre 
analysis of contemporary Chinese historical dramas later in Chapter 5. Finally, all the focus 
groups were recorded with the respondents‘ permission; in case of technical glitches, I used 
two audio recorders.  
 
4.3.3 In-depth interviews 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, Jonathan Gray (2003), in his work on the viewers of The 
Simpsons, finds that many of the anti-fans and non-fans can also provide a lengthy and 
impressive in-depth analysis of the cartoon. He therefore proposes that ‗we must look to 
anti-fans and non-fans as well, and study how the text changes as it meets different 
audiences and viewing environments‘ (ibid. p79). He argues that this way represents the 
future of audience research. Inspired by Gray‘s concept of fan/anti-fan, while the focus 
group was being conducted, I had 11 sit-down in-depth interviews with those individuals 
who expressed relatively extreme like or dislike about the historical television drama. 
Differently from the focus groups dealing with ‗regular viewers‘, in-depth interviews 














 Beijing Changsha 
fans three males (two young, one 
middle-aged) and two young 
females 
two males (one young adult, one 




One middle-aged female one middle-aged female 
 
In-depth interview participants would also be asked to fill in the same questionnaire as the 
one used in the focus groups. Each one of them, on average, lasted for one hour; it took an 
open-structured form. All the in-depth interviews were recorded as well.  
 
4.4 Data analysis 
 
The accomplishment of focus groups and in-depth interviews was by no means the end of 
my research practice. Ien Ang (1996), in her book Living room wars: rethinking media 
audience for a postmodern world, reminds us that: 
 
The collection of data, either quantitative or qualitative in form, can never be separated 
from its interpretation; it is only through practices of interpretive theorizing that unruly 
social experiences and events related to media consumption become established as 
meaningful ‗facts‘ about audiences. Understanding ‗audience activity‘ is thus caught up 
in the discursive representation, not the transparent reflection, of diverse realities 
pertaining to people‘s engagements with media (Ang, 1996, p45-p46). 
 
By differentiating ‗the discursive representation‘ from ‗the transparent reflection‘, in my 
understanding, Ang argues for a discursive turn in an interpretation of audience research 
data; she brings to the fore the position of reflexivity in contemporary audience research.  
  
As far as my research is concerned, it has to involve two levels of reflexivity in the process 
of data analysis. The first level, which is also the technical level, deals with the research 
data itself. As the subject of my research mainly concerns the audiences‘ response, the data 
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drawn from the cultural genre analysis needs to be used in alignment with that from the 
focus groups and in-depth interviews. It took me two and a half months to fully transcribe 
all the interviews from May 2008. In dealing with the interview transcription, I chose to 
make a manual qualitative data analysis. By making a qualitative data analysis, it is my 
intention to take a different stance from such classic linguistics informed analytical tools as 
conversational analysis (Hutchby & Wooffitt 1998), the ethnography of communication 
(Hymes 1972), and critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1995). Inspired by the concept 
of grounded theory (Strauss 1987), however, I analysed the interview transcriptions 
without setting any agenda in advance. According to Strauss, the methodological thrust of 
the grounded theory approach to qualitative data can be understood as below:  
 
[It] is toward the development of theory, without any particular commitment to specific 
kinds of data, lines of research, or theoretical interests. So, it is not really a specific 
method or technique. Rather, it is a style of doing qualitative analysis that includes a 
number of distinct features, such as theoretical sampling, and certain methodological 
guidelines, such as the making of constant comparisons and the use of a coding 
paradigm, to ensure conceptual development and density (Strauss, 1987, p5). 
 
As Chapters 6-8 are devoted to a detailed findings analysis, I shall not go to any length to 
present any particular theme based on my findings. Rather, it is at least worth noting at this 
point that, from the interview data, there emerged three important modes of audience 
response that I need to address here; they provided me with significant clues to further 
explore the audience‘s deep engagement with historical television drama.  
  
First, there is the use of analogy. My respondents tend to use all sorts of analogies to 
describe their understanding of the historical television drama. The following are a few 
examples: 
 
     For me, The Bronze Teeth is like a modern TV sit-com in the guise of old costumes 
(female, aged 24, accountant) 
 
For those who are fans of this kind of historical television drama, they can be really 
loyal to this kind of thing. When they smell it on television, they don‘t miss a single 
episode (male, aged 24, assistant mechanical engineer) 
 
It is true that some serious historical dramas are very slow, but it is not a bad thing. It is 





The use of analogy reflects the respondents‘ multi-dimensional engagement with the 
historical television drama; for example, making an analogy between historical drama and 
life in the last quotation above demonstrates the respondent‘s social imagination of a better 
life through his viewing experience. 
 
Second, there is a sense of sureness. When a respondent feels very certain of what he or 
she says about the historical television drama, he or she is also making a firm value 
judgment. A couple of examples of this are detailed below: 
 
I do think that there is a lot that we can learn from the historical television drama 
(female, aged 25, middle school teacher) 
 
Anything that gets broadcast on the CCTV must be politically correct; it can‘t go 
against the Central Government (female, aged 24, bank clerk) 
 
By using the terms like ‗do think‘, ‗must be‘ and ‗cannot‘, these two young female 
audiences express great certainty in whatever they comment on. This sense of sureness 
deserves in-depth analysis. In the first quote above, for example, this respondent‘s learning 
attitude has to be contextualized in different viewing situations. In the second quote, 
although this female bank clerk does not directly criticize the strict governmental control, 
her strong tone implies some extent of disapproval and even disappointment, which needs 
to be analysed. 
 
Third, there is a sense of uncertainty. Here are some examples: 
 
When it comes to the importance of historical accuracy, I think it depends… Sometimes, 
it doesn‘t bother me (female, aged 40, bank clerk) 
 
      I think this kind of television historical drama may be more attractive to elderly people 
and those who are interested in politics (male, aged 50, university teacher) 
 
      The Bronze Teeth is not quite the same as a serious historical drama; it is between a 
serious drama and a comedy one (male, aged 48, technician) 
 
These respondents take a quite relaxed attitude towards different generic characteristics of 
the historical television drama. This relaxed attitude cannot simply be treated as an act of 
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negligence; rather, in John Corner‘s words, it should be understood as the audience‘s 
‗unwitting affiliation‘ with historical television, which may contribute to the discursive 
formation of the genre as a cultural category (Corner 2007b).  
  
The second level of reflexivity is on the use of focus group as a research method in the 
Chinese context. In an analysis of the interview data, I need to take this issue into 
consideration, because it is always the unsaid that matters more than what is said. As 
previously discussed, critical reception analysis, which is commonly used in the field of 
international media research, is generally absent in Chinese journals (Zhou 2006). Focus 
groups are therefore, still new to many media scholars, not to mention the general public; 
for all of my respondents, it was their first time attending a group discussion like this for an 
academic purpose.  
 
As a matter of fact, for those Chinese people who were born in the 1940s and 1950s, they 
have been used to attending public meetings organized by their affiliated organizations to 
listen to and discuss the documents (wenjian) issued by various levels of the government; 
although these ‗public meetings‘ allow people to express their own opinions to a varying 
degree, their aims is to mobilize the public for particular purposes and thus reach some 
consensus in the end. Against this backdrop, it would be interesting to see how the Chinese 
public behave in a focus group discussion. 
  
In general, most of my respondents took a very corporate attitude towards the research; 
they were quite aware of the fact that what I was doing was a piece of academic research 
so that what they needed to do was just to answer my questions one by one. However, there 
were a few unexpected situations that I found myself in but are worth some reflection. In a 
young adult and a middle-aged adult focus group respectively, a young girl and a middle-
aged lady straightforwardly challenged me more than once by asking me why I chose to 
pursue a Ph.D. abroad working on such a ‗popular culture subject like this‘ as well as 
‗taking it so seriously‘; by asking me this question, they showed much impatience in 
continuing with the discussion.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the young girl obtained a first degree in Chinese literature and 
the middle-aged lady is a senior manager in a high-profile private-owned dairy products 
company. Their impatient attitudes reminded me of American media scholar Ellen Seiter‘s 
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article Making distinction in TV audience research (1990). In that article, Seiter documents 
an interview with two middle-class, middle-aged men; rather than cooperating and working 
with the two interviewers, as had other interviewees in the soap opera project, these two 
were especially interested, according to Seiter, in showing off their knowledge of television 
and their superior taste. The acts of those two female respondents in my research were 
quite similar to what the two middle-class and middle-aged men did in Seiter‘s research; 
they tell us that it is only at a certain level of social scale, where you are dealing with 
people who have a considerable degree of cultural power and self-confidence that your 
respondents actually confront you in such a straightforward way. More importantly, it also 
reminds us that a hierarchy of taste does exist in Chinese audiences‘ response to historical 
television drama.  
 
 Another unexpected situation occurred in a middle-aged focus group held in Changsha. 
When it came to the third question regarding the quality of historical television drama, the 
discussion soon turned into a heated debate about all kinds of social problems in 
contemporary Chinese society. The discussion started drifting away when one male 
respondent questioned the educational impact of the historical drama on young people; it 
then sparked much criticism about the status quo of high school education in China. After 
that, corruption and inequality in Chinese society became the topic. The respondents were 
so much involved in the discussion that they could not stop talking about ‗real‘ social 
problems until I began showing them a clip in order to direct the discussion back to my 
research questions.  
 
From this, it can be seen that deep concerns about social problems in contemporary 
Chinese society are being increasingly more expressed by the Chinese public; whenever 
they are offered an opportunity to raise their own concerns, most of them will not hesitate 
to take it. In this sense, the use of focus groups in researching Chinese society and culture 
can provide an alternative public space for the Chinese public to have their voices heard; at 
the same time, it requires researchers be more reflexive about the relationship between the 




My research project entails a qualitative approach to studying the reception of historical 
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television drama on Chinese television. As a critical television reception study, it makes an 
original contribution to two main areas from a methodological point of view. First, it 
utilizes a cultural genre analysis to critically examine the historical television drama. 
Unlike traditional genre studies which are characterised as a series of textual and narrative 
analyses, a cultural genre analysis covers a full range of issues concerning media industries, 
audiences, policy, critics, and historical contexts. My research project, in particular, adopts 
textual interpretation, document analysis, industry interviews as well as audience research 
to rethink the historical television drama as a cultural genre.  
 
Second, the use of focus groups and in-depth interviews and, more importantly, their 
recruitment criteria, fill a gap in researching contemporary Chinese audience-hood. It is 
worth remembering that the use of focus groups needs to be embedded within a particular 
socio-cultural context; in the case of my research, focus groups can serve as an alternative 
public space for the Chinese public to express their deep concerns about society, which are 
not always found in other mass media content.  
 
Also, it needs to be acknowledged that this research project has a few methodological 
limitations. The biggest one is the size of the audience sample; if I had had been able to 
recruit more respondents, the research outcomes would have been more scientifically 
convincing. The second limitation is the limited number of industry interviews, because it 
was difficult to secure appointments. Finally, the use of computer-assisted data analysis 
software points to the future of audience research; a combination of manual and computer-
assisted data analysis is supposed to enhance a better understanding of audience activity in 



















In Chapter 3, attention was given to the political and cultural contexts under which the new 
historical drama emerged in China since the mid-1990s. From the discussion, it was 
demonstrated that what distinguishes Chinese historical drama since the mid-1990s resides 
in its vivid narration of contemporary political and social issues in the guise of historical 
representation. As far as its sub-genres are concerned, the new historical drama mainly 
includes emperor drama (like The Last Emperor), anti-corruption satirical costume drama 
(like Hunchback Liu the Prime Minister) and period drama (like Yongzheng Dynasty).  
 
Faced with this diversity and complexity, American media scholar Michael Curtin (2005), 
in his article From kung fu to imperial court: Chinese historical drama, defines Chinese 
historical drama as ‗a stylized genre in which contrived roles and events provide a pretext 
for reflection upon the usefulness of myth and legend for a modern world‘ (p312). Here, 
there are two important notions in Curtin‘s definition. The first one is a stylized genre. In 
his article, Curtin goes on to explain the ‗style‘ of the historical drama in a general sense; 
that is, ‗such dramas are putatively about the past, but they are also about contemporary 
concerns‘ (ibid.). Second, ‗a pretext for reflection‘ also serves as a useful concept. By using 
this concept, Curtin rightly points out the nature of the historical drama as a corpus of 
cultural resources; it is through engaging with and reflecting on the roles and events of the 
past that the Chinese audience is encouraged to make sense of particular historical 
representations from a contemporary perspective. 
 
Although he defines Chinese historical drama in quite a convincing way, what Curtin fails 
to question in this article is the category of ‗the historical‘ itself. As mentioned previously, 
‗the historical‘ has become an umbrella term in contemporary China, referring to a full 
range of television dramas connected with the treatment of history (mainly pre-modern), 
explorations of key pre-modern events and figures as well as adaptations of classic novels. 
At the same time, the use of ‗the historical‘ as a term is highly unstable. ‗Serious history‘ 
(zhengshuo lishi) versus ‗popular history‘ (xishuo lishi) remains the most common 
dichotomy made within the Chinese television industry and academia towards this rather 
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broad genre of ‗historical television‘. In discussing the global historical television 
phenomenon, British historian Jerome de Groot suggests that we consider the ways 
historical television has ‗complicated ‗‗history‘‘ to the point that the ‗‗historical‘‘ becomes a 
genre itself to be challenged and subverted‘ (de Groot, 2009, p181). Back to my own study 
of Chinese historical drama, the diverse and inconsistent use of ‗the historical‘ prompts the 
question of how ‗the historical‘ is brought to life through narrating contemporary Chinese 
political and social issues within the historical drama text. In other words, what needs to be 
examined is how Chinese historiographical traditions are manifested in the contemporary 
historical drama‘s production and consumption processes. 
 
Within this chapter, I will focus on the generic characteristics of the historical drama, but it 
is worth emphasising at this point that an interrogation of the textual production of the 
historical television drama paves the way for the reception analysis that this thesis moves 
on to later. As discussed in the literature review, the paradigm of Chinese audience research 
has shifted from an Encoding/Decoding model (see Lull 1991) to a reflexive sociological 
approach that addresses issues concerning the question of cultural citizenship of particular 
social groups (see Fung 2002b, 2003 & 2009). This paradigmatic shift suggests a crucial 
trend in conducting critical audience research in contemporary China. That is, moving 
beyond Lull‘s use of the Encoding/Decoding model, which was based on the thesis of 
cultural resistance by the Chinese television audience, we now adopt a more nuanced and 
multidimensional approach to examine the articulation and disarticulation of contemporary 
China‘s authoritarian politics and their interpretation by Chinese audiences. In the case of 
the historical television drama, first of all, we need to tease out the interpretive possibilities 
provided by the genre which allow audiences to engage in viewing practices. It is these 
interpretive possibilities that work to keep the concept of the historical valid for the 
historical television drama. This chapter therefore intends to undertake a cultural genre 
analysis to examine the generic characteristics of the historical television drama. 
 
In Chapter 2, I introduced the cultural approach to television genres proposed by Jason 
Mittell (2004). Inspired by Foucault‘s historical model of genealogy (see Chapter 2), 
Mittell argues that television genre is ‗a process of categorization‘; it is ‗not found within 
media texts, but operates across the cultural realms of media industries, audiences, policy, 
critics, and historical contexts‘ (ibid. xii). Meanwhile, according to him, the categorical 
rubric, not the textual property of a given genre, should be the primary site and material for 
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genre analysis. Useful as it may be, Mittell‘s approach can be problematic in the study of 
Chinese television culture. The main problem, as I have pointed out, lies in its inheritance 
of a Foucauldian legacy that regards power as diffused and discursive. This, however, is 
problematic when addressing the strict state supervision of television production and 
broadcasting that prevails in China. As Wang (2001) reminds us, unlike modern liberal 
states and neo-liberal states in Europe and the United States, the Party-state apparatus 
remains the ultimate power in Chinese cultural production. It would therefore be naïve to 
directly apply a theory like Mittell‘s cultural genre approach to the Chinese situation, 
although this approach is appropriate as applied to the American broadcasting system. As a 
consequence, because of its theoretical limitations, I shall still use Mittell‘s approach as an 
analytical tool to unpack the historical television drama in China, but vigilance is required 
about how state intervention of all sorts might impact the production, distribution and 
reception of drama programmes. 
 
This chapter consists of four sections. The first section is devoted to briefly introducing 
three sample drama series including The Bronze Teeth (tiechi tongya jixiaolan) (2000- ), 
The Great Emperor Hanwu (hanwu dadi) (2005), and The First Emperor (qin shi huang) 
(2006). The storylines and major theatrical features of the series are provided as indicative 
of contemporary Chinese historical television drama as a whole genre. These sample series 
will be used as case studies in discussions of the genre issues which arise. Section Two is 
focused on the Chinese television drama industry. The aim of this section is to look at how 
the Chinese television drama industry categorizes and evaluates historical drama through 
its production, regulatory, marketing and scheduling practices. The third section turns to 
television scholarship on the genre issues of the historical drama. It revisits the relevant 
work done by four important television scholars in China. Importantly, these television 
scholars approach the genre issues mainly from a textual perspective. The final section 
summarises the whole chapter and lays the foundations for the next stage of analysis, 
which concentrates on audience responses to the historical television drama. 
 
5.2 A brief introduction to three historical dramas 
 
As I have mentioned in Chapter 4, the reasons why I chose the three historical dramas as 
case studies are two-fold. On the one hand, when it comes to the sub-genre question of 
historical television drama, they well represent a range from serious drama to popular 
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drama, which is considered the most important distinction by Chinese popular cultural 
critics. In general, The First Emperor largely relies on historical record, presenting itself in 
a historically realistic fashion. Although based on historical record in terms of its 
characters and storyline, The Great Emperor Hanwu is characterised by its strong 
melodramatic elements. In contrast to these two serious dramas, The Bronze Teeth is a 
widely-recognized popular historical series. On the other hand, from a chronological point 
of view, the production and broadcasting of these dramas covers a period of ten years 
(from 1999 to 2009). This period witnessed great changes in the content and artistic style 
of the historical television drama. Bearing these points in mind, I shall briefly introduce the 
three historical dramas in this section in order to provide the necessary background detail. 
 
The Bronze Teeth 
 
Produced by Beijing Yahuan Audio-visual Production, a Beijing-based commercial 
television company, The Bronze Teeth ran for four seasons 
on Chinese television from its debut on Beijing Television 
Satellite Channel in 2000. Set in the Qianlong Period 
(1711-1799) of the Qing Dynasty, The Bronze Teeth tells 
the story of how Emperor Qianlong (played by Tielin 
Zhang) along with his two closest high officials, the royal 
literary official Xiaolan Ji (played by Guoli Zhang) and the 
Minister of Revenue Shen He (played by Gang Wang), 
deal with political power struggles and corruption within 
different levels of government.  
 
According to China‘s prominent historical records, Emperor Qianlong showed his great 
affection for both Ji and He, although they were known as having conflicting working 
styles and moral behaviors; Ji is commemorated by most Chinese historians for his honesty, 
integrity and insistence on legal governance, whereas He is notorious for his greed, 
ingenuity and playing dirty politics. Therefore, the whole story of The Bronze Teeth is 
centred around melodramatic representation of clashes between Ji and He due to the 
differences in their political and moral values. Even the title of the series, the bronze teeth 
(tong ya), is used as a metaphor referring to Ji because of his powerful verbal language 
skills. In every episode there is always a scene where Ji confronts He in a sarcastic way 
Figure 1       source: web picture 
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that serves as the climax.  
 
Unlike those emperor series like Yongzheng Dynasty (1997) and Qianlong Dynasty (2002), 
which are adapted from Er Yuehe‘s historical novels and claim to be based on prominent 
classic Chinese historical records, notably the Records of the Qing Period (qing shi gao), 
The Bronze Teeth moves away from official historical records and sets a tone of popular 
costume drama in general. Although using quite a few real historical figures, it draws on 
storytelling resources from folklore (minjian chuanshuo) and non-official historical 
documents (ye shi). In terms of artistic style, it is characterised as a hybridisation of 
historical realism, contemporary satire and popular romance. Take the first season of The 
Bronze Teeth (2000) for instance. This 40-episode series consists of five separate stories 
which feature corruption, abuse of power, political hypocrisy as well as love affairs. Most 
importantly, all the stories are set at the level of local officials rather than simply in the 
royal court. With diverse theatrical features including tragedy, comedy and martial arts, 
they effectively portray a fictional ‗public realm‘ (min jian) full of excessive moral 
struggles.   
  
 
The Great Emperor Hanwu 
 
Compared to popular television series like The Bronze Teeth, 
The Great Emperor Hanwu is typical of an epic production 
on contemporary Chinese television. This 58-part television 
drama was co-produced by China Central Television (CCTV) 
and China Film Group Corporation (CFGC), which are 
China‘s largest state-owned media organizations in the 
sectors of television and film respectively. Apart from the 
CCTV and the CFGC, four private-owned media production 
companies also co-funded The Great Emperor Hanwu; they 
include Century Hero Film Investment Company Ltd., 
Beijing Hualu Baina Film and Television Production Company Ltd., Shanghai Jinde Film 
Company and Xintian International Group Corporation. With a huge cast of more than 
1,700 characters, this epic drama series represents a 54-year period of the Han Dynasty 
(206 BC – 220 AD) under the reign of Emperor Wu, who was the seventh Han emperor 
Figure 2       source: web picture 
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from 141 BC to 87 BC.  
 
According to China‘s mainstream interpretation of ancient Chinese history, it is due to the 
wise leadership of Emperor Wu that China under the Han Dynasty became the most 
powerful country in the world at the time. It is widely acknowledged that Wu 
accomplished two important political achievements when he was in power. On the one 
hand, he successfully strengthened centralized state power by cracking down on local 
separatist movements as well as defeating the Xiongnu people‘s20 invasion of China. On 
the other hand, in the process of attacking the royal family‘s abuse of power and 
governmental corruption, he played the decisive role in the implementation of 
Confucianism as the state political philosophy in pre-modern China. Based on these two 
achievements the series The Great Emperor Hanwu offers a dramatic portrayal of events in 
the Han Dynasty under Wu‘s reign. 
 
The Great Emperor Hanwu has three main theatrical characteristics. First, it re-emphasises 
a historically realist style in representing important historical events. In an interview in 
2006 (Meng 2006), Mei Hu, the director of the series, says that what she intended to 
achieve with The Great Emperor Hanwu was not simply, as most of the previous emperor 
dramas did, to put the political power struggle within the imperial court on the television 
screen. More importantly, in order to better demonstrate the glorious military power of the 
Emperor Wu period, she insisted on recreating prominent battle scenes between the Han 
and the Xiongnu armies in a spectacular way through a combination of actual shooting and 
digital visual effects. Therefore, unlike the previous emperor dramas, which are mostly 
shot indoors, The Great Emperor Hanwu has almost the same number of outdoor scenes 
involving battles as indoor ones. Second, although it to a large extent maintains a realist 
mode of storytelling, the series also contain strong melodramatic elements. These 
melodramatic elements are mainly used to represent the characters‘ inner conflicts caused 
by all sorts of ethical dilemmas.  
 
                                                        
20 The Xiongnu were ancient nomadic-based people that formed a state or confederation north of the agriculture-based 
empire of the Han Dynasty. Chinese sources from the 3rd century BC report them as having created an empire under 
Modu Chanyu, the supreme leader after 209 BC. The identity of the ethnic core of Xiongnu has been a subject of varied 
hypotheses, because only a few words, mainly titles and personal names, were preserved in the Chinese sources. The 
name Xiongnu may be cognate to the name Huns, but the evidence for this is controversial. This empire stretched beyond 
the borders of modern day Mongolia. Relations between early Chinese dynasties and the Xiongnu were complex, with 




At this point, it is worth saying a few words to differentiate the notion of melodrama in 
Europe from that in China. Christine Geraghty (2006), in her discussion of British soap 
opera Eastenders, proposes that there has been a shift from traditional realist modes to 
melodramatic modes in the storylines of Eastenders over the last few years. By referring to 
Zygmunt Bauman‘s book (2002) on risk society, Geraghty (2006) argues that ‗the turn to 
melodrama (of Eastenders) can be understood as a way of trying to fill the vacuum created 
by the instabilities and lack of trust (in British society) that Bauman describes‘ (p226). 
However, in his discussion on Taiwanese film director Ang Lee‘s Wedding Banquet21, Chris 
Berry (2003) points out that, in the Chinese language, the European notion of melodrama 
was translated as wenyipian that literally means ‗literature and art film‘ because of many 
similar dramaturgical characteristics between them.  
 
Using the family melodrama as an example, he further argues, the distinction between the 
European family melodrama and the Chinese family-morality drama (jiating lunli ju) is 
apparent; it ‗produces a tension between two different models of secular subjectivity, one 
based on psychology and its expression and the other based on ethically defined social and 
kinship roles‘ (Berry, 2003, p186). In addition, as I have noted previously, Chinese 
government strictly censors the themes of China‘s television drama productions. Thus, 
Chinese television dramas are doomed to send positive, political messages to the general 
public. Unlike the melodramas in European countries, therefore, contemporary Chinese 
television drama is not merely a popular television genre. More importantly, it is burdened 
with political agendas. For example, the relationship between Emperor Wu and his mother 
is depicted as a major conflict in the series. Emperor Wu needs to be wary of the Queen 
Mother‘s constant intervention in his political decisions and at the same time shows her 
great care and respect.  
 
Third, The Great Emperor Hanwu adopts a cast comprised of celebrity actors and actresses 
from the Greater China region. For instance, Huang Jiao and Baoguo Chen, both of whom 
are popular mainland Chinese actors for their performances as emperor figures in previous 
dynasty dramas, also play two important roles in the series; Jiao plays Emperor Jing (188 
BC – 141 BC), the father of Emperor Wu and Chen plays Emperor Wu. Meanwhile, in 
                                                        
21 The Wedding Banquet, directed by Ang Lee, is a 1993 film about a gay Taiwanese immigrant man in the United States 
who marries a mainland Chinese woman to placate his parents and get her a green card. His plan backfires when his 
parents arrive in the U.S. to plan his wedding banquet. 
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order to attract audiences from Hong Kong and Taiwan as well as the attention of 
television drama buyers in those two regions, the series includes three non-mainland 
Chinese television stars. Ray Lui, a well-known Hong Kong actor, plays Qing Wei, one of 
the greatest generals of the Han period. Ya-Lei Kuei, an award-winning Taiwanese actress, 
plays the Queen Mother. Shih Chang, also from Taiwan, took the role of Fen Tian, the 
uncle of Emperor Wu.  
 
The First Emperor  
Similar to The Great Emperor Hanwu, The First Emperor is 
another epic television series produced by the CCTV. It is 
based on the story of Zheng Ying, the founder as well as the 
first emperor of the Qin dynasty (221BC – 207 BC). Although 
it only lasted for 15 years, the Qin dynasty was the first unified 
Han-Chinese state and it marked the beginning of more than 
two thousand years of Chinese ancient history. Because of that, 
Chinese historians often call Zheng Ying the First Emperor (shi 
huangdi). Within China‘s mainstream history text books in the 
post-Mao era, the First Emperor is in general portrayed as a heroic but controversial 
historical figure.  
 
On the one hand, it was under his strong leadership that the Kingdom of Qin took ten years 
to unify the other six Han-Chinese kingdoms at the time and thereafter became the first 
Chinese empire in 221 BC. For the first time in Chinese history, a centralized 
administrative system was introduced by the First Emperor to govern the entire country. 
The country was divided into 36 counties (jun) and a county consisted of a certain number 
of towns (xian). The officials of both counties and towns were directly appointed by the 
Emperor himself. At the same time, it was also under his supervision that laws were passed 
to ensure the standard use of the Chinese language system and Chinese unit of 
measurement across the country.  
 
On the other hand, the First Emperor is always criticised for his cruel dictatorship by 
Chinese historians. In building up his private palace as well as his own magnificent tomb, 
for example, he is said to have forced more than 700,000 ordinary men together with 
prisoners to work on the palace and the tomb as a form of unpaid national service. Also, 
Figure 3 source: web picture 
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the First Emperor notoriously ordered most existing books to be burned with the exception 
of those on astrology, agriculture, medicine, divination and the history of the Qin dynasty. 
What is more, as he refused to take advice from Confucian scholars on the practice of 
moral governance, the Emperor even had more than four hundreds scholars buried alive for 
owning forbidden books. 22  The First Emperor‘s immoral rule finally led to a massive 
peasants‘ rebellion organized by Sheng Chen and Guang Wu one year after he died. The 
rebellion resulted in the collapse of Qin dynasty in 207 BC.  
 
Like other epic emperor dramas, this 36-part series narrates all the important events in the 
life of the First Emperor. It was filmed between 1999 and 2000 and was first released in 
2001 in Hong Kong and Thailand, and in 2002 in Singapore. However, it was not approved 
for broadcast on mainland Chinese television because it had to endure censorship from the 
CCTV‘s Drama Unit. The initial version of the series had 32 episodes and two main 
adaptation issues were raised by the Drama Unit. First, the historians of the Drama Unit 
cast doubt on the way that the controversy surrounding the birth of the First Emperor was 
dealt with in the series. There have long been historical questions among Chinese 
academics about who were the birth parents of the Emperor. Yet the original television 
series seems to have treated this in an over-straightforward manner. Second, in the original 
version, the love affair between the First Emperor and a princess named A Nuo constituted 
an important part of the drama content. Interestingly enough, the love affair was judged to 
be over-emphasised and thus unacceptable by the Drama Unit. This section was re-edited 
and the series was not allowed to be shown on CCTV until 2006, five years after it had 
appeared in Hong Kong and Thailand. 
 
Having briefly introduced the three case-study historical dramas, I shall next move on to 
take the second step of my cultural genre analysis looking at the Chinese television drama 
industry. The practice of categorization and evaluation of historical drama by the television 
industry can provide an important starting point for the audience to make sense of the 
genre.  
                                                        
22 According to China‘s well-known Records of the Grand Historian (shi ji), after the Emperor unified China in 221 BC, 
his chancellor Li Si suggested that he suppress the intellectual discourse to unify all thoughts and political opinions. This 
was justified by accusations that the intelligentsia sang false praise and raised dissent through libel. Beginning in 213 BC, 
all classic works of the Hundred Schools of Thought (zhuzi baijia sixiang) — except those from Li Si's own school of 
philosophy known as legalism (fa jia) — were subject to book burning. The Emperor burned the other histories out of 





5.3 Television industry 
 
Based on my document analysis and industry interviews, I will divide the evolution of 
Chinese historical drama into three stages: 1984-1992, 1992-2004, and 2004 to the present. 
At each stage, the meaning of ‗the historical‘ has been conditioned by certain literary, 
production, scheduling and regulatory circumstances. The phase between 1984 and 1992 
not only witnessed Chinese television industry‘s recovery from the Cultural Revolution. 
Chinese television drama also started to become more mature and diverse in terms of 
content and style during this period. It is between 1984 and 1989 that historical drama 
appeared as a new genre on Chinese television in greater numbers. The prominent 
examples are the Dream of the Red Chamber (hong lou meng, 1986), Strange Tales of A 
Lonely Studio23 (liaozhai zhiyi, 1986), Journey to the West (xiyouji, 1987), and The Last 
Emperor (modai huangdi, 1988). Most of these dramas were based on popular literary 
work, so the term ‗literary adaptation‘ (wenxue gaibian) was often used referring to 
historical drama by the television drama directors at the time (see Li & Xiao 2006).  
 
According to Chinese television historical drama researcher Liwen Liu (2004), these 
literary adaptations produced in mainland China fell into three categories: classic ancient 
Chinese novels (zhongguo gudian xiaoshuo, like the Dream of the Red Chamber), ancient 
legendary folklores (minjian shenhua chuanshuo, like Strange Tales of A Lonely Studio) 
and contemporary historical novels (dangdai lishi xiaoshuo, like The Last Emperor). Apart 
from their literary origins, these dramas have two other characteristics that are worth 
special attention. First, they were all produced by the state-owned television studios, 
mainly those affiliated to CCTV or provincial television stations. Under the strict 
supervision of China‘s Central Ministry of Propaganda (zhong xuan bu), Chinese television 
dramatists were required to dogmatically follow the so-called Marxist literary and artistic 
principles (makesi zhuyi wenyiguan), which basically advocated that artists and writers 
                                                        
23 Strange Tales of A Lonely Studio, authored by the Qing Dynasty Chinese writer Songling Pu (1640-1715), is a 
collection of nearly five hundred mostly supernatural tales written in Classical Chinese during the early Qing Dynasty. Pu 
borrowed from a folk tradition of oral storytelling to put to paper a series of captivating, colorful stories, where the 
boundary between reality and the odd or fantastic is blurred. The cast of characters include magical foxes, ghosts, 
scholars, court officials, Taoist exorcists and beasts. Moral purposes are often inverted between humans and the 
supposedly degenerate ghosts or spirits, resulting in a satirical edge to some of the stories. Ghosts and spirits are often 
bold and trustworthy, while humans are on the other hand weak, indecisive and easily manipulated, reflecting the author's 
own disillusionment with his society.The stories differ broadly in length. Conciseness is the key, with the shortest stories 
under a page in length. 
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serve the people and the socialist system, adopting a social realism style in their work. In 
this political climate, as Chinese media critics Li and Xiao comment (2006), Chinese 
television dramatists throughout the 1980s ‗treated the historical or literary subjects in a 
relatively serious manner compared to those in the 1990s‘ (p23). 
 
This ‗seriousness‘, in my understanding, well reflected the dramatists‘ ideological and 
rhetorical burdens that were imposed by the central authority at the time. Meanwhile, the 
‗seriousness‘ effectively set a ‗quality‘ standard for the historical drama. This quality 
standard can be characterised as a strong combination of literary accuracy and moral 
instruction. Second, as well as the inherited Chinese literary tradition, these productions 
were also influenced by productions from abroad, notably in their adoption of the serial 
format. For instance, the Dream of the Red Chamber has 36 episodes and The Last 
Emperor 28 episodes, with each episode running for about 45 minutes. What is more, most 
of these dramas debuted on the CCTV-1, the most watched television channel in the 
country, in the evening slot between 8pm and 8:45pm, which became China‘s daily 
national television prime time throughout the 1980s until the present. From all that, one 
can say that historical drama on Chinese television in the 1980s performed a dual cultural 
function: promoting national literary heritage on the one hand, and providing mass 
entertainment on the other.  
  
In the second stage between 1992 and 2004, Chinese historical drama experienced 
enormous transformation in both its content and its sub-genres. Most importantly, the 
dichotomy between ‗serious drama‘ (zheng ju) and ‗popular drama‘ (xishuo ju) emerged in 
the public discussion about historical drama in the mid-1990s. Taiwanese television culture 
and the ongoing commercialization of Chinese television worked together to generate and 
reinforce this dichotomy.  
 
With regards to the influence of Taiwanese television culture, Curtin (2005, 2007) revisits 
this important political and cultural change which had much impact on contemporary 
Taiwanese and Chinese television culture. According to him (2005), ‗as martial law began 
to wither and new media outlets began to flourish‘, reformers within the Taiwanese ruling 
Kuomingtang (KMT) decided to loosen their control of China Television (CTV), one of 
three state-controlled television stations in Taiwan; the others being China Television 
System (CTS) and Taiwan Television System (TTS) controlled by the military and the 
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provincial government respectively (p297). KMT‘s decision to relax its control was made 
in response to a growing multiplicity of cable television channels and increased 
competition in the Taiwanese commercial television market. The KMT‘s reformers 
believed that cutting off the explicit ties between CTV and the party would better realize 
CTV‘s commercial objectives as well as making it more attractive as a public stock 
offering. At the same time, in order for the station not to fall into the hands of the 
opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the KMT installed managers who were 
sympathetic to the KMT at CTV. CTV transformed itself from the KMT‘s propaganda 
machine to a market-oriented business, although its core identity still revolved round ‗its 
distinctive association with Chinese arts and culture‘ (Curtin, 2005, p298). It needs to be 
made clear here that CTV‘s strong Chinese identity is to a large extent determined by 
CTV‘s spiritual resonance with the KMT, which has always been controversially in favor 
of imagining a ‗Greater China‘ (dazhongguo xiangxiang). 
 
Under these circumstances, CTV started to devote itself to producing costume drama 
(guzhuangju) for audiences in the Greater China region from the early 1990s. CTV‘s 
production of costume drama served as a historic starting point for frequent collaboration 
between Taiwanese and Chinese television producers after almost 40 years of military 
stand-off across the Straits. The 42-part Tales of Emperor Qianlong (xishuo qianlong), co-
produced by Taiwan‘s Flying Dragon Film Production and China‘s Beijing Film Studio, 
was the first pioneering series. Based on the well-known historical tale about the Qing 
Emperor Qianlong‘s visit to South China, it tells a story of the Emperor‘s wish to pursue 
freedom and true love. The serial made its first appearance on CTV in the prime time slot 
of 8pm to 9pm on weekdays between May and July in 1991. One year later in 1992, it got 
shown on most of China‘s cable television channels as well. In my view, the rise of the 
costume drama represented by Tales can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, as 
Curtin rightly observes, it came as a result of Taiwanese television producers ‗seeking 
alliance outside of the island in order to respond to local market pressures‘ (ibid. p.311). 
On the other hand, it suggested to television producers on either side of the Straits that 
despite the fact that there exists intense ideological tension between contemporary Chinese 
and Taiwanese politicians, pre-modern Chinese history provides them with much less 
sensitive and culturally specific artistic inspiration.  
 
For television dramatists in China, the success of Tales introduced them to the whole idea 
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of ‗popular historical drama‘ (xishuo lishi ju). For a proper understanding of this broad 
term ‗popular historical drama‘ in the Chinese context, I need to elaborate. Starting from 
Tales of Emperor Qianlong, Xishuo drama gradually came to be recognized by Chinese 
television dramatists as a distinctive television genre. Not based on official historical 
records but popular historical tales, a xishuo serial tends to address such issues as 
corruption, romance, tradition and identity using historical events and characters. Heavily 
influenced by Tales, a wave of popular historical dramas thus emerged in China and 
saturated prime time provincial television schedules in the mid-1990s. In Chapter 3, I have 
mentioned the 40-episode Hunchback Liu the Prime Minister (zaixiang liuluoguo), which 
was produced and distributed by Shanghai Hairun Film and Television Production in 1996. 
It is widely documented as the earliest domestically produced popular (or xishuo) historical 
drama that enjoyed massive popularity (see Li and Xiao 2006). The Bronze Teeth, one of 
my case-study historical serials, serves as a more recent example of the xishuo genre.  
 
At the same time, traditional ‗literary adaptation‘ genres that emerged in the 1980s 
continued to develop. For one thing, many classic ancient Chinese novels, for example, 
The Tales of Three Kingdoms (sanguo yanyi), which was first turned into television drama 
in the 1980s, got re-made by the state-owned television studios, mainly by CCTV. The 
introduction of new set designs and new casts to the classic literary adaptations attracted 
audiences of all ages both in China and beyond. For another, as I have discussed in Chapter 
3, the Qing emperor serials emerged. The most prominent examples have to be the novelist 
Er Yuehe‘s biographical novels of three Qing dynasty emperors (see Chapter 3). Similar to 
the popular historical drama, the emperor serials use the past to mirror the present and 
draw upon the past to satirize the present. However, the fact that they claim to be based on 
official historical records differentiates them from the popular serials.  
 
Ever since Er Yuehe‘s Qing emperor drama was a huge success on Chinese television in 
the mid-1990s, the term ‗serious drama‘ or ‗correct drama‘ has been adopted by industry 
professionals. Le Fu, a senior television drama producer from the Drama Unit of Hunan 
Television, comments on the use of the term in my interview with him. He says that 
although China‘s television dramatists still use terms like costume drama, period drama or 
emperor drama to specify a certain historical serial depending on its content and style, 
‗serious drama versus popular drama has served as the threshold showing to what extent a 
certain historical drama concerns real history since the late 1990s‘‘ (December 2007). ‗Real 
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history‘ is an interesting notion here. From this, it can be seen that the way of representing 
‗the historical‘ has become key in evaluating historical drama within the television industry 
since the mid-1990s. In other words, not until almost two decades after historical drama 
appeared on Chinese television did China‘s television industry professionals start to rethink 
the legitimacy question of ‗the historical‘ as a cultural category in such a straightforward 
manner. This legitimacy question reflects the changing political and cultural value of 
Chinese historical drama. It eventually led to deep controversy and further hybridisation of 
the historical drama from 2004 to the present.   
 
It is worth noting that, for the Chinese audience, the biggest attraction of Er Yuehe‘s Qing 
emperor series lies in its Chinese historiographical traditions which have been inherited 
from literary and artistic work. The series drew upon historical allegories and historical 
rewritings to explore the history and power relations of contemporary Chinese society. This 
televised practice of re-writing history reached a climax in spring 2003 when the incident 
of Towards the Republic happened. Towards the Republic (Zouxiang Gonghe), was a 
Chinese historical television series first broadcast on CCTV from April to May 2003. The 
series is based on events that occurred in China between the late 19th century and the early 
20th century that led to the collapse of the Qing Dynasty and the founding of the Republic 
of China. The series reinterpreted aspects of the historical events and actors involved. 
Therefore, its airing immediately resulted in heated public discussions in the media as well 
as in the internet. Due to its portrayal of historical issues deemed politically sensitive by 
Chinese government, the series was subject to censorship in mainland China. Some 
installments had to be edited, and its planned repeated airing in provincial television 
channels was cancelled.  
 
In a general sense, the restrictions that Towards the Republic faced in the end were 
primarily due to the reason that, as German sinologist Muller (2007) states, the serial‘s 
historical interpretation ‗did not accord with the widely-held official one supported by the 
government‘ (p3). Up to this point, I would like to propose that, unlike the seriousness 
embedded in the 1980s television literary adaptations, which wrestled with a combination 
of literary accuracy and moral instruction, the seriousness of the 2000s historical drama is 
imbued with eagerness to criticize contemporary political and social problems using 




Not surprisingly, the popularity of this televised re-writing of history soon attracted the 
attention of the Chinese authorities, the incident of Towards the Republic being an obvious 
sign. In 2004, the SARFT issued its 40
th
 regulatory policy of the year on the censorship of 
television drama attached with a document entitled ‗Concerning the Adjustment of 
Censorship Procedure for Proposals and Final Versions of Film and Television Drama on 
Very Important Revolutionary and Historical Subjects‘.24 According to the policy and the 
document, film and television producers must have approval from a special committee 
within the Central Ministry of Propaganda, rather than simply the SARFT itself, if they 
wish to deal with prominent events and figures from both ancient and modern Chinese 
history. 
 
The stricter censorship of historical drama since 2004 resulted in less and less mentions of 
the old dichotomy between serious and popular drama within Chinese popular press. I 
suggest that there are three main reasons behind this change of television culture. First of 
all, restrained by the SARFT‘s 40th Regulatory Policy in 2004, Chinese television 
dramatists became more cautious in dealing with serious historical events and figures. The 
forced re-editing of the First Emperor by CCTV‘s Drama Unit as discussed previously 
taught them a lesson.  
 
Second, moving away from the controversial Qing dynasty, China‘s veteran television 
dramatists re-emphasised the role of the historical drama in promoting Chinese culture and 
philosophy. The Great Emperor Hanwu is a case in point. As introduced earlier in this 
chapter, it tells a story of how Confucianism was established as China‘s state political 
philosophy by Emperor Wu.  
 
Last but not the least, increasingly more popular historical dramas are also devoted to 
promoting different aspects of traditional Chinese culture and societies. They have started 
to touch upon such issues as commerce, medicine and the legislative system in different 
periods of pre-modern China. Interestingly enough, the meaning of ‗being Chinese‘ has 
again been addressed within more recent Chinese historical dramas. Echoing the Harvard 
professor Wei-ming Tu‘s influential essay Cultural China: the Periphery as the Centre 
published in 1991, which I mentioned in Chapter 3, Chinese historical drama, as an 
                                                        




important part of Chinese cultural industry, seems to be an unfinished project for modern 
Chinese identity formation. 
 
Next, I shall move on to examine how prominent media scholars of Chinese television are 
critically engaging with historical drama as a genre.         
            
5.4 Television scholars 
 
When it comes to academic criticism of Chinese historical drama, although quite a few 
important scholars of Chinese media (some of whom are of Chinese origin) are based in 
North America and Australia, many more active ones come from mainland China (e.g. Li 
and Xiao, 2006; Wang, 2008; Yin, 2001, 2002, 2009; Zeng 2000, 2002). These mainland 
Chinese media scholars are under the dual influence of the domestic academic disciplinary 
tradition and Western-originated media and social theories. Unlike media work in Britain, 
for example, media studies, particularly television criticism in China, is not grounded in a 
tradition of sociology and political science; it is always theoretically-based, suspicious of 
statistical empiricism and obsessed with textual analysis of meaning and value. Looking 
back at influential criticism of television drama within China‘s academic circle in the past 
two decades, I should, first of all, mention the important debates between Beijing-based 
media scholars Qingrui Zeng and Hong Yin in the early 2000s.25  
 
Drawing on quite different cultural and political scenarios, these two scholars put forward 
a series of interesting questions concerning the innovation and commercialization of 
Chinese television. With the aim of evaluating the impact of Economic Reform on the 
Chinese television drama industry in the 1990s, Zeng published a two-part article titled ‗In 
the defense of spiritual value in television drama: a review on conflicting television drama 
culture in the 1990s‘ in 2000. In the article, he gives a full account of the development of 
the Chinese television drama industry since the early 1990s. He defines the nature of 
Chinese television drama in the 1990s as the interplay between mass culture, official 
culture and elite culture. For him, the rise of mass culture (dazhong wenhua) came as a 
result of the commercial management of the Chinese cultural industry. Official culture 
(guanfang wenhua), promoted and sustained by Chinese government, serves as a 
                                                        
25 Zeng is professor of film and television arts at Communication University of China, Beijing. Yin is professor of 
communication arts at Tsinghua University, Beijing. 
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mainstream ideology embedded in media representation. The formation of elite culture 
(jingying wenhua), according to Zeng (2000a), is attributable to ‗those Chinese 
intellectuals who are always in the pursuit of enlightenment and artistic creation‘ (p70).  
 
From the article, one can easily tell that it is from the position of elite culture that Zeng 
expresses deep worry over the commercialization of Chinese television drama. Examining 
the emergence of popular historical drama on Chinese television, for example, the 
popularity of Hunchback Liu the Prime Minster, he credits its success to the triumph of 
western-imported television consumerism in China. Instead of categorizing television 
drama like Hunchback Liu as either serious or popular, Zeng simply considers it to be 
slapstick television. Towards the end of the article, Zeng, in a rather abstract way, makes 
twelve observations on the challenges to Chinese television drama posed by the 
commercialization of Chinese television. His main concern lies in the crisis of Chinese 
national culture (minzu wenhua) in an age of cultural globalisation.  
  
One year later in 2001, two journal articles on the subject of Chinese television drama 
written by Hong Yin appeared. In his first article, Yin (2001a) adopts what he calls ‗a 
political economy analysis‘ of the development of the Chinese television drama industry 
since the early 1990s. He points out that the commercialization and de-regulation of the 
Chinese television industry led to a boom in television content in China. According to Yin, 
although the Chinese television industry is still subordinated to strict governmental 
supervision, it is through this ‗semi-marketization‘ (zhun shichanghua) status that Chinese 
television transformed itself and became integrated into regional and global television 
programme exchanges.  
 
In the second article entitled ‗Cultural strategies of Chinese television drama‘, Yin (2001b) 
begins with a criticism of Zeng‘s elitist position on contemporary Chinese television drama. 
He writes that Zeng takes ‗a culturally conservative attitude‘ towards the marketization of 
Chinese television and this cultural conservatism remains widely shared by many other 
elitist Chinese intellectuals who are ‗opposed to marketization of China‘s television 
communication in a radical way‘ (ibid. p21). Taking a somewhat Foucauldian perspective, 
Yin positions his own understanding of cultural strategies in Chinese television drama into 
a site of ideological negotiation and compromise involving the government, commercial 
television organizations and the intellectual. That is also what he believes to be the current 
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situation of the Chinese television drama industry. In order to illustrate this point, Yin uses 
the rise of new historical television drama since the mid-1990s as a case study. He claims 
that ‗the appearance of many historical dramas in recent years is an evitable result of the 
conflicts within television culture‘ (ibid. p22).  
 
He goes on to explain that ‗History‘ is distanced from all the sensitive conflicts and 
political power struggles of contemporary China, so ‗it provides a rich selection of 
resources and a more open narrative space‘ (ibid.). As far as the evolution of the historical 
drama is concerned, Yin views it as a result of various cultural, social and economic forces 
combined. According to him, costume drama like the Tales of Emperor Qianlong had no 
intention of exploring ‗contemporary China‘s political and power struggle in reality‘; it 
simply offered the Chinese public ‗pure entertainment in the disguise of historical 
representation‘ (ibid. p23). In contrast, historical dramas like the Great Emperor Hanwu, 
while adopting diverse theatrical styles, have inherited Chinese intellectuals‘ 
historiographical tradition; it not only ‗recalled history, but also simulated history‘ and 
‗provided intellectuals with a means of expression and certain rhetorical strategies‘ (ibid. 
p24). From this, it can be seen that, in Yin‘s opinion, the dichotomy between ‗the serious 
drama‘ and ‗the popular drama‘ is formulated within Chinese-style cultural market logic, 
which can be characterised as the co-existence of socialist legacies and neoliberal 
strategies. 
 
Unsurprisingly, Zeng strongly disagrees with Yin‘s optimistic attitude towards the impact 
of global market forces on Chinese television drama. In 2002, Zeng wrote another two-part 
article titled ‗Chaos and confusion of artistic institutions, cultural industry and mass 
culture‘ in response to Yin. In the article, Zeng points out that Yin conceptualizes the nature 
of Chinese popular television drama in a reductionist manner. He claims that since it first 
appeared on Chinese television in the late 1950s, television drama has played a significant 
role as a national artistic institution (guojia yishu shiye) in China. The last two decades 
witnessed the commercial transformation of the Chinese television drama industry, but, 
according to Zeng (2002b), that transformation process was intertwined with ‗not so much 
compromise and negotiation as conflict between the government, dramatist and elitist 
intellectuals‘ (p13). He reminds us that the SARFT has been exerting major influence on 
the evolution of the historical drama. Nevertheless, Zeng (2002a) argues for ‗a rational 
attitude towards positive state ideological control (youxiao guojia yishixingtai kongzhi) on 
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the national cultural industry‘ (p11). He claims that, facing the invasion of modern western 
mass culture (xiandai xifang dazhong wenhua), Chinese government decided to strengthen 
its ideological authority over cultural production in the national interest.  
 
In the case of the Chinese television drama industry, Zeng observes that Yin criticizes 
Chinese government‘s ideological control in a reductionist manner. He comments that ‗Yin 
seems to be full of illusionary romanticism for Chinese popular culture, which is similar to 
an understanding of American popular culture by US-based cultural theorist John Fiske‘ 
(2002b:13). Zeng believes that Chinese government‘s positive ideological control over the 
television drama industry is crucial for the protection of China‘s national cultural 
personality (minzu wenhua gexing). In this connection, he introduces the national cultural 
project of producing ‗mainstream melody television drama‘ (zhuxuanlu dianshiju) or 
‗quality television drama‘ (jingpin dianshiju) that has been initiated by Chinese 
government since 2000. By ‗mainstream‘ or ‗quality‘, it essentially means ‗a quality of 
maximizing the influence of positive state ideology in the logic of popular communication‘ 
(ibid. p15). Therefore, as far as Zeng is concerned, whichever sub-genre or artistic style a 
certain television drama belongs to, the main evaluation criterion lies in how well it 
performs its mainstream cultural function. 
 
From the debates between Zeng and Yin, it can be seen that these two media scholars hold 
quite different opinions as to the nature of Chinese popular television culture. Yin 
considers the rise of Chinese popular television culture to be the result of the power 
struggle between the government and the commercial television dramatists. However, 
Zeng attempts to find a possible alternative to Western modernity and capitalist 
globalisation in determining a conceptual framework of the national-popular (although not 
in a Gramscian sense) in a contemporary Chinese context. In relation to Chinese historical 
drama, therefore, these debates position the drama in a wave of post-socialist television 
criticism, within which a linkage between the historical and the popular is established and 
critically examined. This linkage not only challenges the narrowly defined dichotomy 
between ‗serious drama‘ and ‗popular drama‘ that has been often used by television 
professionals in their categorization of the historical drama. More importantly, it brings 
forward the question of ‗the popular‘ (tongsu) in a rethinking of Chinese historical drama 




Apart from media scholars like Zeng and Yin, who mostly discuss Chinese television 
drama in general, there are also media scholars in China who have studied the historical 
drama in particular (e.g. Li and Xiao, 2006; Wang, 2008). In my opinion, Researching on 
Historical Television Drama (2006) co-authored by Shengli Li and Jinghong Xiao presents 
the most comprehensive and systematic academic investigation on the historical drama. It 
is worth noting that, as both of the authors come from a traditional Chinese literary studies 
background, their discussion more or less concentrates on textual characteristics and 
assumptions.  
 
In Chapter 3, I have already referenced Li and Xiao‘s work when analyzing the rise of new 
historical novels in contemporary China. For that, they document the literary 
transformation in contemporary Chinese fictional pre-modern history writings, which is 
generally characterised by the re-emergence of emperors as heroic protagonists in 
historical representations. Within their work, as a matter of fact, the transformation of 
history writing in contemporary China is treated merely as one of the eight perspectives 
offered by Li and Xiao for a study of the historical drama; the remaining seven being 
motives of reception and production, dramatization of history, historicization of drama, 
claims of historical authenticity, Chinese literary tradition, contemporary social reality as 
well as television effects. From this list of perspectives, one can see that, although Li and 
Xiao attempt to examine the whole process of the historical drama communication from 
production and reception issues to textual and literary properties, the textual parts receive 
more attention and remain more detailed.  
 
As far as production issues are concerned, Li and Xiao put them into two main categories; 
one is intentional, the other is contextual. According to them, under the supervision of 
Chinese government, communicating historical knowledge to the general public serves as a 
significant educational goal of China‘s historical dramatists. At the same time, due to its 
mass communicative nature, a successful historical drama is supposed to ‗seamlessly 
combine the elements of history education and dramatic entertainment‘ (Li & Xiao, 2006, 
41). They go on to argue that, in order to realize educational purposes, the historical drama 
needs to involve contemporary implications. In this connection, they refer to Chinese 
literary critic Jian Ouyang‘s (2003) view on the relationship between historical fiction and 
historical fact. For Ouyang, the writing of a historical fiction is technically driven by ‗the 
author‘s unsatisfactory and suspicious attitude towards certain historical facts‘ (quoted by 
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Li & Xiao, 2006, p43). It is this unsatisfaction and suspicion that leads to continuous 
reinterpretation of the historical facts from a contemporary perspective.  
 
When it comes to the provision of ‗dramatic entertainment‘, they believe that it constitutes 
an important cultural function of Chinese television industry. For them, the so-called 
‗popular historical drama‘ is largely intended to offer mass entertainment and, in their 
words, produce ‗economic gains‘ (jingji xiaoyi), as its creative process well demonstrates a 
viewing market-driven logic; on the contrary, ‗the serious historical drama‘ puts more 
emphasis on mass education and indeed the achievement of ‗social gains‘ (shehui xiaoyi).  
 
Furthermore, Li and Xiao suggest one think through this divide between the economic gain 
and the social gain by situating it into a wide economic, cultural and political context of 
contemporary China. For one thing, they propose that the commercial operation of the 
Chinese television industry and the rise of media consumerism in Chinese society provide 
a basis for the commoditization of the production, distribution and broadcasting of the 
historical drama, although strict television content censorship system still exists. Once it 
gets approved by the SARFT to be broadcast on television channels at certain levels, the 
ultimate aim of the historical drama is to ‗attract the biggest audience numbers that it 
possibly can‘ (ibid. p163). This market-oriented pressure, according to Li and Xiao, applies 
to historical drama of all kinds whatever sub-genre it belongs.  
 
Another point they rightly observe is that the emergence of the historical drama fills in an 
important content gap on contemporary Chinese television. As cultural globalisation 
process continues, the historical drama provides the Chinese people with a televised forum 
to ‗reflect on their traditional cultural identity‘, ‗claim their spiritual heritage‘ as well as 
‗reconsider their orientation in a future order of global culture‘ (ibid. p168). Meanwhile, 
the fact that dramas related to contemporary subjects are somewhat over-burdened with 
their expected ideological function allows much space for the development of the historical 
drama in China. As previously mentioned, endorsed by Chinese government, producing 
‗mainstream melody television‘ remains the most important standard for a politically 
correct television drama in China. 
 
This forced pursuit of political correctness poses great challenge for the television 
dramatists and makes them attempt to balance propagandist function and artistic appeal in 
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dealing with contemporary social issues. Under these circumstances, as they explain, the 
production of the historical drama multiplied; sufficiently far removed from a direct 
representation of sensitive social and political situations, the historical drama, especially 
the popular incarnation, draws on story-telling resources from a mixture of ‗official 
historical records, local folklore and the contemporary social reality‘ (ibid. p174). 
  
In the treatment of the historical drama text, Li and Xiao‘s discussion falls into two main 
groupings of discourses. First, there is a question of historical accuracy. Initially, they put 
forward a dichotomy between dramatization of history (lishi de xijuhua) and historicization 
of drama (xiju de lishihua). By ‗dramatization of history‘, they refer to a historically realist 
fashion adopted by most of the so-called serious historical drama, for instance, Great 
Emperor Hanwu and The First Emperor, which is characterised by the very fact that it is 
largely based on official historical records. They continue to argue that dramatization of 
history produces two major consequences in portraying historical figures and events: 
ideologization (yishi xingtai hua) and aestheticization (shenmei hua). In the case of Er 
Yuehe‘s Qing emperor series that I mentioned in Chapter 3, Li and Xiao write that the 
serious historical drama attempts to convey strong political messages to its audiences 
through selective representation of relevant historical materials. As a result, it makes a 
highly ideological judgment on certain historical figures or events.  
 
As for the dimension of aestheticization within the historical drama, they refer it to a 
Kantian analysis of aesthetics (shenmei). According to them, Kantian version of 
aestheticization means rational human pleasure in processing authenticity, virtue and 
beauty. Importantly, it ‗supplements the concept of ideologization with an ethical (daode) 
interpretation‘ (ibid. p61) and involves both the aesthetics of content (neirong) and that of 
form (xingshi). In the example of the historical drama, Li and Xiao assert that its content 
consists of characters, settings, plots and visual-audio effect, whereas its form includes 
narratives, formats and structures. For them, it is both the content and the form that work 
together to generate aesthetical discourses around a certain historical drama. Take the First 
Emperor, they highlight the significance of choosing an appropriate actor and a balanced 
serial format in representing its protagonist the emperor Zheng Ying. 
  
By ‗historicization of drama‘, Li and Xiao focus on the role of historical representation in 
the realization of dramatic effect. They note that the term ‗historicization‘ here can be also 
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understood as ‗simulation of history‘ (nishi) (ibid. p78); it basically means staged or 
falsified history. They meticulously break down historicization of drama into two types: 
historicization of drama-in-part and historicization of drama-as-a-whole. The former type 
can be easily found in the serious historical drama (like Great Emperor Hanwu and The 
First Emperor), where some parts of the story are made up and not based on any historical 
record; it enables the television dramatist to either amend or rewrite certain historical 
moments with a view to keep them valid in a historical logic. The latter type well defines 
most of the popular historical dramas (like The Bronze Teeth), where the whole story 
narrates contemporary issues such as corruption and political power struggles using 
historical characters and settings; this illusionary artistic practice, in Li and Xiao‘s view, is 
conducted by the historical dramatist in order to avoid potential political risk on the one 
hand, and satisfy the audience‘s consumerist fetishism for history on the other.  
 
To summarise the first grouping of textual discourses, Li and Xiao suggest one extend a 
thinking of historical truth claim (lishi zhenshi) to that of artistic truth claim (yishu zhenshi), 
and in the meantime, differentiate these two concepts from each other. Historical truth 
claim, as they clarify, carries a double-layered meaning which includes: a) a reasonably 
conducted rewriting or distorting of certain historical facts with an aim to encode a logical 
historical-related message and b) a partial or complete use of certain historical records on 
certain historical figures or events. Artistic truth claim, however, operates as a discursive 
formation involving three cultural factors: a) the producer‘s sincerity during the process of 
selecting historical materials and producing the historical drama, b) the extent to which a 
certain historical figure and event is based on widely recognized historical records, and c) 
the audience‘s perceived realism in watching the historical drama. By ‗perceived realism‘, 
Li and Xiao here propose a certain level of experiential authenticity as the outcome of the 
audience‘s textual engagement with a drama text. For them, it is these two truth claims 
combined that creates a sense of historical authenticity for a certain historical drama. 
 
Li and Xiao‘s second grouping of textual discourses circulate around Chinese literary 
tradition. In the book, they point out that historical drama, as an art form, has experienced a 
long history in China since ancient times. In regard to the uniqueness of historical drama as 
a Chinese literary genre, Li and Xiao explain that this uniqueness is derived from the most 
important tradition of ancient Chinese mainstream fictional writing. That is, writers always 
preferred turning to actual historical figures and events over cultural myth or legendary 
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tales for their creative inspiration, or, as Li and Xiao phrase, ‗they adored history and 
undermined myths‘ (chongbai lishi yizhi shenhua) (ibid. p137). Li and Xiao move on to 
write that, unlike old Greek myths, which were systematic on their own, ‗primitive Chinese 
myths were lacking in interconnectedness and often contradicted each other‘ (ibid. p140). 
What is more, the rise of Confucianism from the second century in Chinese society, as they 
argue, further constrained the development of Chinese myth culture through introducing a 
series of secular political and moral principles. In brief, these principles include avoidance 
of conflict, a social hierarchy that values seniority and patriarchy and a reliance on astute 
leadership. Consequently, it is History rather than any sacred belief system that became the 
major influence on ancient Chinese fictional writings.  
 
As far as historical inaccuracy of Chinese historical drama is concerned, Li and Xiao 
believe that it should be traced back to literary nature of important Chinese historical 
records. They remind us that prominent ancient Chinese historical records are always 
characterised as a blurred boundary between history and literature. In the example of 
China‘s most well-known historical record the Records of the Grand Historian (shi ji)26 
written by the great historian Maqian Si in the Western Han period (206BC-9AD), Li and 
Xiao rightly observe that subjective elements such as the use of language, inner-world 
activity description and plot structuring often overweigh objective ones such as time, 
numbers and details involved in the historical record text. This, according to them, is due 
to the practical reason that since the Han period (206BC-220AD), there had emerged 
ordinary citizens‘ historical record keeping accompanied by the rise of mass education in 
ancient China, and therefore, unofficial literary intellectuals had taken the place of official 
historians in documenting historical figures and events. Nevertheless, as most of these 
intellectuals gained recognition and support from governmental officials at the time, their 
literary historical records like the Records of the Grand Historian got passed on from 
generation to generation. 
 
Having said that, Li and Xiao claim that both of the literary traditions above mentioned 
have a significant bearing on contemporary Chinese television historical drama. They point 
                                                        
26 The Records of the Grand Historian (shiji), written from 109 BC to 91 BC, was the Magnum opus of Sima Qian, in 
which he recounted Chinese history from the time of the Yellow Emperor (huang di) until his own time. The Yellow 
Emperor, traditionally dated around 2600 BC, is the first ruler whom Sima Qian considered sufficiently established as 




out that, there exists a dichotomy between the serious historical drama and the popular 
historical drama within Chinese public realm, but the irony is that few Chinese historians 
would treat the so-called serious dramas as real historical documentation. They argue that 
this dichotomy simply reflects Chinese public‘s collective cultural sub-consciousness to 
legitimize the category of the historical within popular historical representation. At this 
point, Li and Xiao also express their concerns about the Chinese audience‘s exposure to the 
historical drama text. On the one hand, they worry that a certain historical drama may run a 
serious risk of ‗misleading its audience by presenting inaccurate or mistaken historical 
facts‘ (ibid. p181). On the other hand, they consider the audience‘s reception to be a 
complicated process; referring to Stuart Hall‘s Encoding/Decoding model, they write that 
‗to what extent an audience will be affected by a certain historical drama is ultimately 
determined by his or her social and cultural positions‘ (ibid. p189). 
 
It can be easily seen that Li and Xiao‘s work adopts a text-centred approach in looking at 
all the aspects concerning the historical drama. In my view, this text-centred approach 
demonstrates the crucial position of the text in Chinese cultural productions. As previously 
mentioned, the Chinese cultural production tradition has ‗tended toward a fusion of history 
and fiction with emphasis on didacticism‘ (wenyizaidao) (Ma, 1989, p83). This cultural 
production tradition has thus led to the formal quality of the Chinese narrative text that is 
suggested by Ma as ‗the textualization of the context‘ (ibid.). As an audience researcher, 
however, I must say that, although they offer some thoughts on the audience response to 
this ‗textualization of the context‘ of the historical drama, Li and Xiao fail to present any 
empirical evidence in their work. 
 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
 
The popularity of historical dramas on contemporary Chinese television has triggered a 
massive cultural debate within the Chinese popular realm since the mid 1990s. At the heart 
of the debate are concerns about the implications of those bygone dynasties as well as 
historical characters represented within the drama texts for contemporary Chinese society. 
Although so much has been said about Chinese historical drama in the debate, what has 
been neglected is to question the category of ‗the historical‘ itself. In this chapter, I used 
three sample series including The Bronze Teeth (tiechi tongya jixiaolan) (2000- ), The 
Great Emperor Hanwu (hanwu dadi) (2005), and The First Emperor (qin shi huang) (2006) 
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as case studies in discussions of the genre issues which arise.  
 
The first section is focused on the Chinese television drama industry. The aim of this 
section is to look at how the Chinese television drama industry categorizes and evaluates 
historical drama through its production, regulatory, marketing and scheduling practices. 
Since the early 1990s, Chinese historical drama has experienced enormous transformation 
in both its content and its sub-genres. Most importantly, the dichotomy between ‗serious 
drama‘ (zheng ju) and ‗popular drama‘ (xishuo ju) emerged in the public discussion about 
historical drama in the mid-1990s. However, the stricter censorship of historical drama 
since 2004 resulted in less and less mentions of the old dichotomy between serious and 
popular drama within Chinese popular press. Therefore, one can say that the Party-state 
apparatus remains the ultimate power in Chinese cultural production. The strict state 
supervision of television production and broadcasting still prevails in China.  
 
The second section turns to television scholarship on the genre issues of the historical 
drama. It revisits the relevant work done by four important television scholars in China. 
Generally speaking, these television scholars approach the genre issues mainly from a 
textual perspective. The debates between Zeng and Yin position the historical drama in a 
wave of post-socialist television criticism, within which a linkage between the historical 
and the popular is established and critically examined. This linkage not only challenges the 
narrowly defined dichotomy between ‗serious drama‘ and ‗popular drama‘ that has been 
often used by television professionals in their categorization of the historical drama. More 
importantly, it brings forward the question of ‗the popular‘ (tongsu) in a rethinking of 
Chinese historical drama genre as a whole in contemporary Chinese society. 
 
Li and Xiao, two literary scholars in China, present a comprehensive and systematic 
academic investigation on the historical drama. As far as the serious/popular divide of the 
historical drama is concerned, they argue that, the so-called ‗popular historical drama‘ is 
largely intended to offer mass entertainment and, in their words, produce ‗economic gains‘ 
(jingji xiaoyi), as its creative process well demonstrates a viewing market-driven logic, 
whereas ‗the serious historical drama‘ puts more emphasis on mass education and indeed 
the achievement of ‗social gains‘ (shehui xiaoyi). They also point out that, historical drama, 
as an art form, has experienced a long history in China since ancient times. However, 
unlike old Greek myths, which were systematic on their own, primitive Chinese myths 
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were lacking in interconnectedness and often contradicted each other. What is more, the 
rise of Confucianism from the second century in Chinese society, as they argue, further 
constrained the development of Chinese myth culture through introducing a series of 
secular political and moral principles. Although Li and Xiao attempt to examine the whole 
process of the historical drama communication from production and reception issues to 





































As previously mentioned, the popularity of historical dramas on contemporary Chinese 
television has triggered a massive cultural debate within the Chinese popular realm since 
the mid 1990s. At the heart of the debate are concerns about the implications of those 
bygone dynasties as well as historical characters represented within the drama texts for 
contemporary Chinese society. For those media scholars who look solely at the production 
and content aspects of historical dramas, the implications are two-fold (e.g. Yin, 2002; Zhu, 
2008a, 2008b). On the one hand, historical dramas inherit China‘s intellectual traditions of 
historiography, which are characterised as ‗using the past to mirror the present, and 
drawing upon the past to satirize the present‘ (Yin, 2002, p35). As Yin argues, the 
appearance of historical dramas thus ‗provided intellectuals with a means of expression 
and certain rhetorical strategies‘ in response to all sorts of social, cultural and political 
changes in contemporary China (ibid. p34). On the other hand, the rise of historical dramas 
is attributed to Chinese government‘s advocacy of ‗building a harmonious society through 
television drama‘ (Zhu, 2008b, p126). Consequently, the emergence of historical dramas is 
articulated with, what Zhu terms (2008a), the Chinese public‘s ‗totalitarian nostalgia‘. 
Fascinating as these two implications may seem, what is missing here is any empirical 
inquiry into the Chinese audience‘s reception and perception of these dramas. As far as a 
popular cultural phenomenon like the Chinese historical drama is concerned, one may fail 
to comprehend the nature of it, unless all the forces that shape the phenomenon itself are 
taken into account, to which the audience‘s understanding largely contributes. 
 
This chapter analyses three important issues concerning the historical representations 
within the drama texts from the point of view of the audience. These issues, including the 
significance of historical accuracy, totalitarian nostalgia and contemporary use of the 
historical representations, are drawn from the long-term debate of historical dramas that 
can be easily found both within the Chinese television drama industry and academic 
debates. In his writing on televised history, John Corner (2007b) proposes the notion of 
‗sensory engagement‘ in differentiating watching television history from reading history 
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(p.135); he defines this sensory engagement as watching and listening to ‗the physicality of 
the past as places, people, objects and actions and then, on the basis of this, a more deeply 
cognitive and affective engagement with its meanings and implications‘ (ibid.). What 
Corner argues here to a large extent echoes John Ellis‘s (2000) psychoanalytical 
understanding of contemporary television as ‗working through‘; by this, Ellis means that 
‗television can be seen as a vast mechanism for processing the material of the world into 
more narrativized, explained forms‘ (ibid. p78). Both Corner and Ellis provide me with an 
insight into looking at how the Chinese audiences perceive those three issues in relation to 
the Chinese historical drama; in this sense, this chapter can be also seen as an attempt to 
operationalize their discussion on contemporary television culture through a nationally 
specific reception study. 
 
6.2 Historical accuracy and the public attitudes 
 
As I have discussed in Chapter 5, when it comes to the sub-genres question of 
contemporary Chinese television historical dramas, the most widely-accepted distinction 
would be that of ‗serious dramas‘ (zheng shuo ju) versus ‗popular ones‘ (xi shuo ju); this is 
particularly the case for the majority of historical drama producers and the popular press in 
China. As Le Fu, a senior executive producer at the Drama Unit of Hunan TV, states27, 
‗although there are a couple of commonly used terms to categorize the Chinese historical 
drama, notably costume drama and period drama, the most straightforward one for me is 
serious or popular drama‘.  
 
The distinction of ‗serious and popular‘ here brings to the fore the issue of historical 
accuracy (lishi zhenshi); the major difference between a serious historical drama and a 
popular one concerns to what extent it is based on historical evidence. For instance, The 
Kangxi Dynasty, the Qianlong Dynasty and the Great Emperor Hanwu, which claim to be 
based on prominent classic Chinese historical records, such as the Records of the Qing 
Period (qing shi gao) and the Records of the Grand Historian, always fall into the category 
of serious drama; the prime examples of popular drama include the Tales of Qianlong, 
Hunchback Liu the Prime Minister and the Bronze Teeth, where the protagonists and 
settings are present within historical records, but the plots are either altered or re-written in 
                                                        
27 Telephone interview conducted in December 2007. 
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order to narrate or simply satirize contemporary issues.  
 
The boundaries between serious and popular historical dramas seem clearly defined, but 
the issue of historical accuracy concerning the whole genre of Chinese historical drama 
remains controversial amongst many Chinese historians and cultural critics (e.g. Meng 
2005; Lei 2007). The controversy involves a heated discussion of the role of Chinese 
historical drama played in the public education of pre-modern Chinese history.  
 
Chinese historian Zhuo Meng (2005), for example, in his provocative book A Critique 
towards Six Famous Historical Dramas, revisits six well-known contemporary Chinese 
historical television dramas, pointing out a wide range of historical inaccuracies within the 
drama texts; by doing so, he intends to arouse the public‘s awareness of the significance of 
accumulating accurate historical knowledge and argues for ‗correct‘ public understanding 
of traditional Chinese culture. Along with this discussion of the educational mission of the 
historical dramas emerges a deep worry about the rise of media consumerism in China. As 
Lei (2007) reminds us, watching televised history has become an important leisure activity 
for ordinary Chinese people since the mid-1990s; she goes on to argue that both history 
and the audience who watches it face the possibility of being commodified in the 
production and consumption process of historical dramas, and therefore it is important to 
critically examine the historical drama producer‘s ‗perspectives on the history‘ (shi guan).  
 
It can be argued that the debate about historical accuracy of the Chinese historical drama is 
not just shaped from within the needs of communicating historical knowledge. Rather, it is 
an institutional media phenomenon, which is associated with a specific set of regulatory, 
production and consumption practices. In other words, it takes its character from the 
relationship between production and consumption it inhabits. In my research, my 
respondents demonstrate their own understanding of this relationship from different 
perspectives. The following are just a few examples: 
 
When it comes to television programmes, they serve two purposes for the general 
public; providing entertainment, on the one hand, and spreading knowledge on the other. 
That‘s it! (male, aged 55, company manager). 
 
Commercial values are so important for television drama these days. A good drama is 
good because it can make a good profit. As far as the historical drama is concerned, it 
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makes every effort to attract the modern audience even at the cost of misrepresenting 
traditional Chinese culture (male, aged 25, office worker). 
 
The reason why people choose to watch the historical drama is because that they want 
to get some positive message from it, for instance, one‘s loyalty to his country. As long 
as a certain historical drama meets your expectation, it can be considered a success! 
(female, aged 40, senior manager). 
 
These quotations illustrate some crucial dimensions of the Chinese public‘s attitudes 
towards a production-consumption relationship of the historical television drama; they 
suggest a multilayered framework for rethinking the debate of historical accuracy as a 
popular culture phenomenon. First of all, a certain level of culture repertoire is required for 
Chinese audiences to deal with the issues of historical accuracy here in question. By 
proposing a dichotomy between entertainment and knowledge, for example, the middle-
aged male respondent quoted above shows a relatively serious attitude towards the 
purposes of television programmes; this ‗seriousness‘ reflects his ability not only to 
understand the features of a certain television programme, but also to make distinctions 
among them. 
 
Second, with the commercialization process going on in China‘s television industry, there 
has been a growing awareness of commodification of television products for Chinese 
audiences; through acknowledging ‗the commercial values‘ of the historical drama, my 
respondents recognize the significance of infotainment within the drama text. Furthermore, 
instead of directly criticising the question of historical inaccuracy itself, they make an issue 
of the rise of commercial culture in Chinese media industry as a whole. Third, against the 
backdrop of China‘s commercial television culture, the personal meanings of a certain 
historical television drama need to be taken into consideration; my respondents‘ use of the 
terms like ‗choice‘, ‗want‘ and ‗expectation‘ in their discussion reveal that Chinese 
audiences seemingly enjoy much freedom of watching and valuing a certain drama text, 
although to what extent that ‗freedom‘ has to do with ‗democratic mediations‘ (Dahlgren 
1995) remains a question. 
 
One may argue that this multilayered framework explains how Chinese audiences make 
sense of the historical television drama; it, therefore, provides us with a point of departure 
to get involved with the debate of historical accuracy in the drama text. However, I would 
like to push an understanding of this framework a bit further. The multidimensionality of 
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the Chinese public‘s attitudes here offers me possibilities to reassess the relationship 
between generic knowledge and agency within the reception process of Chinese historical 
television drama; in my understanding, the issue of historical inaccuracy, as a crucial 
component of generic knowledge about Chinese historical television drama, matters less in 
the fields of historical knowledge than in those of the social world and action. Similarly, 
Nick Couldry (2006a), in his thought-provoking article Transvaluing media studies, argues 
for moving beyond a media-centric perspective and thus a renewed sociology of 
knowledge. He writes: 
 
By knowledge, I mean, not our knowledge of media as researchers, but the relationship 
between media and the social distribution of knowledge about the world. The primary 
question, then, is not the analysis of this or that media form, but the role, if any (and 
there could be huge variation here), of different media in people‘s acquisition and use 
of knowledge, including knowledge of the social world (Couldry, 2006a, p187). 
 
If we agree with Couldry, then the debate about historical accuracy along with the 
popularity of the Chinese historical television drama needs to be re-examined; rather than 
dwell on the category of historical knowledge, one has to shift one‘s attention to study how 
the debate is constructed, and at the same time, why it matters in a wider socio-cultural 
context. In this connection, the study of audience responses should not be simply focused 
on the audience‘s textual engagement with the drama texts either; it is required to explore, 
to use Bourdieu‘s concept (1984), ‗the generative mechanism‘ of the debate itself from the 
audience‘s point of view. As Couldry goes on to argue, ‗Accumulating evidence about how 
people read or engage with this or that text is not, by itself, enough unless it contributes to 
our understanding of how they act in the social and personal world with or without 
reference to media‘ (ibid. p187). 
  
Bearing all these arguments in mind, I now move on to analyse my respondents‘ 
engagement with the issue of historical accuracy. As previously discussed in Chapter 5, the 
dichotomy between a serious drama and a popular one is central to the debate about the 
historical accuracy of the Chinese historical television drama; although it is considered 
invalid by some of China‘s professional historians, who treat the historical television 
drama as a television genre of mass entertainment more than anything else, this dichotomy 
is widely used within Chinese television industry as well as amongst Chinese cultural 
critics. However, the use of this distinction to categorize the Chinese historical drama has 
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attracted constant criticism. Chinese media scholars Shengli Li and Jinghong Xiao (2006), 
as previously mentioned, in their book Researching into the historical television drama, 
critically examine the distinction between the serious and popular historical drama. 
According to them, this distinction not only concerns the extent to which a historical drama 
is based on historical record; it is also a matter of artistic style.  
 
They go on to claim that, the serious type refers to both normal serious drama and tragedy, 
whereas the popular type is always comedy. Here, Li and Xiao introduce the issue of 
artistic style into a bold discussion about historical accuracy; what they intend to do is to 
enrich an understanding of generic knowledge of the Chinese historical television drama 
by emphasising the importance of its artistic value. Some of my respondents are also quite 
aware of the artistic elements that characterize different types of historical dramas. For 
example, after showing them the act of ‗Jingke‘s attempted assassination of the Emperor 
Qin‘ in The First Emperor, I asked this group of young people in Beijing about what they 
think of the importance of historical accuracy in this piece of television work. A young 
man chose to answer my question from an unexpected angle. He says:  
 
I think most of these Chinese historical TV dramas are targeting those who are over 35 
years old [laugh]. Why it is the fact that Korean dramas are more popular, I think, is 
because they are quite straightforward. Many Chinese historical dramas are filled with 
hidden meaning. You‘ve got to be sophisticated enough to understand them. Korean 
dramas are not like that; they cater to a wider range of age groups. A 20-year-old girl 
likes them, so does my mother. The Chinese ones are preoccupied with too much 
subtlety. Some age groups just won‘t be able to understand (24-year-old, Beijing male, 
accountant).  
 
Instead of making any direct comment on my question, this young man relates the question 
of genre to the demographic factors of the audience, including age and gender. It is worth 
noting that The First Emperor can be seen as a perfect example of the so-called serious 
historical television drama; compared with most of the Korean costume dramas like Dae 
Jang Geum (see Chapter 3) shown on contemporary Chinese television, The First Emperor 
indeed presents itself in a historically realistic mode. According to this young male 
audience member, however, this historically realistic mode is ‗filled with hidden meaning‘ 
and ‗with too much subtlety‘, and therefore it becomes something available to ‗those who 
are over 35‘ and probably mainly male audiences. What this young man is concerned with 




By revisiting Stuart Hall‘s famous ‗Encoding/Decoding model‘ (1973, 1980), David 
Morley (1992), in a critical postscript on his own work The ‘Nationwide’ audience, argues 
for ‗translating our concerns from the framework of the decoding model into that of genre 
theory‘ (p127); by doing so, he believes that we can develop a more flexible model of 
text/audience relations, where the interplay between generic forms and cultural 
competences is better observed. Here, Morley borrows the notion of cultural competence 
from Pierre Bourdieu. In his work Distinction (1984), Bourdieu asserted that ‗a work of art 
has meaning and interest only for someone who possesses the cultural competence, that is, 
the code, into which it is encoded‘ (p2). Drawing on the example of Cohen and Robbins‘s 
work on Kung-fu movies and youth culture (1978), Morley continues to suggest that ‗the 
genre is popular to the extent that it ―fits‖ with the forms of cultural competence available 
to this group‘ (ibid. p128).  
 
From Morley, then, one can argue that, understanding a certain cultural genre is made 
possible by the distribution of cultural competences among the audiences of that genre; 
nevertheless, the distribution process itself is an on-going social formation involving a 
wide range of structural factors, among which age and gender are certainly significant ones. 
In the case of the Chinese historical television drama, this argument has been proved valid 
by that young Beijing man‘s response to the issue of historical accuracy.  
 
Besides age and gender, more structural factors can also be identified in my group 
interviews concerning the same issue. When asked whether they would care about 
historical accuracy in the drama text or not, a couple of middle-aged respondents from 
Changsha debate on this:  
 
LIU: I wouldn‘t care about that personally. Pure history is just too much for the general   
public. 
PENG: I would though. 
LIU: Oh yes, I am sure some people do, like those fans of politics. 
PENG: Come on, I am not really a fan of politics! I started going to see the old operas 
like these with my mother when I was a small child, so I have been quite familiar 
with some stuff and cannot bear anything inaccurately done to them. 
 
Within this short debate, a potential gender-related stereotypical view on the historical 
television drama audience is firstly challenged by the fact that Liu is a male, whereas Peng 
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is a female; what it tells us is that, although it may be the case that the male audience, on 
average, shows greater interest in watching historical drama, in particular, the serious type, 
than his female counterpart, the overemphasis of the gender factor runs much risk of 
misrepresenting the truth about television reception from a qualitative perspective. Second, 
the linkage between ‗pure history‘ and ‗fans of politics‘ made by Liu is such an interesting 
one; it largely reflects over-interpretation of the potential political implications of historical 
television drama by some audience groups within China. Like many intellectuals, who, as I 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, consider the historical drama as a means of 
expression and certain rhetorical strategies, these ‗audience groups‘ also pay specific 
attention to certain historical fact and its contemporary implication. Last but not the least, 
educational capital surely plays a part in the audience‘s engagement with the historical 
television drama; this can be seen by Peng‘s familiarity with some particular historical 
knowledge due to her long term exposure to it. Interestingly though, rather than through 
any form of school education, her educational capital in the field of the historical 
knowledge gets accumulated through parental influence since her childhood. 
 
6.3 The myth of totalitarian nostalgia 
 
According to my literature review as well as the genre analysis on the historical drama, 
apart from the issue of historical accuracy, another prominent accusation facing 
contemporary Chinese historical television drama is made of its association with a wave of 
totalitarian nostalgia within China‘s popular cultural sphere, which began from the late 
1980s. US-based Chinese media scholar Ying Zhu (2008a, 2008b), in a series of 
discussions on the popularity of the Qing drama, points out, as what she phrases, ‗the 
symbolic link between Neo-authoritarianism‘s justification of the Tiananmen crackdown 
and the drama‘s ideological positioning‘ (Zhu, 2008a, p30). She reminds us that, the 
revisionist Qing drama emerged at a time when Chinese society was undergoing rapid 
economic growth due to the Xiaoping Deng-led economic reform in the aftermath of the 
Tiananmen Square protests of 1989; as the Chinese people were fed up with corruption and 
the society‘s perceived loss of its moral grounding‘ along with the economic development, 
these dynasty dramas attempted to ‗present exemplary emperors from bygone dynasties 
and ‗capitalize on the popular yearning for models of strong leadership‘ on Chinese 




At the same time, Zhu positions this authoritarian nostalgia for ‗exemplary emperors‘ in 
parallel with the fact that Mao enjoyed the same kind of renewed popularity from the late 
1980s to the early 1990s (see Wang 1996). From this, it can be seen that Chinese 
intellectuals like Zhu believe that, the search for model rulers is rooted in Chinese cultural 
tradition that has been dominated by Confucianism, as a state religion, dating back to the 
second century and down to the late Qing Dynasty and the early twentieth century. 
 
Within this section, it is not my intention to argue against the interconnections between 
Confucianism as an old Chinese political philosophy and its contemporary media 
representations. Rather, as a media sociologist, who is obsessed with the category of media 
experience and its sociological groundings, I always feel suspicious of a narrowly-
interpreted media phenomenon and thereafter felt urged to interrogate its broader, but not 
necessarily deeper, meanings; on this point, I have to agree with Barker and Brooks‘s 
(1998) observation on the problem of media and popular culture studies, as they say that 
‗the problem seems to be that the media and popular culture are so politically salient and 
culturally sensitive, that it is hard to break free from what we will call ―folk theories of the 
media‖‘ (p84).  
 
Nevertheless, much room is left in Zhu‘s discussion itself that can be further explored. By 
using the term ‗the symbolic link‘ to describe the relationship between ‗Neo-
authoritarianism‘s justification of the Tiananmen crackdown and the drama‘s ideological 
positioning‘, she unconsciously offers great opportunity for a cultural sociological study of 
the drama in question; what she does here, as a matter of fact, introduces a ‗symbolic‘ 
dimension into an understanding of the drama‘s ideological features in relation to their 
actual political backdrop. Therefore, to borrow Nick Couldry‘s idea of symbolic power in 
his book Media Rituals: A Critical Approach (2003), the embedded discourse of 
authoritarian nostalgia within the Chinese historical television drama text can be 
understood as a corpus of symbolic resources provided by the drama production and 
broadcast organization; its connections with symbolic power cannot be ignored, as these 
connections exist on two territories, first, the very heart of  the drama production and 
broadcast organization, second, their social consequences, which I am mainly concerned 
with within my thesis. 
 
Before I touch upon the question of social consequence, I need to cast some light on the 
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idea of nostalgia here. Fred Davis (1979), the late University of Chicago trained sociologist, 
in his book Yearning for Yesterday: A Sociology of Nostalgia, offered his subtle and 
complex insight into nostalgia as a human mood. Influenced by the theory of symbolic 
interaction of Herbert Blumer, Davis looked at the issue of nostalgia through the lenses of 
sociology of culture. He explained that the word ‗nostalgia‘ had its Greek roots of ‗nostos, 
to return home, and algia, a painful condition‘, so it means ‗a painful yearning to return 
home‘ (1979:1). Moving away from an etymological perspective, Davis went on to suggest 
a theoretical approach to studying modern nostalgia by proposing a framework of orders of 
nostalgia. He said:  
 
By ‗order of nostalgic reaction‘ I mean something other than the purely logical 
possibilities inherent in some such scheme as: I feel nostalgia; I reflect upon the 
nostalgia I feel; I reflect upon the reflection of the nostalgia I feel, etc. Rather, I shall 
point to three successive orders of cognition and emotion, the patternings of which 
derive not from the mere mechanical extension of ordinal possibilities but from the 
musings attendant on the course of life experience. I shall call these First Order or 
Simple Nostalgia, Second Order or Reflexive Nostalgia, and Third Order or Interpreted 
Nostalgia (Davis, 1979, p17). 
 
According to Davis, then, ‗the order of nostalgic reaction‘ comes into being and operates 
during the course of people‘s life experiences; it takes its character from a modern human 
condition, which consists of a series of subjective or inter-subjective activities, such as 
feeling, reflecting and interpreting. Also, it is worth emphasising that in this order of 
nostalgic reaction, Third Order or Interpreted Nostalgia is placed at the highest level, 
which, as Davis argued, is less of the fact that it has something to do with ‗issues of the 
historical accuracy or felicity of the nostalgic claim on the past‘ than that it ‗unfolds, 
questions and, potentially at least, renders problematic the very reaction itself‘ (ibid. p24).  
 
Towards the end of his book, Davis usefully brought the question of nostalgia into the 
reality of contemporary media-dominated society; he believed that ‗rather than polluting 
the wells of our nostalgic memory, the mass media have enriched and invigorated them‘ 
(ibid. p140). Taking together all Davis‘s arguments, one can argue that, the study of media-
dominated nostalgia has to involve two main considerations; on the one hand, the theory of 
‗order of nostalgic reaction‘ can be still illuminating, on the other hand, the rise of 
mediated-culture sets new agenda for a revised understanding of modern nostalgia, the new 




Having introduced the theoretical part, I shall return to my respondents‘ attitudes towards 
the issue of authoritarian nostalgia concerning the Chinese historical television drama. 
Interestingly enough, although most of my respondents give more or less affirmative 
answers to the question, the angles that they choose to answer remain quite diverse. Here 
are some representative examples: 
 
Nostalgia? Oh, I am sure there is a bit. Nostalgia for great emperors…or simply for 
great heroes! (male, aged 25, accountant). 
 
As far as authoritarian nostalgia is concerned, I don‘t think the audience would have so 
strong feeling about it while he or she is watching the actual drama, but for a particular 
nation-state or ethnic-state, there must be something that it subconsciously shows 
nostalgia for but not even realizes (female, aged 26, university teacher). 
 
While I was watching the Great Emperor Hanwu, not only did I get so attracted by the 
emperor himself, but also became very concerned with the fate of other characters. Also, 
you can imagine how strong the Han Dynasty was at that time! (female, aged 43, 
accountant). 
 
      For a historical drama audience, it takes a certain level of human qualities to be able to 
feel nostalgic for anything. You have to think and be reflexive! If you don‘t sort out the 
business of thinking through a particular historical story, you just end up feeling very 
bored about it (male, aged 45, self-employed). 
 
This diversity of audience response offers me, at least, two points of departure to unpack 
the myth of authoritarian nostalgia. First, the representations of a particular historical 
figure or period in the drama text tend to conjure up the Chinese audience‘s cultural 
imagination of different types. Instead of treating the issue of nostalgia at a superficial 
level, the audience always tries to reflect upon and interpret a nostalgic reaction. In the first 
quote above, for instance, this young man perceives the nostalgia as less of a yearning for 
any actual political authority than that for heroic figures who made their names by 
successfully changing the status quo in a particular historical period. 
 
 In a similar vein, that middle-aged female respondent acknowledges her nostalgic reaction 
towards the Han Dynasty. However, it needs to be pointed out that this reaction is 
essentially triggered by her melodramatic imagination based on a series of historical 
characters in a fictional version; the fact that, not only did she get attracted to the emperor 
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as the protagonist, but also ‗became very concerned with the fate of other characters‘ tells 
us that her understanding of the relationship between characters is key to her 
representations about the Han Dynasty portrayed in the drama text.  
  
Second, a television viewer‘s life stage also affects his or her nostalgic reactions toward the 
historical representations. Gauntlett and Hill (1999), in their work TV Living: Television, 
Culture and Everyday Life, give much attention to this question; they apply the concept of 
life-course analysis to study whether ‗television has a role to play in the transitional 
periods of people‘s lives‘ (p79). According to them, the audience adopts different ‗coping 
strategies‘ in the use of television at different transitional periods of their lives (ibid.). For 
example, compared to young adults, middle-aged adults are ‗more likely to have 
established patterning of television viewing‘ (ibid. p109) - this fits well with the middle-
aged male respondent quoted above. This self-employed man told me that he had formed 
the habit of watching television as a daily routine and, more importantly, he regarded the 
practice of watching television drama as ‗a business of thinking through‘.  
 
On the contrary, that young female university teacher doubts that the audience would have 
strong nostalgic feeling ‗while he or she is watching the actual drama‘, as she claims that 
watching television is by no means a daily routine in her busy life. However, by 
recognizing a country‘s ‗subconscious nostalgia‘ for its past, she shows good awareness of 
possible cultural values surrounding the historical television drama within Chinese society; 
this kind of cultural awareness, as I would argue, exactly reflects this young woman‘s 
attempt to come to terms with a variety of audience interpretations from different socio-
cultural positions. 
 
From these, it is clear that the audiences‘ interpretation of the issue of authoritarian 
nostalgia remains quite divergent; it reminds us of Sonia Livingstone‘s social 
psychological work Making Sense of Television (1990, 1998a), where she highlights the 
importance of using empirical methods to investigate the ‗theoretical concerns developed 
within cultural studies‘ (p150) in discussing the potential convergence between media 
effects dominated and critical audience studies. In the example of Chinese historical 
television drama here, through a critical analysis of the viewers‘ responses, it indeed 
appears that the issue of authoritarian nostalgia, which is originally defined by literary 




6.4 Historical resources and contemporary use 
 
From what has been discussed so far, it can be seen that, unlike most of the Chinese 
literary television critics and media academia in general, who often take the historical 
television drama quite literally, the Chinese audience expresses a wide range of cultural 
concerns over the drama text on a daily basis. Furthermore, the last two sections put the 
question of reflexivity on the spot through an analysis of my respondents‘ attitudes towards 
the historical television drama. In a general sense, however, in what ways does the Chinese 
audience use the historical television drama? Or, what frames does the audience apply to 
make sense of the historical drama? In order to answer this question, first of all, we need to 
be clear about the importance of understanding the historical drama as a cultural resource 
in relation to its audiences. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, John Ellis (2000) defines the current era of television 
broadcasting as the ‗age of plenty and uncertainty‘ and then proposes the term ‗working 
through‘ to describe an inter-subjective process linking media forms with people‘s public 
and private concerns. Liesbet van Zoonen (2005), who is deeply committed to an academic 
position of political communication and is also influenced by Weberian political 
philosophy, considers popular culture as a resource for ‗political citizenship‘; for her, 
popular culture produces ‗comprehension and respect for popular political voices that 
allow for more people to perform as citizens…in other words, a resource that can entertain 
the citizen‘ (van Zoonen, 2005, p151).  
 
As for a study of the Chinese historical television drama, to borrow Ellis and van Zoonen‘s 
arguments can be both useful and problematic. With the economic development and the 
spreading of television technology, television historical drama has gradually become the 
most important television genre for the Chinese public since the mid-1990s; its artistic 
styles and sub-genres also flourished as hundreds of commercial television companies have 
emerged in the country to meet the fast-growing market demand for this television product 
since 1990. Thus, the Chinese historical television drama has made its own contribution to 
‗an age of plenty‘, as least, in terms of the quantity of production; it provides a multitude 
of cultural resources for the general Chinese public. However, differently from most of 
western democratic countries, television production is still subordinated to strict 
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governmental control in China; a television drama cannot be produced unless its proposal 
gets approved by China‘s State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT). In 
this sense, the question of to what extent popular culture ‗produces comprehension and 
respect for popular political voices‘ in China will take much empirical effort and in-depth 
analysis to answer.  
 
As also discussed in Chapter 2, Michael Keane suggests that one apply the Foucauldian 
notion of ‗governmentality‘ to understand the policy ramifications that impact on Chinese 
television; for him, in a post-socialist or post-reform Chinese society, cultural resources are 
guided through the authoritarian Chinese government‘s cultural policies; at the same time, 
these cultural resources function as cultural technologies, which play an important role in 
organizing different fields of human action in society. Seen from this perspective, therefore, 
the ways that the Chinese audience uses the historical television drama go beyond the level 
of textual interpretation; they can provide a clue to understanding the audience‘s varying 
levels of affect by the drama text as well as the degree to which these levels work in an 
identity creation process of the audience. In the rest of this section, I shall discuss three 
significant frames that can be identified in my respondents‘ use of the historical television 




When it comes to the cultural values of the Chinese historical television drama, for the 
Chinese cultural elites, the most important one is always considered as ‗educating the 
Chinese people about their own history‘. In his famous article History, History Studies and 
Historical TV drama, for example, Fensi Xing (2006), the editor-in-chief of the Chinese 
Communist Party‘s official journal Seeking Truth28 (qiushi), suggests that the historical 
television drama serves a better educational function than history studies in communicating 
historical knowledge; he argues that the historical television drama should be much more 
acceptable and understandable than history studies by the general public, as it deals with 
historical facts through lively artistic representations.  
 
                                                        
28 Launched in July, 1988, Seeking Truth is the primary theoretical journal of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party. As one of the CPC's official publications, most of its distribution goes to government offices at various 
levels in China. The cover inscription was written by Xiaoping Deng. The magazine was launched in 1988 as a 
replacement for Red Flag (hong qi), which ran from June 1, 1958, through June 16, 1988. 
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Underlying this argument is the very assumption that the audience has a desire to seek 
historical knowledge from the drama text; according to Chinese cultural critics like Xing, 
the practice of historical knowledge learning is taken for granted when it comes to 
watching the historical television drama. Of course, no one can deny the fact that 
accumulating historical knowledge serves as an important purpose for the historical 
television drama‘s audience. For example, this middle-aged Beijing male respondent says 
in my in-depth interview with him: 
   
Why I like watching the Great Emperor Hanwu is because it helps me to increase my 
knowledge about the Han Dynasty. We all know the importance of the Han Dynasty in 
Chinese history, but I personally didn‘t know much about it in detail. This drama is 
such a nice artistic version of the history of the Han Dynasty (male, aged 55, company 
manager). 
 
At a superficial level, his answer may not look surprising, but if one critically examines 
this statement, there are at least two points worth special attention. On the one hand, this 
respondent to a significant extent expresses his personal interest in ‗knowing about‘ the 
history of the Han Dynasty; this can be seen as a driving force behind his willingness to 
watch the Great Emperor Hanwu. On the other, by describing the drama as ‗an artistic 
version‘ of the Han history, he shows good awareness of the fact that what he learns from 
is not a serious history lecture but a piece of dramatic representation. Drawn on from these 
two points, I would argue that the practice of learning has to be attached with two strands 
of social psychological activities. 
  
First, the issue of fandom emerges here. Similar to the middle-aged male above, when 
asked whether they could learn any concrete historical knowledge from the Qing Drama 
series, quite a few of my respondents, the majority of whom are young males, give me 
answers like the following:  
 
Some people learn a lot from them because they are just interested in that particular 
historical period (male, aged 24, assistant mechanical engineer). 
 
I was a big fan of them when I was in college, so I learned a lot about the Qing Dynasty 
at that time (male, aged 25, office worker). 
 
Interestingly, instead of talking about himself, this 24-year-old assistant mechanical 
engineer points out ‗some people‘s‘ fandom for the Qing Drama series; his recognition of 
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the ‗some people‘ here reveals a close association between historical knowledge learning 
and fandom activity in the reception of the historical television drama. At the same time, 
the factor of life stage contributes greatly to the practice of learning. That 25-year-old 
office worker, for instance, was a fan of the Qing Drama series only when he was in 
college; that is to say, it is at that particular life stage that he was immersed in the drama 
series and therefore had the chance to ‗learn from‘ the drama. 
 
Second, emotion plays a role in the practice of learning. Also in a discussion of the act of 
‗Jingke‘s attempted assassination of the Emperor Qin‘ in The First Emperor, a middle-aged 
female‘s response is a good example. She says: 
 
I originally learnt this story from history books. The TV drama version is really 
engaging; it is full of emotional elements. Middle-aged female audiences like me prefer 
this kind of educational and emotional stuff [laugh] (female, aged 52, administration 
officer). 
 
For her, emotion constitutes an integral part of the learning experience of the drama. More 
importantly, she is aware of an interaction between emotional engagement with her age and 
gender; using the Foucauldian analysis of emotion, I would argue that this kind of 
emotional learning can be viewed as a ‗strategic formation‘ that continually interacts with 
and is (re)produced and regulated by other strategic formations, of which gender remains a 




Having discussed the question of learning, I now move on to the issue of reflection. As I 
pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, Corner proposes the notion of ‗sensory 
engagement‘ to differentiate watching television history from reading history. He claims 
that there are two levels involved in this ‗sense making‘ process; the first level, which 
resembles an actual learning process as I have just discussed, concerns ‗an encounter with 
the physicality of the past as places, people, objects and actions‘, and the second level 
refers to ‗a more deeply cognitive and affective engagement with its meanings and 
implications‘ (Corner, 2007b, p135). It is these two levels, in my understanding, that form 
the basis for the audience‘s reflection on televised history. Although he rightly defines two 
levels of sensory engagement in watching television history, Corner does not go any 
128 
 
further to discuss specific themes of sensory engagement in his particular article. In my 
research, however, I find three basic reflective themes in the reception of the Chinese 
historical television drama.  
 
First, there is witnessing. For example, this young adult says:  
 
The most fascinating part about watching a historical television drama is a kind of 
witnessing, witnessing a dynasty going from prosperity to devastation, or from 
turbulence to restoration (male, aged 25, accountant). 
 
Rather than go into any deep level of interpretation, this male respondent primarily 
expresses a sense of co-presence with a historical drama text. As Ellis (2000) observes, 
‗witness is a new form of experience; it arrived with the development of mechanical media 
which accord with how we believe we perceive everyday reality‘ (p15). According to Ellis, 
then, this co-presence can be understood as ‗an everyday, intimate and commonplace‘ 
relationship established between the audience and the historical television drama (Ellis, 
2000, p36); one thus can say that, this reflective style plays on the richness of the relations 
between two types of time perception: historical time represented in the drama text on the 
one hand, and physical time in reality on the other.  
 
Second, there is demystification. It is mentioned in Chapter 5 that the late 1990s saw a rise 
of television serials under the title of ‗popular history‘ (xishuo lishi) on Chinese television; 
based on folklore and vernacular historical tales, this wave of historical drama offers an 
alternative representation of a wide range of historical events and characters. Although its 
commercial considerations aroused massive controversy, this new genre of historical 
television adds another generic characteristic to the Chinese historical television drama, a 
characteristic often described as ‗demystification‘ (jiemi). Lots of my respondents also 
perceive this as an important mode of address employed by contemporary Chinese 
historical television. A 35-year-old male audience claims:  
 
For me, the most important thing about a historical TV drama is the extent that it 
demystifies a certain historical fact; take The Secret History of Xiaozhuang, I always 
wanted to know who on earth the Empress Xiaozhuang married and this drama gives 
you a sort of answer. The whole idea of demystification is what makes you think, as far 




This respondent‘s mention of the Empress Xiaozhuang is particularly interesting. As I have 
introduced  in Chapter 3, the Empress Xiaozhuang (1613-1688), known for the majority of 
her life under the title ‗Grand Empress Dowager‘, was the concubine of Emperor 
Huangtaiji, the mother of the Shunzhi Emperor and the grandmother of the Kangxi 
Emperor during China‘s Qing Dynasty. She wielded significant influence over the Qing 
court during the rule of her son and grandson. Known for her wisdom and political ability, 
Xiaozhuang has become a largely respected figure in Chinese history. It was not until the 
historical novelist Er Yuehe successfully in re-introduced Princess Xiaozhuang into the 
historical novel that this figure has now also become a popular character for many 
historical TV productions ever since then.  
 
The term ‗a sort of answer‘ is interesting here; it demonstrates that this audience does not 
necessarily believe in ‗the answer‘ given by The Secret History of Xiaozhuang to his 
question, but he still gains some satisfaction in it. For him, demystification becomes what 
he expects to gain from the historical television drama; it makes the drama itself into a 
reflective resource for him to explore the meaning of history in both public and private 
arenas. 
 
Last, there is national identity. Michael Billig (1995), in his book Banal Nationalism, 
argues that, in the contemporary new world order, the theoretical consciousness of 
nationalism includes ‗assumptions about how a nation should behave; how ―we‖ should 
behave; and the world, or the whole ―international community‖ should behave‘ (p92). The 
assumption about ‗how a nation should behave‘ also finds its place in my respondents‘ 
interpretation of the practice of reflecting on history. My favourite example of this is the 
one below:  
 
Reflecting upon history is such a Chinese thing! The Chinese people enjoy pondering 
over the meaning of history. This is part of our culture! Some people call it a sign of 
being a civilized Chinese [laugh]! (female, aged 47, civil clerk) 
 
This middle-aged female audience succinctly relates the practice of reflection with her 
understanding of being Chinese; for her, ‗pondering over the meaning of history‘ makes us 
come to terms with our national identity. In a reference to Billig‘s arguments, for the 
Chinese audience, the practice of reflecting on the historical television drama has to be 
understood as a national behavior; it is ‗narrowed into the framework of nationhood‘ but 
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negotiates with an increasingly globalizing media landscape. I shall return to this point in 




The third important frame that can be identified from my respondents‘ engagement with 
the historical television drama is what I would like to term as suspicion. A middle-aged 
male university instructor told me about his suspicious feeling towards the historical 
television drama in a focus group conducted in Changsha: 
 
Sometimes, the dialogue and the image in the historical drama give you a sense of 
uncertainty, or if you like, a sense of falseness. It looks really odd that those ancient 
characters speak the modern Chinese language (male, aged 44, university instructor). 
 
This respondent is quite clear about the fact that what he watches is nothing but a 
television drama, but when it comes to the factual part of a ‗historical‘ text, he 
simultaneously understands that this staged ‗past‘ is itself a falsification; his sense of 
‗oddness‘, in De Groot‘s words, demonstrates that a consumer of historical product ‗has a 
complexity of engagement that is at a level higher or more complex than that of the 
―contemporary‖ text‘ (De Groot, 2009, p182). 
  
Also, this sense of oddness has much to do with the question of anti-fandom and non-
fandom. A middle-aged female respondent, who claims to dislike historical television 
dramas, says in a Beijing in-depth interview:  
 
I have never watched this kind of thing because I am not interested in history. It looks 
very boring to me. It is a pure propaganda thing. I cannot feel anything. I have no idea 
how I should relate to it (female, aged 42, accountant). 
 
Extreme as her response may look to some extent, this respondent at least expresses her 
anti-fandom for the genre of the historical television drama. US-based Canadian media 
scholar Jonathan Gray (2003), in his work on the viewers of The Simpsons, finds that many 
of the anti-fans and non-fans can also provide a substantial and impressive in-depth 
analysis of the cartoon. He proposes that ‗we must look to anti-fans and non-fans as well, 
and study how the text changes as it meets different audiences and viewing environments‘ 
(Gray, 2003, p79). Compared to the affect it has on those who claim to be its fans, the 
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historical television drama indeed changes its role for the anti-fans like this female 
respondent; it becomes a ‗pure propaganda thing‘ for her due to its explicit politics-related 
content. Of course, for those who are non-fans, they do not seem to take the issue of 
‗falsification‘ in their viewing experience. The following two young adults in a group 
discussion illustrate this well:  
 
CHANG: We are uncertain about the historical TV drama in terms of how real it is. 
Few people would turn to history books for things they watch in a historical drama. 
FANG: That‘s right! 
CHANG: (continues) Most of the audiences just watch it for fun. It is true that they are 
uncertain about how real it is, but they do not really bother either. 
 
 
6.5 Concluding remarks 
 
Based on an analysis of my field work data, this chapter makes an attempt to address three 
important issues concerning the Chinese historical television drama; these three issues, 
including the significance of historical accuracy, totalitarian nostalgia and contemporary 
use of the historical representations, are raised in a long-term debate of the historical 
television drama‘s role in communicating historical knowledge within the Chinese 
television drama industry and the academia.  
 
Standing from a perspective of reception studies, I find that the ways that the audience 
engages with these historical representations are far more complex than generally thought; 
rather than insist on a literal interpretation of the drama text, the audience engages with the 
historical television drama in quite a divergent way due to his or her age, gender, life stage 
and socio-cultural status. Inspired by the work of Couldry, Davis and van Zoonen, I realize 
that a renewed sociology of knowledge may serve a more convincing theoretical approach 
to studying the impact of historical television drama on Chinese society.  
  
Within the first section, which deals with the issue of historical accuracy, the dichotomy 
between serious and popular drama was a constant challenge to my respondents; moving 
away from a textually informed way of categorizing, my respondents tend to bring forward 
the factors of cultural competence as well as socio-cultural position to contextualize the 
extent to which the issues matter to them. The second section concerns the problem of 
authoritarian nostalgia; although most of my respondents acknowledge nostalgia as a 
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political and cultural agenda set by the drama producer, they take more or less reflexive 
attitudes towards a nostalgic reaction. It is worth noting that it is the social consequence 
rather than the nostalgic reaction that concerns the audience the most.  
 
The last section analyses the three important frames that are adopted by my respondents in 
their use of the historical television drama as a cultural resource. Influenced by Corner‘s 
concept of sensory engagement in watching televised history, I move a bit further in 
examining specific constitutive elements of engagement in a general sense; these three 
frames, including learning, reflection and suspicion, can be viewed as a discursive 
formation of the Chinese audience‘s viewing experience of the historical television drama. 
All in all, what I have discussed in this chapter very much echoes Durkheim‘s (1995) 
argument towards the end of his famous book The Elementary Forms of Religious Life : ‗It 
is life itself, and not a dead past, that can produce a living cult‘ (p429). Bearing this 
argument in mind, I shall move on to examine two main themes that emerged from the 



























In Chapter 6, I analysed my respondents‘ views on three main issues that are drawn from a 
long-term debate about historical drama within the Chinese television drama industry and 
academic circles. These three issues include the significance of historical accuracy, 
totalitarian nostalgia and the contemporary use of historical representations. According to 
my analysis, as previously mentioned, the ways that my respondents engage with historical 
representations are far more complex than generally thought; rather than insist on a literal 
interpretation of the drama text, a respondent would engage with the historical television 
drama in quite a divergent way depending on his or her age, gender, life stage, socio-
cultural status as well as a certain extent of affinity with a specific text or sub-genre. Also, 
after a critical examination of how my respondents respond to individual issues, I came to 
realize the usefulness and necessity of adopting a critical sociological approach to a 
production-consumption study of the historical drama.  
 
This critical approach, as I would like to re-emphasise here, has focused on integrating two 
areas of sociological investigation: the sociology of the historical drama as a body of 
popular cultural knowledge on the one hand, and the sociology of the audience‘s cultural 
competence on the other. Therefore, it is theoretically guided by a critical sociological 
approach and methodologically informed by the grounded theory (see Chapter 4) that I 
conducted during the second stage of my analysis of the audience research data. 
  
At this point, it is worth noting again that the central research question of my entire thesis 
concerns how historical television drama is understood and socially and culturally valued 
in contemporary China, through an examination of the personal, social, historical and 
cultural issues that relate to viewers‘ engagement to it. In other words, the ways that my 
respondents ‗understand‘ and ‗value‘ the sample historical dramas are supposed to be the 
focal points of the audience data analysis. Within the previous chapter, quite several 
themes and concepts were raised and discussed and they to a varying degree help address 
the central research question. The three main themes addressed include learning, reflection 




However, it should be pointed out that, all of the three themes are derived from the 
respondents‘ mental processing and interpretation of the historical drama texts. This 
psychological interest in the study of contemporary audiences, according to Alasuutari 
(1999), has given way to a more sociological perspective, ‗within which one studies the 
range of frames and discourses on the media and their content as a topic in its own right‘ 
(p13). In this chapter as well as the next one, therefore, I shall present two text-based 
interpretive frameworks that are adopted by my respondents across all the focus groups 
and in-depth interviews in their understanding and evaluation of the historical drama text. 
Both of these interpretive frameworks are identified through manual data processing; they 
serve as the two most significant categories of findings from my audience research. 
  
This chapter is focused on the interpretive framework of fact/fiction. This particular 
competing framework emerged from my respondents‘ discussion about the first and second 
questions that I asked them in the interviews. The first question was how they define 
historical television drama. The second question was how they deal with the relationship 
between ‗history‘ and ‗drama‘ in the sample historical television drama texts. In Chapter 5, 
I undertook a cultural genre analysis examining how Chinese television drama 
professionals and key scholars of Chinese media studies in China perceive the truth claims 
of Chinese historical drama. From the television drama professionals‘ perspective, in 
general, there still exists a dichotomy between serious historical drama and popular 
historical drama. This is defined mainly according to the extent to which a certain drama 
text is based on prominent historical records. However, the media scholars (Li and Xiao, 
2006; Wang, 2008; Yin, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005; Zeng 2000, 2002) suggest, for a proper 
understanding of the historical drama‘s truth claim, one must link a consideration of 
historical accuracy or a claim to historical truth with that of claims to artistic truth where, 
apart from the roles played by the producer and the drama text, the audience‘s perceived 
realism in his or her viewing practice is involved. By ‗perceived realism‘, the media 
scholars here propose a certain level of experiential authenticity as the outcome of the 
audience‘s textual engagement with a drama text.  
 
Although it remains a textual assumption made by and for media scholars, this notion of 
audience‘s perceived realism is such an inspiring one. In my view, it can be seen as a 
psychological standard for a Chinese rational individual involved in the practice of 
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watching historical drama. In her comparative study of British and Swedish reality 
television, Annette Hill (2007) usefully reminds us that the rational individual plays ‗an 
important part of thinking behind ―the public knowledge project‖29 and notions of the 
public sphere‘ (p85). Within the public knowledge project, television programmes, no 
matter whether they are factual or fictional or sources of information or entertainment, can 
be perceived as forms of public knowledge. Furthermore, the audience‘s interpretation and 
its social determinants are connected with how the programmes function to organize and 
disseminate public knowledge. I believe that it is also worth exploring how this viewing 
rationality is manifested or challenged in the reception process of a drama text in the 
specific Chinese context.  
 
At the same time, in a technical sense, the notion of the audience‘s perceived realism offers 
me an opportunity to re-contextualize the interpretive framework of fact/fiction in a 
particular actual viewing practice. John Durham Peters, in his 2001 article Witnessing, 
presents a rather philosophical discussion on the relationship between fact and fiction in 
contemporary media representations on news events. He argues that ‗ultimately, the 
boundary between fact and fiction is an ethical one before it is an epistemological one‘ 
(Peters, 2001, p721). By prioritizing the ethical over the epistemological, Peters attempts to 
highlight the importance of a moral interpretation of textually complex media content 
nowadays. Influenced by Peters‘ argument, I would assume that a critical analysis of the 
Chinese audience‘s perceived realism in the viewing practice will reveal broader social and 
cultural implications from the whole fact/fiction complex other than simply textual ones. 
  
Bearing all those points in mind, I shall next present my findings in relation to the 
fact/fiction framework in two sections. The first section introduces diverse ways of 
defining the historical drama by my respondents. I find that the defining practices work as 
points of departure for my respondents to articulate a broad range of public and personal 
meanings from the fact/fiction complex. The second section moves beyond the ways of 
genre definition and concentrates on the major attitudes adopted by my respondents 
towards China‘s historiographical traditions inherent in the historical drama text. Based 
upon their attitudes towards the historiographical traditions which take their character from 
contemporary China‘s system of television historical drama production, I divide my 
                                                        
29 For a thorough knowledge about this long term project, see John Corner‘s work in 1991, 1995, 2008 and 2009. 
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respondents into three types including conservatists, culturalists and realists. Arbitrary as it 
may look, this dividing practice methodologically reflects certain cultural and social 
identities that potentially constitute my respondents‘ cultural citizenship. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, cultural citizenship is constituted by a process of continuous performance that 
can be defined as the struggle over the norms, practices, meanings, and identities through 
which groups and individuals are socially included and excluded in society. In short, it 
involves the negotiation of the role of cultural difference in everyday life. Finally, a 
concluding part will be provided to integrate all the findings and highlight critical 
viewership that exists in my respondents‘ adoption of the interpretive framework of 
fact/fiction in their viewing practices.          
7.2 Genre definition 
In Chapter 5, I conducted a cultural genre analysis looking at how the Chinese television 
drama industry and important scholars of Chinese media studies in China contribute to the 
social formations of Chinese historical drama. It needs to be re-emphasised that my genre 
analysis represents an attempt to use Jason Mittell‘s cultural approach to television genres 
in a contemporary Chinese context. As discussed in Chapter 2, following Foucault‘s 
historical model of genealogy, Mittell‘s cultural genre analysis has undergone an analytical 
focus shift from a traditional text-centred approach to a cultural one to television genres. 
For Mittell, television genres are ‗not found within media texts, but operate across the 
cultural realms of media industries, audiences, policy, critics, and historical contexts‘ (2004: 
xii). Therefore, discursive formations of genres should not be studied through ‗interpretive 
readings or deep structural analysis‘; rather, they should be studied ‗in their surface 
manifestations and common articulations‘ (ibid. p13).  
  
As an analytical tool, Mittell‘s approach has proved quite useful in my genre analysis. It 
enables me to gain a multidimensional understanding of Chinese historical drama, from the 
past to the present and from the textual to the contextual. However, based on my genre 
analysis, I would like to argue that Mittell‘s Foucauldian position towards television genres 
remains largely incompatible with the social formations of Chinese historical drama, 
although it is appropriate as applied to the American broadcasting system.  
 
According to my discussion in Chapter 5, there are two main reasons behind this potential 
theoretical incompatibility. First, unlike in the United States, where the television system 
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operates under liberal market logic, in China, the Party-state apparatus still plays a 
dominant supervisory role in the production and broadcasting of historical drama. Through 
its regulatory policies, the Chinese Communist Party forcefully determines the ways that a 
certain historical figure or event should be interpreted and represented within a particular 
drama text. Second, prominent Chinese historical dramatists like Mei Hu, the director of 
The Great Emperor Hanwu often claim to promote traditional Chinese cultural heritage 
through their works in response to the rise of cultural globalisation (see Meng 2006). As a 
result, a serious historical drama text is expected to carry more explicit symbolic meanings 
in relation to Chinese national belonging than would other television genres. On the basis 
of these two reasons, I hence argue that Mittell‘s cultural genre analysis that considers 
media power as diffused and discursive is inadequate for a proper understanding of the 
Chinese context, where the government still occupies the dominant position in supervising 
the media and organizing media-based symbolic resources.  
  
Returning to my analysis on how my respondents define historical drama, I would like to 
promote a re-centring of Mittell‘s cultural approach to television genres in Chinese 
situations. By ‗re-centring‘, I mean that, instead of dwelling on the ‗surface manifestations‘ 
and ‗common articulations‘ in the study of the social formations of a particular television 
genre, one needs to re-establish a link between those manifestations and articulations and 
their actual historical and sociological groundings. When asked to define the historical 
drama, my respondents would offer me a broad range of ways of definition. Some define 
by historical setting (for example Qing drama), some by content (for example anti-
corruption drama), some by audience effect (for example historical comedy), and some by 
narrative form (for example the drama of demystification). On the other hand, when it 
comes to the relationship between historical accuracy and dramatic effect, the respondents‘ 
initial responses are always similar to what this young male adult from a Changsha group 
said below:  
 
I think the relationship is already very clear; dramas like The Great Emperor Hanwu are 
real historical dramas because they are based on historical facts, whereas stuff like The 
Bronze Teeth is nothing but a satirical television fiction set in the Qing dynasty (male, 
aged 28, self-employed). 
 
At the surface level, one can easily identify a definitional tension that emerges here. For 
one thing, there appears a diversity of genre definitions depending on the angle from which 
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the audience chooses to textually engage with a particular drama. For another, there 
seemingly exists a clear boundary between fact and fiction in defining a historical drama 
amongst my respondents. However, after conducting an in-depth analysis of my 
respondents‘ definitions across all the groups, I came to realize that there was a crucial link 
between the fact/fiction complex as a corpus of genre knowledge and the respondents‘ 
cultural competences in dealing with it.  
 
In Chapter 6, I introduced Pierre Bourdieu‘s notion of cultural competence linked to David 
Morley‘s reflection (1992) on his own work The ‘Nationwide’ audience. According to 
Bourdieu (1984), cultural competence is the code into which a work of art is encoded; it is 
‗only for someone who possesses the cultural competence‘ that the work of art ‗has 
meaning and interest‘ (p2). Meanwhile, I have found this notion quite useful in analyzing 
my respondents‘ attitudes towards the issue of historical accuracy. When I move further to 
examine the textual engagement with the fact/fiction complex within the historical drama 
in particular, I find that my respondents demonstrate two main types of cultural 
competences. It is through the working through of these cultural competences that they are 
able to offer a broad range of definitions. Next, I shall detail these cultural competences in 
the rest of the section. 
  
First, there is an extent to which the audience has known a particular historical subject 
before he or she watches the historical drama that deals with it. It is worth remembering 
here that three clips were shown in the middle of the focus group discussion in order to 
help the respondents to answer the questions (see Chapter 4). All of the clips are taken 
from the three historical television dramas that I use as case studies; The Great Emperor 
Hanwu and The First Emperor being often labeled as serious historical dramas and The 
Bronze Teeth a more popular entertainment drama. According to my observations, almost 
all of my respondents are aware of the fact that this serious-popular divide lies at the heart 
of public discourses about the historical drama. In talking about their familiarity with those 
sample dramas, many respondents would naturally use the divide to differentiate The Great 
Emperor Hanwu and The First Emperor from The Bronze Teeth. However, when I move on 
to ask them to define these dramas in their own ways, most of my respondents expressed a 
certain level of suspicion or uncertainty about the serious-popular divide in their 




Example 1: I am not sure if The Great Emperor Hanwu and The First Emperor are 
completely based on historical records, but I would still define them as 
historical dramas because at least their main plots stick to well-known 
historical facts (male, aged 28, self-employed). 
  
Example 2: For me, most of the so-called serious historical dramas are just revisionist or 
reinterpreted historical dramas because lots of historical facts in them have 
been either altered or rewritten. For example, some elements of the story of 
Jing Ke‘s attempted assassination of the Emperor Qin are missing in The First 
Emperor. Because I have known this story very well, I can quickly realize 
what the missing elements are (female, aged 40, bank clerk). 
 
Example 3: For me, a historical drama is characterised as a knowledge spectrum; at the one 
end of the spectrum is complete popular history and at the other end of the 
spectrum is complete official historical document. It‘s up to you to position a 
particular historical drama within that spectrum (female, aged 25, college 
teacher). 
 
Example 4: In my opinion, the popular historical dramas like The Tales of Emperor 
Qianlong and The Bronze Teeth to some extent serve as unofficial versions of 
the history of the Qianlong Period, so I would call them costume dramas with 
historical tales. In The Tales of Emperor Qianlong, for example, most of the 
love stories that happened to Emperor Qianlong during his visit to South 
China may be totally made up, but there have been oral tales for generations 
saying that Qianlong lost his passion for his ugly wives so he went to inspect 
South China with the aim of taking beautiful concubines [laughter] (male, 
aged 25, office worker). 
 
From the four examples shown above, one can easily see that the ways that the respondents 
perceive and evaluate historical knowledge largely influence how they engage with the 
fact/fiction complex of the historical drama. It is a multimodality of historical knowledge 
that keeps the term historical television drama valid in contemporary Chinese context. 
These four examples well illustrate this multimodality of historical knowledge.  
 
The first example represents the most common attitude towards the fact/fiction complex 
within the historical drama amongst my respondents. This self-employed young man 
comes to grips with historical facts by adopting a grand narrative. In order to make sense 
of historiographical traditions inherent in a particular historical drama text, he chooses to 
rely on the plots of historical subjects rather than the details of them. Unlike this young 
man who appears relaxed about the issues of historical accuracy, the female bank clerk 
presented in the second example takes issue with the representation of detailed historical 
facts. Her particular comments about the depiction of Jing Ke‘s attempted assassination of 
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the Emperor Qin are, of course, made on the premise that she has ‗known this story very 
well‘. However, by claiming that ‗most of the so-called serious historical dramas are just 
revisionist or reinterpreted‘, she demonstrates a general critical viewership in the 
reinterpretation of historical facts within the historical drama. It should be pointed out here 
that, in all the focus group discussions, only those respondents like this lady, who have a 
considerable level of history education and self-confidence, are able to take this sort of 
critical stance on historical representation.  
  
Going beyond the categorization of historical representation, the respondents shown in the 
third and the fourth examples express their major concerns about the nature of historical 
knowledge itself. In Example Three, the female college teacher takes quite a conservative 
attitude towards historical knowledge. By differentiating ‗complete popular history‘ from 
‗complete official historical document‘, she attempts to draw a line between popular 
historical representation and official historical records. For her, official historical records 
serve as the highest factual standards for historical representation.  
 
In the fourth example, on the contrary, the young male office worker challenges this 
narrow definition of historical knowledge. For him, as well as official historical records, 
oral historical tales occupy important positions in his knowledge about the Emperor 
Qianlong. As previously explained, it is widely considered by the Chinese television 
audience that The Tales of Emperor Qianlong is a popular costume drama. That, however, 
would not stop the man from using his vernacular historical knowledge to formulate an 
alternative historical understanding of the drama. This alternative historical understanding 
is not only highly male-oriented. At the same time, it is, to borrow Fung and Ma‘s notion 
(2002a), offered in a pragmatic mode. That is, by bringing in the Emperor‘s romance tales, 
the man treats the story of the Emperor Qianlong as a casual and realistic tale rather than 
noble or mysterious one.      
  
Moving away from the question of concrete historical knowledge, the second type of 
cultural competence involves an awareness of the operation of ideology within particular 
drama texts. This awareness of ideological operation can be easily identified from the ways 
that my respondents define historical drama. More importantly, it is also manifested within 
an interpretive framework of fact and fiction. As noted earlier in Chapter 5, Li and Xiao 
(2006) raise the concept of ‗dramatization of history‘ in order to explain the relationship 
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between the factual and the fictional within contemporary Chinese television historical 
drama texts. By ‗dramatization of history‘, they mainly refer to the historically realist style 
adopted by most of the so-called serious historical dramas, for instance, The Great 
Emperor Hanwu and The First Emperor, which are characterised by the very fact that they 
are largely based on official historical records. For them, dramatization of history produces 
an ideological consequence in portraying historical figures and events. In the example of 
Er Yuehe‘s Qing emperor series that I mentioned in Chapter 3, they write that the serious 
historical drama attempts to convey strong political messages to its audiences through 
selective representation of relevant historical materials. As a result, it makes a highly 
ideological judgment about certain historical figures or events. Drawn from a text-centred 
approach in the study of historical drama, the ideological consequence here proposed by Li 
and Xiao remains a textual assumption.  
 
David Morley (1992), in his influential work Television, Audience and Cultural Studies, 
offers a proper understanding of ideological problematic in relation to audience research. 
Ideological problematic, according to him, ‗must be understood not as a set of contents but 
rather as a defined set of operations: the way a problematic selects from, conceives and 
organizes its field of reference‘ (Morley, 1992, p66). Moreover, a text can ‗be structured by 
more than one problematic, although one or a restricted set will tend to be in dominance‘ 
(ibid.). Inspired by Stephen Neale (1977), Morley continues to argue that it is from certain 
‗subject positions‘ of the audience that certain ideological operations of the text become 
realized (ibid.).  
  
Back to my own audience research, Morley‘s explanation of ideological problematic 
proves quite convincing. In their definitions of the historical drama, my respondents would 
touch upon different ‗fields of reference‘ to the operation of ideology based on the drama 
text. In the case of The First Emperor, I found that my respondents revealed four main 
fields of reference, which can be illustrated by the following four examples respectively: 
 
Example 1: As far as I am concerned, The First Emperor is just an educational television 
drama. The way that the historical facts are presented in it is almost as boring 
as it is in the history textbook that I used in my high school history class. Not 
much new stuff in there! (female, aged 24, technician). 
 
Example 2: For me, most of the Chinese historical dramas like The First Emperor are 
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nothing but poorly delivered televised history lectures. They‘re overloaded 
with historical stuff that the producer wants you to learn. They are so vague 
but the producer expects you to guess their meanings… I am just so sick of 
guessing them (female, aged 26, university teacher). 
 
Example 3: The First Emperor is typical of a Chinese historical drama, which is always 
about something positive and about one‘s loyalty to his own country. Like this 
story of Jing Ke‘s attempted assassination of the Emperor Qin... Jing shows 
great loyalty to his King by following his order. He is such a typical national 
hero (female, aged 44, hospital nurse). 
 
Example 4: The historical drama is by no means just something about the past. Instead, 
things like The First Emperor tell us what we should do in the present. As the 
Confucian saying goes, only by reviewing the old can one learn the new. The 
First Emperor is that sort of a cultural thing! (male, aged 55, company 
manager) 
 
In the first example, the female technician links Chinese historical drama with China‘s high 
school history textbook. According to her, there is a similar treatment of the story of The 
First Emperor within high school history teaching and the mainstream popular television 
communication in contemporary China. One may argue that the comment of ‗not much 
new stuff in there‘ on the historical drama is somewhat unfair, because the drama producer, 
as mentioned in Chapter 5, has made good attempt to provide the audience with some 
unofficial tales about the protagonist Emperor Zheng Ying in the drama. In my view, 
however, the comment at least shows that she identifies the same dominant narrative in the 
televised historical representation as in the high school education concerning this particular 
historical subject. Furthermore, by ‗almost as boring as it is in the history textbook‘, she 
criticizes this dominant narrative sustained by both China‘s media and educational 
institutions.  
 
Example Two brings to the fore the issue of communicative style of contemporary Chinese 
historical drama. On the one hand, this female young university teacher demonstrates her 
good knowledge about the whole genre of Chinese historical drama. On the other, by using 
the terms ‗poorly delivered history lectures‘, ‗over-loaded‘ and ‗vague‘, she expresses 
strong disapproval towards the propagandist tone of the historical drama. Differently from 
the first example, where that young lady relates the historical drama to the field of China‘s 





The third and fourth examples shift their attention from the contents and styles of the 
historical drama to the political implications behind them. Importantly, it is mostly those 
respondents from my middle-aged groups who would show positive attitudes towards 
those implications. Unlike most of my young adult respondents who are very aware and 
critical of the informative and educational elements of the historical drama, the middle-
aged ones tend to take a culturally reflexive approach to treat those elements. In the third 
example, the middle-aged lady perceives the First Emperor to be ‗typical of a Chinese 
historical drama‘ for the sake that it offers a detailed portrayal of this national hero Jing Ke. 
If one refers back to the so-called positive state ideology endorsed by Chinese media 
scholars like Zeng which I discussed in Chapter 5, the story of Jing Ke is such a case in 
point. It is worth reminding that, according to China‘s mainstream official historical 
interpretation, Jing is widely known as a historical symbol for loyalty and bravery for his 
attempt to assassinate Emperor Qin in order to protect his own country of Yan from being 
invaded and unified by the Kingdom of Qin. Through a positive reading of the story of 
Jing in The First Emperor, this lady comes to terms with the state ideological meanings 
involved in this drama text.  
 
Example Four extends an ideological interpretation of The First Emperor from the political 
arena to the cultural one. This is demonstrated by the definition of ‗that sort of a cultural 
thing‘ given by the middle-aged company manager. By quoting that particular Confucian 
saying about the relationship between the old and the new, he seems to suggest that the 
historical drama be understood as a contemporary adaptation of ancient Confucian 
teaching. This effectively adds a cultural/historical dimension to an understanding of the 
historical drama apart from the educational, the industrial and the political ones shown by 
the other examples just discussed. It is these dimensions altogether articulated by my 
respondents, as I would argue, that constitute the ideological operations of the historical 
drama. 
 
7.3 Chinese historiographical tradition and its three types of television interpreters 
  
Having undertaken a multidimensional analysis on the definitions of the historical drama, I 
shall now move on to examine how my respondents deal with the relationship between 
‗history‘ and ‗drama‘ in the selected historical television drama texts. In Chapter 5, I have 
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introduced how some prominent media scholars in China look at China‘s historiographical 
traditions inherent in contemporary Chinese historical drama text. According to Li and 
Xiao (2006), historical drama, as an art form, has experienced a long history in China since 
ancient times. In regards to the uniqueness of historical drama as a Chinese literary genre, 
they explain that this uniqueness is derived from the most important tradition of ancient 
Chinese mainstream fictional writing. That is, writers always preferred turning to actual 
historical figures and events over cultural myth or legendary tales for their creative 
inspiration, or, as Li and Xiao (2006: 137) phrase, ‗they adored history and undermined 
myths‘ (chongbai lishi yizhi shenhua). Li and Xiao move on to write that, unlike old Greek 
myths, which were systematic on their own, ‗primitive Chinese myths were lacking in 
interconnectedness and often contradicted each other‘ (ibid. p140). What is more, the rise 
of Confucianism from the second century in Chinese society, as they argue, further 
constrained the development of Chinese myth culture through introducing a series of 
secular political and moral principles. In brief, these principles include avoidance of 
conflict, a social hierarchy that values seniority and patriarchy and a reliance on astute 
leadership. Consequently, it is History rather than any sacred belief system that became the 
major influence on ancient Chinese fictional writings.  
 
When it comes to the appearance of the television historical drama since the mid-1990s, 
Yin (2001b: 22) explains that ‗History‘ is distanced from all the sensitive conflicts and 
political power struggles of contemporary China, so ‗it provides a rich selection of 
resources and a more open narrative space‘ (ibid.). As far as the evolution of the historical 
drama is concerned, Yin views it as a result of various cultural, social and economic forces 
combined. According to him, costume drama like the Tales of Emperor Qianlong had no 
intention of exploring ‗contemporary China‘s political and power struggle in reality‘; it 
simply offered the Chinese public ‗pure entertainment in the disguise of historical 
representation‘ (ibid. p23). In contrast, historical dramas like the Great Emperor Hanwu, 
while adopting diverse theatrical styles, have inherited Chinese intellectuals‘ 
historiographical tradition; it not only ‗recalled history, but also simulated history‘ and 
‗provided intellectuals with a means of expression and certain rhetorical strategies‘ (ibid. 
p24). 
  
From the perspective of audience research, however, the historiographical traditions 
discussed by these media scholars serve as nothing but text-based assumptions made by 
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them for the understanding and interpretation of the historical drama. Furthermore, they are 
derived from the treatment of the historical drama as a literary form of writing history. As I 
discussed in Chapter 2, the relationship between the writing of history and historical 
television drama programmes is far from simple. A historical television drama is shaped 
primarily within the categories of television rather than the needs of historical knowledge; 
it is an institutional media phenomenon, which is associated with a specific set of 
regulatory, production, distribution and scheduling practices.  
 
In the meantime, the writing of history and the production of historical television 
programmes are not completely autonomous activities; according to British film and 
television scholar Colin McArthur (1978), they ‗take their character from the system of 
production relationships in the social formation they inhabit‘ (p15). In this connection, I 
would argue that the ways that the audience relates to certain historical representation and 
its contemporary meanings largely reflect particular attitudes they take towards the social 
formation where the production of that representation takes place.  
 
As argued in the previous chapter, the debate about historical accuracy along with the 
popularity of the Chinese historical television drama needs to be re-examined beyond the 
textual level. By the same token, rather than dwell on the historiographical traditions as 
such, one has to shift his or her attention to study how their different ways of perception 
are constructed, and at the same time, why they matter in a wider socio-cultural context. 
Informed by this understanding of production-consumption relationship, I identify three 
main types of attitudes amongst my respondents in terms of how they perceive the 
historiographical traditions inherent in the historical drama.  
  
Meanwhile, it should be pointed out that these three types of attitudes adopted by my 
respondents are essentially methodologically determined. They are distinctively constituted 
within the focus group discussions as well as the in-depth interviews. As I have noted in 
Chapter 4, a focus group features group consensus and it to some extent mimics real social 
situations in which certain social and cultural values are shared or contested. Nevertheless, 
‗talk‘ can be seen as a process of sense-making, comprehension as well as critique. 
Therefore, the focus groups and in-depth interviews that I conducted, which were both 
based on talk, would provide insight into how the historical drama as a genre with complex 
textuality is operationalised in contemporary Chinese context. My intension of dividing the 
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respondents into three types is to reveal that operationalization process of cultural 
difference. It is also during that process that, as I argue, the historiographical tradition 
becomes socially relevant. Next, I shall elaborate on each one of the audience types.                  
 
7.3.1 Conservatists 
The first type of respondents is what I would term as conservatists. Out of my 41 focus 
group participants in total, I would say that there are around five respondents who can be 
categorized into this type. Also, all of the historical drama fans that I interviewed would 
belong to this category as well. These respondents strongly advocate that China‘s television 
dramatists be obliged to represent important Chinese historical figures and events in an 
accurate way. As far as a serious historical drama is concerned, they would prioritize its 
claim to historical truth over that to artistic truth emphasising the avoidance of realizing 
dramatic effect at the sacrifice of distorting historical facts. The following two respondents 
are representative of this type of audiences. For example, when talking about The Great 
Emperor Hanwu, they express their opinions as below: 
Generally speaking, The Great Emperor Hanwu has done well in dealing with the 
relationship between fact and fiction. Most of the scenes are based on their original 
historical stories. However, some of the big scenes look a bit too modern and not that 
authentic. For instance, there is this scene where a big royal ceremony is held to 
celebrate the end of the winter. It looks more like a disco dance party than any event that 
would take place in ancient times (male, aged 44, university instructor). 
 
In general, The Great Emperor Hanwu has made a good balance between representation 
of historical facts and melodramatic effect. It can be easily felt that the producers have 
made good efforts to weave historical facts into an engaging way of story-telling. Where 
it falls down, however, is in an insufficiency of historical accuracy in the detail. For 
example, there is this battle that involved tens of thousands of soldiers according to its 
well-know historical records, but you just get less than one hundred actors appear in the 
scene. Fake scenes like that would make me feel very unsatisfied and disappointed (male, 
aged 27, self-employed). 
 
From these two quotes, one can easily feel a sense of strictness concerning the extent of 
factual accuracy of the historical drama that these two male respondents expect. In other 
words, the quotes demonstrate the respondents‘ strong yearning for a fair and candid 
representation of historical facts by historical dramas, especially those ones which claim to 
be based on well-known historical records. Here, this strong yearning for authentic 
historical representation is manifested by two approaches of audience interpretation. First, 
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there is a sensory approach. That 44-year-old male university instructor above quoted, for 
example, constantly expressed unsatisfactory feelings with misrepresentation of historical 
facts in the historical drama in his group discussion. In that quote, his critique of ‗a bit too 
modern and not that authentic‘ on that particular royal ceremony scene from The Great 
Emperor Hanwu is simply derived from his sensory engagement with relevant historical 
representation.  
 
The second approach of audience interpretation is informed by the audience‘s use of 
factual knowledge. The quote from that 27-year-old self-employed male well illustrates 
this interpretive approach. In my in-depth interview with him, this young male fan of the 
historical drama repeatedly emphasised the crucial significance for a serious historical 
drama to do justice to the widely known historical facts represented within it. He even 
drew a parallel between the historical drama and the historical documentary on 
contemporary Chinese television, stating that his ideal type of historical television 
programmes would be ‗a perfect combination‘ of the two genres. Extreme as his statement 
may sound, what he says here tells us the fact that a claim to historical truth remains the 
most important viewing value for him as far as the historical drama is concerned. For him, 
historical accuracy serves as the most important standard for a quality, serious historical 
drama. 
  
The above-mentioned two males are representative of the conservative audiences for the 
fact/fiction debate in two main aspects. First, these audiences are always males. Like that 
young self-employed male respondent, they have a strong affinity for the historical drama. 
Furthermore, this affinity is mainly towards the claim to historical truth made by the 
dramatist. In the previous chapter, I have revealed a close association between historical 
knowledge learning and male fandom activity in the reception of the historical television 
drama. Here, this gender-based association needs to be re-emphasised.  
 
Second, those who take a conservative attitude mostly have relatively high educational 
levels. Like that middle-aged male who is a university instructor himself, there other two 
out of the five respondents within this type are both middle school teachers. From the focus 
group discussions, I find that these educational workers tend to more naturally and strongly 
defend the function of communicating accurate historical knowledge to the general public 
performed by the historical drama. More importantly, they also criticize the 
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misrepresentation issues similar to the one taken by that middle-aged male through a 
sensory engagement of particular historical drama texts. This, in my understanding, is 
largely due to the fact that they have cultivated a strong awareness of historical knowledge 
in watching the historical drama. In the meantime, they are more likely to articulate that 
awareness on public occasions like a round of focus group discussion. 
 
7.3.2 Culturalists 
Different from those conservative audiences who have high expectations on factual 
accuracy of the historical dramas, especially of the serious ones, many other respondents 
are much more relaxed in dealing with historical accuracy. On the one hand, they would 
more or less admit that artistic illusion between the past and the present created by the 
historical drama serves as the biggest attraction for them to watch this particular television 
genre. On the other hand, they would challenge the legitimacy of the widely acknowledged 
serious/popular divide of the historical drama; they suspect that the serious historical 
drama‘s claims to historical truth could be actually realized on contemporary Chinese 
television in the way that those conservative respondents assume. Out of my 41 focus 
group participants, I find that there are about 18 of them who basically take this kind of 
attitude. For these respondents, I would like to call them culturalists here for the analytical 
reason. The following two quotes are from two respondents within this category 
respectively: 
There is absolutely no doubt that all these emperor dramas including The Great Emperor 
Hanwu and even The Bronze Teeth have their own political agendas. We all know that 
the government is now promoting the building of a harmonious society in China, right? 
These historical things are surely supposed to send that message. However, in order to 
get that message across a certain historical drama has to be made acceptable to its 
audiences in the first place. Producing historical dramas is not doing academic historical 
research. It is mass art and mass entertainment production! The serious historical drama 
also needs to be entertaining (male, aged 55, company manager).  
 
To what extend or in what ways an audience would understand the relationship between 
a certain historical fact and its contemporary meanings is a complicated question. You 
may get different answers from different people. I think that a good understanding of 
historical representation has a lot to do with this audience‘s life experience. Take the 
story of Jing Ke‘s assassination of the Emperor Qin, you have to be old and mentally 
mature enough to truly understand Jing Ke‘s heroic deeds. The story is not just about 




From these two quotes, it is easy to identify a high level of cultural competence. As 
previously explained, cultural competence is the code into which a work of art is encoded; 
it is ‗only for someone who possesses the cultural competence‘ that the work of art ‗has 
meaning and interest‘ (Bourdieu, 1984, p2). In this particular case, this high level of 
cultural competence is reflected in the respondents‘ good ability and flexibility to deal with 
the fact/fiction issues that relate to the historical drama. For example, that 55-year-old 
company manager believes that Chinese historical drama, whichever sub-genre it is, 
performs an important propagandist function for Chinese government. From this, one can 
say that this respondent is quite aware of the fact that the rise of traditional Chinese culture 
contents on contemporary Chinese television has been deliberately endorsed by the 
government. On the other hand, he is also very concerned with mass entertainment. In 
saying that ‗a certain historical drama has to be made acceptable to its audiences in the first 
place‘, he effectively suggests an audience-centred way of understanding the impact of the 
historical drama. Furthermore, his statement of ‗the serious historical drama also needs to 
be entertaining‘, in my view, shows his positive attitudes towards the ideological 
transformation of the historical drama text.                    
  
Instead of making a serious/entertaining distinction, that 47-year-old female civil clerk 
considers an understanding of historical representation to be ‗a cultural question‘. In the 
previous chapter, when discussing the audience‘s practice of reflecting on the historical 
television drama, I also quoted this female respondent. In that quote, she succinctly relates 
the practice of reflection with her understanding of ‗being Chinese‘. She claims that 
pondering over the meaning of history while watching the historical drama makes her 
come to terms with her own ‗Chinese cultural identity‘. In this quote, she further explains 
that identity formation process. By proposing the notion of ‗the audience‘s life experience‘, 
she brings a humanist perspective in an understanding of historical representation. The way 
she interprets the story of Jing Ke‘s assassination of the Emperor Qin well reflects this. She 
moves beyond a nationalistic interpretation of Jing and treats his heroic deeds as ‗human 
suffering‘. This humanistic interpretation echoes the revisionist understanding of historical 
development within China‘s historical novels since the early 1990s, which I have discussed 
in Chapter 2. That is, it is the realm of human unconsciousness not external social and 





As far as their age and social status are concerned, these culturalist respondents have two 
characteristics worthy of a special mention. First, like the two respondents above quoted, 
most of them are middle-aged viewers. In the previous chapter, some discussion has been 
devoted to an interaction between my respondents‘ emotional engagement with the 
historical drama and their age. I find that the middle-aged respondents are more likely to 
have established patterning of television viewing than their young adult counterparts. As a 
result, they tend to regard the practice of watching television drama as a serious business of 
gaining entertainment as well as engaging with public concerns. In the case of the 
historical drama, these culturalist audiences, in particular, would view it as an important 
cultural forum on which prominent Confucian values are disseminated and debated in 
contemporary Chinese society.  
 
Second, interestingly enough, nearly all my respondents who occupy senior administrative 
positions in China‘s state-owned enterprises fall into this audience category. They would 
address Confucianism-related or traditional Chinese culture issues in a more active manner 
than others. The above quoted middle-aged male respondent serves as a perfect example. 
The male respondent is a senior manager of a small-sized state-owned retail company in 
Beijing. For instance, when discussing The Great Emperor Hanwu, he enthusiastically 
associated the Emperor Wu with China‘s current leading political authority, the Hu-Wen 
Administration. He repeatedly claimed that the Hu-Wen Administration had a lot to learn 
from the Emperor Wu in maintaining China‘s national unification and social stability.     
 
7.3.3 Realists 
The third type of my respondents is what I would like to call realists. Based on my analysis 
on all the interview data, I find that the rest 18 focus group participants and the two female 
anti-fans for my in-depth interviews belong to this category. Unlike two preceding types of 
respondents, these respondents would take distance from actual historical facts in an 
interpretation of certain historical representation. More importantly, in terms of their social 
positions, most of these realistic respondents are either self-employed or low-rank 
employers in state-owned enterprises. They not only choose to approach the historical 
representation from a contemporary perspective. Their understanding of the historical 
representation is entirely derived from their personal social and cultural concerns. In order 




When it comes to an interpretation of the historical drama, it completely depends on the 
angle from which you choose to look at it. In my view, there are normally three main 
angles. They include seeking for historical knowledge, pursuing contemporary meanings 
and just looking for fun. You know what, I have watched The Great Emperor Hanwu 
three times.  For the first time, I watched it on television like everyone else. Just for fun! 
For the second time, I watched it really carefully on the Internet. That was during a 
summer holiday when I was in college because I felt like learning some history. I didn‘t 
watch it for the third time until after I watched Zhongtian Yi‘s lectures on the Han 
Dynasty on the CCTV 10
30
. Yi interpreted the history of Han from a complete 
contemporary angle. It was so engaging and lively that I couldn‘t help watching the 
show again! (male, aged 24, assistant mechanical engineer) 
 
 
I am a complete realist. I only care about contemporary life. Those dynasties are too far 
away from me. Take the scene of Jing Ke‘s assassination of the Emperor Qin for an 
example, I have absolutely no problem with its presentation of historical facts and 
figures although there are maybe some missing details. However, getting its message is 
the key. That is, Jing‘s bravery and loyalty to his country! What I am really concerned, 
however, is that the scene is just so slow that young people like my 14-year-old daughter 
won‘t have the patience to watch it at all. I think young people should learn some history! 
(female, aged 40, senior manager) 
 
 
Instead of directly addressing the historical drama in relation to its social impact, these 
respondents tend to focus more on their personal concerns with the genre. The first quote is 
from a young adult who works for a state-owned factory as an assistant mechanical 
engineer. In this quote, he almost tells a personal story about how The Great Emperor 
Hanwu as a television text was consumed by him. From his words, one can easily feel his 
strong sense of freedom in television consumption. One may argue that the use of multi-
platform communication technologies offers him opportunities to engage with the same 
drama text at different times for different purposes. However, his mention of this television 
personality Zhongtian Yi deserves attention. In my opinion, the fact that he chose to watch 
The Great Emperor Hanwu for the third time under the influence of Yi‘s lecture series to 
some extent contradicts his sense of freedom of choice in consuming the text of The Great 
Emperor Hanwu. In other words, to what extent his realistic attitudes toward the historical 
drama enable him to formulate his own idea of History remains a question.   
 
                                                        
30 Born in 1947, Zhongtian Yi is a Chinese writer, historian, scholar and television personality. In 2005, he appeared on 
the television programme Lecture Room (Baijia Jiangtan) on the CCTV 10, CCTV‘s educational channel. Yi‘s lecture 
series on personalities of China‘s Han Dynasty and the Three Kingdoms period were successful. However, because of his 
colloquial way of lecturing on history, he also aroused some controversy about the academic quality of his lectures. 
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In the second quote, in a rather blunt way, this middle-aged female respondent claims that 
she is ‗a realist‘. By that, she goes on to explain that she would always interpret television 
contents from a contemporary perspective. It is worth pointing out that this female 
respondent is s a senior manager in a high-profile private-owned dairy products company 
in the city of Changsha. In my methodological notes in Chapter 4, I have noted that, in her 
group discussion, she straightforwardly challenged me more than once by asking me why I 
chose to pursue a Ph.D. degree abroad working on such a ‗popular culture subject like this‘ 
and ‗taking it so seriously‘. In almost the same tone, she also strongly disagreed with those 
fellow respondents in her group who insist on the importance of historical accuracy of the 
historical drama.   
 
Using the story of Jing Ke‘s assassination of the Emperor Qin as an example, she argues 
that what is really important about the historical drama does not lie in historical accuracy. 
Rather, she believes that it is important to grasp the exact message that a certain historical 
drama intends to send to its viewing public. What fascinates me the most about her quote is 
the fact that she expresses her worry about a limited influence of the historical drama on 
the young people like her daughter. On the one hand, she feels that there is a need for her 
daughter to learn ‗some history‘. On the other hand, she claims that the serious historical 
drama like The First Emperor may fail to attract the young people due to its slow speed of 
story-telling. What she worries here, as a matter of fact, points towards the question of 
quality about the historical drama in general. It is exactly this quality question that I should 
move on to deal with in the next chapter. 
 
7.4 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter concentrates on the ways that my respondents tend to understand the 
historical drama depending on their own viewing practices. Through an in-depth data 
analysis, I identify a competing framework of fact/fiction from the respondents in their 
understanding of the relationship between ‗history‘ and ‗drama‘ in the sample historical 
television drama texts. In order to unpack this fact/fiction complex, I adopt a critical 
sociological approach to a production-consumption study of the historical drama. As 
shown in the discussion, this critical approach has focused on integrating two areas of 
sociological investigation: the sociology of the historical drama as a body of popular 
cultural knowledge on the one hand, and the sociology of the audience‘s cultural 
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competence on the other. In a general sense, I have established that this conceptual 
framework of fact/fiction works to produce two main cultural approaches amongst my 
respondents. For one thing, it serves as an interpretive tool for the respondents to textually 
and socially engage with the serious-popular divide that characterizes historical drama on 
contemporary Chinese television. For another, it operates as a cultural indicator which 
divides my respondents into three types in terms of how they perceive the sense of realism 
that can be derived from the historical drama text. It is based on these two cultural 
approaches that I became aware of my respondents‘ critical viewership in understanding 
historical drama as a television genre.  
 
As far as the actual findings are concerned, I find that my respondents demonstrate two 
main types of cultural competences when they attempt to define a particular historical 
drama. The first type of cultural competence concerns the extent to which the audience has 
known a particular historical subject before he or she watches the historical drama that 
deals with it. The second type involves an awareness of the operation of ideology within 
particular drama texts. When it comes to the fact/fiction debate concerning Chinese 
historiographical traditions inherent in the historical drama, the most important finding is 
that those who occupy senior administrative positions in state-owned enterprises as well as 
those who are middle school or university teachers appear much more concerned with the 
debate than those who are self-employed or low-rank employers in state-owned enterprises. 
Based on all these findings, I would argue that it is only those respondents, who have 
accumulated a considerable amount of political and educational capital, are actively and 



















The previous chapter concentrates on the ways that my respondents tend to understand 
historical drama depending on their own viewing practices. Through an in-depth data 
analysis, I identify a competing framework of fact/fiction from the respondents in their 
understanding of the relationship between ‗history‘ and ‗drama‘ in the sample historical 
television drama texts. However, although it generates different ways of understanding the 
historical drama by my respondents, this conceptual framework remains inadequate to fully 
address the performance of cultural citizenship by the respondents in watching historical 
drama. This is due to the fact that the conceptual framework of fact/fiction mainly involves 
a process of definition and interpretation of historical drama, but fails to incorporate a 
value judgment. By a value judgment here, I mean a judgment of the goodness or badness 
of a particular television historical drama, or of the social and cultural function of the 
drama, based on the audience‘s personal view. As I suggested in Chapter 2, both Mittell 
and Corner provide me with useful positions on the relationship between television genres 
and the audience‘s value judgment. Referring back to Mittell‘s cultural approach to 
television genres, a cultural genre analysis is incomplete without an evaluation process 
apart from those of definition and interpretation. According to Mittell (2004), if we accept 
that genres are constituted by generic discourses, we need to acknowledge that these 
discourses are circulating within larger systems of power as well as located within ‗the 
common process of generic evaluation‘ (p27). For him, these larger systems of power can 
also be understood as systems of ‗cultural hierarchies‘ (ibid. p26) or ‗hierarchies of cultural 
value‘ (ibid. p27).  
 
At the same time, Corner (2007a) rightly observes this emergence of value judgment in his 
discussion on the new trend of television criticism. He terms judgments on television 
programmes themselves as ‗primary judgments‘ and those on ‗the broader culture and 
politics that the programmes evidence and perhaps support‘ as ‗secondary judgments‘ (ibid. 
p367). As far as the audience is concerned, Corner points out that he or she ‗might be 
regarded as variously wittingly or unwittingly affiliated to‘ those second judgments within 
a new round of television criticism (ibid.). Here, audiences‘ ‗various witting or unwitting 
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affiliation‘ to the value judgment on a particular television genre can be seen as the way(s) 
that they may contribute to the discursive formation of the genre as a cultural category. 
From this, it can be seen that Mittell mainly argues for an open rather than a closed 
analytical attitude towards a given television genre and its generic function, whereas 
Corner proposes to bring the value judgment into that analysis.  
  
Speaking of an examination of the audience‘s value judgment, I would also re-emphasise 
the great potential usefulness of Nick Couldry‘s work Media Rituals: A Critical Approach 
(2003) here. In the book, he launches a careful critique of the neo-Durkheimian type of 
functionalism notably represented in Dayan and Katz‘s work on broadcasting events 
(1992); he puts forward a crucial assertion that, as Buonanno (2008) summarises, ‗shared 
values emanating from the ―core‖ of society find elements in televisual events that have…a 
―coagulating‖ effect, in that they keep the diverse and disunited parts of society together‘ 
(p46). Nevertheless, as Couldry himself argues, media rituals are not something universal; 
they are social forms ‗which legitimate a fact that about the current organization of 
mediation, in most parts of the world, that is contingent, not necessary‘ (ibid. p135). The 
current organization of mediation, as he goes on to remind us, is ‗the intense concentration 
of society‘s symbolic resources in centralized institutions that we call ―the media‖‘ (ibid.).  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Couldry‘s mediation analysis reintroduces a sociological 
perspective to Cultural Studies. Compared to Mittell‘s television genre theory and Corner‘s 
idea of second judgment on television programmes, what Couldry attempts to do is to 
provide a missing link between the cultural and the social by reexamining the symbolic 
dimension of social life (see Couldry 2006b). In other words, only by treating 
contemporary media representations as a corpus of symbolic resources that are produced, 
regulated and distributed by the centralized media institutions in a particular society would 
one be possibly able to grasp shared values that hold that society together.  
 
Meanwhile, it is worth noting that when it comes to the presentation of the findings on my 
data analysis, I draw much inspiration from van Zoonen‘s work Entertaining the Citizen: 
When Politics and Popular Culture Converge (2005). In the book, as discussed in Chapter 
2, through an online forum study of American audience‘s reaction to political dramas like 
Mr. Smith, Dave or The West Wing, van Zoonen finds that ‗people seem to apply the same 
frames to make sense of fictional and true politics‘ (ibid. p137). These ‗frames‘ including 
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description, realism, judgment, reflection and utopia, according to her, provide 
opportunities for people to ‗sharpen their overall angle on politics and express an overall 
sense of utopia‘ (ibid. p139). Thus, she argues that popular culture is a resource for 
‗political citizenship‘; it produces ‗comprehension and respect for popular political voices 
that allow for more people to perform as citizens…in other words, a resource that can 
entertain the citizen‘ (ibid. p151). 
 
Guided by a juxtaposition of Mittell, Corner, Couldry and van Zoonen‘s work, therefore, 
this chapter is focused on the quality issues connected with historical drama from the point 
of view of the audience. This theme of ‗classic‘ (jingdian) emerged from my respondents‘ 
discussion about the third and fourth questions that I asked them in the interviews. The 
third question was what they think about the quality of Chinese historical television drama. 
The fourth question was how they associate the contents of the historical television drama 
with contemporary Chinese society.  
 
From the focus group interviews, I encountered two levels of cultural discourse that are 
closely associated with the quality debate about historical drama. The primary level 
concerns a series of important theatrical factors including settings, acting and audio-visual 
effect. These factors should not be simply regarded as the reference points used by the 
respondents in their evaluation of the historical drama. More importantly, they prompt a 
discussion about the commercialization process of Chinese television and its influences on 
the Chinese audience. The secondary level of the quality debate about the historical drama 
focuses on the respondents‘ broader concerns about the social and cultural implications of 
this particular television genre. Through a careful examination of these two levels of 
cultural discourse, I identify that ‗classic-ness‘ serves as a rhetorical frame that shapes the 
whole quality debate concerning the historical drama from the perspectives of my 
respondents. This rhetorical frame is put forward as well as challenged by the respondents 
both in focus group and in-depth interviews. The adoption of this frame by my respondents 
involves wider social and cultural processes focused around Chinese historical drama. 
Most importantly, it reflects a broader range of televisual participation and indeed social 
imaginaries amongst my respondents.  
 
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section offers a reappraisal of the 
meanings of classic television drama based on my audience research. Against the 
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background of commercialization and trans-nationalization of China‘s television drama 
production, I realize that the way a certain respondent evaluates the authenticity issues 
concerning the historical drama remains co-determined by his or her gender, generation as 
well as social position. To follow upon a reappraisal of the discourse of classic television 
drama, Section Two examines my respondents‘ reflexive attitudes towards the changing 
nature of the ‗classic‘ discourse in the case of the historical drama. Within this section, an 
emphasis has been put on the crucial influence of a television viewer‘s social position on 
his or her treatment of popular historical representation on contemporary Chinese 
television. Based upon all the factors discussed throughout this chapter that determine how 
my respondents evaluate the discourse of classic historical drama, the concluding section 
refers back to American anthropologist Lisa Rofel‘s suggestion (1994, 1999) of taking a 
close look at how state power in China operates through the way the state creates itself as 
an imagined entity, which I mentioned in Chapter 2. Now, I shall embark on the first 
section.           
 
8.2 The classic television drama: a reappraisal  
 
The notion of classic television was in varying degrees mentioned and discussed across all 
of my eight focus groups. My favourite example is that, immediately after I showed all of 
the clips that were taken from the three case-study historical television dramas to a group 
of young people from the city of Changsha (FG5), Yang, a female respondent, challenged 
me for not showing what she had had thought to be the most classic (jingdian) Chinese 
historical drama of the past decade. That is, the costume drama The Princess Pearl.
31
 She 
even led a short but fascinating debate on what a classic historical drama should be like. 
Here is how the debate proceeded: 
 
YANG: Dawei, you didn‘t show us the most classical historical drama of the past decade! 
INTERVIEWER: Alright! What‘s that then? 
YANG: Just guess everybody! 
                                                        
31 The Princess Pearl (huanzhu gege), also known in Singapore and the Philippines as My Fair Princess, is a television 
series adapted from the widely-known Taiwanese romance novelist Yao Chiung's novel series of the same title. Produced 
by China‘s Hunan Television, the series is centred around the legendary figure Princess Huanzhu during the reign of 
Emperor Qianlong of the Qing dynasty. Huanzhu is widely considered to be a fictional character created by the author. In 
the series, although she is an orphan in her formative years, Huanzhu‘s life changes after she makes an accidental 
acquaintance with the Emperor and is made a princess by him. The series tells a story of how Princess Huanzhu fights 
against social injustice as well as remaining optimistic towards and confident in love and care in human relations. Some 
characters, the plot premise and certain sections of the story are based on historical events and figures, but considerable 
artistic license was employed. The series ran for three seasons. The first season was produced in 1997 and broadcast in 
1998. The second was broadcast in 1999, and the third in 2003. 
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WEI: Emm…I am not sure what Yang‘s most classical one is but I also think that all the 
stuff that we were just shown are kind of new. There are some good and old ones 
as well. 
YANG: I do mean the most classical one! 
HO: I think I kind of know which one Yang is talking about. Is it this one that has been 
repeatedly shown on television for more than one decade [laugh]? 
YANG: Yes! Every summer and winter holiday! 
HO: Bingo! Now I know which one you are talking about [laugh]. 
MIAO: Is it Dream of the Red Chamber? 
WEI: Is it Tales of Emperor Qianlong? 
YANG: No! It is the Princess Pearl!! 
HO: That‘s right [laugh]! 
WEI: Come on, the Princess Pearl has not been repeatedly shown for more than one 
decade! 
HO: I am afraid that it has! 
YANG: Tell you what, The Princess Pearl has become such a classic that even the cross-
talk
32
 comedians Qizhi and Dabing once said that they were now experts in the 
history of Qing dynasty because they had watched The Princess for too many 
times [laugh]. 
WEI: Well, just because it has been shown on television for a long time, it doesn‘t 
necessarily mean that it is something classical. 
YANG: No, it‘s surely not just that. It‘s because The Princess was new, provocative and 
fundamentally different when it firstly came out! 
WEI: OK. I see your point.  
… 
 
This short debate serves as a perfect example of what Joke Hermes (2005) calls an 
‗audience-led re-reading of popular culture texts‘ (p92). By that, she suggests that 
contemporary media scholars rethink the relationship between textual analysis and 
audience experience. She simply argues that ‗we know a lot about the structures and 
meanings of many popular forms, but little about what readers do with them‘ (ibid.). This 
particular debate on classic television well illustrates Hermes‘ point. My highly-planned 
research agenda did not stop Yang from standing forward and making her own judgment 
on The Princess Pearl, a costume drama which I was not at all prepared to particularly 
mention in the interviews. Most importantly, she brought up the question of classic 
television into the group discussion. Based on my two-year long document research on 
Chinese historical drama, I can say that, to define popular historical drama like The 
Princess Pearl as classic series would be absurd and unacceptable to China‘s mainstream 
                                                        
32  Cross-talk (xiangsheng) is a traditional Chinese comedic performance in the form of a dialogue between two 
performers, or, much less often, a solo monologue or, even less frequently, a multi-player talk show. The language, rich in 
puns and allusions, is delivered in a rapid, bantering style. Being one of China's foremost and most popular performing 
arts, Cross-talk is typically performed in the Beijing dialect (or in Standard Mandarin with a strong Beijing accent). Qizhi 
and Dabing are two famous cross-talk comedians from China‘s Hunan province. Their dialogical performances gained 
rapid popularity via the local television channels in Hunan in the mid-1990s.    
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media scholars and literary critics. The main reason lies in the fact that the term ‗classic 
television drama‘ (jingdian dianshiju) is often used within the contemporary Chinese 
public realm referring to those television series characterised by particular literary and 
political contents and the popular historical drama does not seem to fit into that ‗classic 
category‘. At this point, I shall briefly explain the term ‗classic television drama‘ in a 
contemporary Chinese context. 
  
In a general sense, the term ‗classic‘ refers to artistic work that has achieved canonical 
status over a long period of time. China‘s mainstream classic television drama consists of 
two important sub-genres. First, there are classic ancient Chinese literary adaptations. As 
introduced in Chapter 5, ancient Chinese literary adaptations appeared as a new genre on 
Chinese television in good numbers in the mid-1980s. These literary adaptations produced 
in mainland China fall into two categories: ancient Chinese fictions (like the Dream of the 
Red Chamber, 1986) and ancient legendary folklores (like Strange Tales of A Lonely Studio, 
1986).  
 
In recent years, some of these literary adaptations have been remade catering to a new 
generation of Chinese television audiences. For example, the Dream of the Red Chamber 
was remade by the China Film Group Corporation (CFGC) in 2010. These literary 
adaptations, for many leading television scholars in China like Qingrui Zeng (2000, 2002), 
are televisual representations of China‘s national literary heritage. They are considered to 
have made a great contribution to the promotion of traditional Chinese culture in an age of 
cultural globalisation. However, there are differences. It is worth noting that, the 1980s 
dramas were required by China‘s Central Ministry of Propaganda to dogmatically follow 
the so-called Marxist literary and artistic principles and serve the people and the socialist 
system, adopting a social realism style in their work. By contrast, the 1990s and 2000s 
literary adaptations incorporate increasingly more diverse theatrical styles as well as 
commercial elements.  
 
Second, there are so-called ‗Red Classics‘ (hongse jingdian). According to Australian-
based Chinese media scholar Gong Qian (2008), the term ‗red classic‘ started appearing 
within the Chinese press on a frequent basis in the late 1990s. As it can be easily 
understood, the word ‗red‘ symbolizes the Communist Revolution in modern Chinese 
history. The Red Classics, therefore, refer to a series of prominent literary works that 
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emerged in the Maoist period.
33
 These revolutionary works, as Qian explains, represented 
‗a conscious endeavor by the Chinese state to create a revolutionary culture which would 
mold the socialist subject‘ (ibid. p157). Take Tracks in the Snowy Mountain (linhai 
xueyuan), written by Bo Qu in the 1950s. It tells a story of how the Communist Army 
eradicates the defeated Nationalist Army‘s bandits who had joined professional brigands 
and landlord tyrants in northeast China in the 1940s. In 1967, the novel was turned into one 
of the eight Model Revolutionary Beijing Operas
34
 (yangbanxi) widely performed during 
China‘s Cultural Revolution. The 1990s witnessed a wave of these Red Classics remakes 
by China‘s major television studios; this followed the renewed popularity of Mao as a 
popular culture icon from the late 1980s to the early 1990s (see Wang 1996).  
 
Different from the original works, which advocated a strong sense of Communist ideology, 
the remade Red Classics are mostly characterised by a romanticized way of story-telling. 
For instance, Tracks in the Snowy Mountain was remade into a television series under the 
supervision of the Propaganda Department affiliated to the Municipal Government of 
Shenzhen in 2003. Compared to the original novel and the play, the television series 
humanizes both the hero and the enemy characters with the introduction of a storyline 
dealing with their love affairs and moral complexes as well as their straight revolutionary 
or anti-revolutionary deeds. As Qian rightly comments, these television series based on the 
Red Classics capitalize on ‗nostalgia and cultural memory in a post-revolutionary age‘ 
(ibid. p170).  
 
From these two sub-genres, one can see that China‘s mainstream classic television dramas 
still carry the heavy ideological and rhetorical burdens of promoting nationalism and 
collectivism. At the same time, the last two decades saw the rise of commercialization in 
the Chinese television industry. This, I would argue, allows increasingly more space for a 
materialistic and individualistic reading of so-called ‗classic television‘. In one word, as far 
as contemporary Chinese television drama text is concerned, the meaning of ‗classic-ness‘ 
                                                        
33 A short list of the Red Classics includes Tracks in the Snowy Mountain (Linhai xueyuan), The Red Detachment of 
Women (Hongse niangzijun), Shajiabang (Shajiabang) and Struggles in the Old-line City (Yehuo chunfeng dou gucheng).  
34 Model Revolutionary Beijing Operas were commissioned and engineered during the Cultural Revolution by Jiang Qing, 
the wife of Mao. As Communist Party-sanctioned operas, they were considered to be revolutionary and modern in terms 
of thematic and musical features when compared with traditional operas. At the time, traditional Beijing opera was 
criticised of being feudalistic and bourgeois and therefore banned in China. The revolutionary operas were made in 
accordance with Mao's provision that ‗art must serve the interests of the workers, peasants, and soldiers and must 
conform to proletarian ideology‘. In total, eight revolutionary operas were made. The operas are now widely viewed as 




has become increasingly pluralistic and complex. 
 
Referring back to the example of the young audience‘s debate on classic historical drama 
mentioned above, one can easily identify this plurality and complexity from the 
respondents‘ understanding and perceptions about the idea of classic television. The 
alternative use of the term ‗classic television‘ by Yang, that 25-year-old female college 
teacher, is a perfect case in point. By putting The Princess Pearl into the category of 
classic historical drama, Yang effectively challenges a mainstream generic knowledge 
system of classic television. Unlike the classic literary adaptations or the Red Classics, 
which more or less convey serious messages about traditional cultural or mainstream 
nationalist ideologies, The Princess Pearl came out as a piece of pioneering costume 
drama that was intended to provide the audience with pure fictional entertainment through 
a mixture of romance, martial arts and comedy in a dynastic setting. Most importantly, the 
protagonist Princess Huanzhu (played by Wei Zhao), also nicknamed as the Little Swallow 
(xiao yanzi) in the show, impressed Chinese audiences with a fictional portrayal of a royal 
princess of great fun, pleasant cuteness and indeed sentimental kind-heartedness. This was 
a princess figure that they had had never seen before within the genre of costume drama. 
This intention of offering ‗pure entertainment‘ (chun yule), according to Li and Xiao 
(2006), well demonstrates a market driven television production logic.  
 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 5, this market-driven logic began to be widely 
accepted and adopted by China‘s television dramatists from the early 1990s. It is under this 
television production context that when it was first broadcast on Chinese television in 1997, 
the Princess Pearl enjoyed sudden and massive popularity amongst the Chinese audience 
as a new costume drama genre. The comment of ‗new, provocative and fundamentally 
different‘ made by Yang represents a typical kind of generic evaluation as well as cultural 
memory about this new drama genre, as far as my respondents, especially the young ones, 
are concerned. This, in my opinion, came as a result of the rise of television consumerism 
in Chinese society followed by the commercialization of the Chinese television industry 
starting from the late 1980s. It is, therefore, mostly those who grew up with the rise of 
commercial television culture that tend to challenge a mainstream understanding of classic 
television drama by welcoming and embracing the emergence of new historical television 
drama genres. Within Yang‘s group, for example, another respondent, Ho, a 28-year-old 
male office worker, to a large extent shares Yang‘s value judgment on the classic-ness of 
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The Princess Pearl. Although he has neither claimed to be a fan of the television show nor 
to have watched the whole series throughout the entire focus group interview, Ho at least 
expresses his good awareness and familiarity of the generic characteristics of The Princess 
Pearl. On the basis of this generic awareness and familiarity, Ho agrees with Yang‘s 
alternative use of the term classic television in the case of the television show.  
 
On the other hand, it should be pointed out that Yang‘s alternative use of the term classic 
television was not without controversy within her group. Although she challenges a 
mainstream understanding of classic television by bringing forward the example of The 
Princess Pearl, Yang herself believes that the term classical can mean different things 
according to different artistic standards when it comes to historical drama on contemporary 
Chinese television. Her revisionist interpretation of the term classical is well reflected in 
her answers below when I asked her to further explain what she meant by her claim that 
The Princess Pearl was a classic historical television drama: 
 
INTERVIEWER: Yang, what do you mean by classical here? 
YANG: The term classical has different meanings in different places. For example, I 
agree that The Dream of the Red Chamber is classical because it‘s a piece of 
classic literary work imbued with rich traditional Chinese cultural meanings… 
INTERVIEWER: How about The Princess Pearl then? 
YANG: Well, if The Dream of the Red Chamber is classical in terms of literary value, 
then The Princess Pearl is classical in terms of artistic style of costume drama. 
The acting of the Princess Pearl by Wei Zhao is just so funny and authentic. It 
was so different from what you normally saw in costume dramas that you 
simply wouldn‘t forget her images… 
 
From her answers, it can be seen that Yang made her judgment on the classic-ness of The 
Princess Pearl mainly based on the acting of the protagonist. The portrayal of Princess 
Pearl presents her with a breakthrough example of how far the performance of a costume 
drama character can go to be different. However, Miao and Wei, the other two respondents 
in the group, express their own concerns about classic television other than those of acting. 
By proposing the example of The Dream of the Red Chamber, Miao, the 26-year-old 
female university teacher, concentrates on a close link between classic historical dramas 
with national literary heritage. For her, a classical historical drama should, first of all, have 
a serious, classic literary origin. According to her, the Dream has set the standard for 
quality costume drama on contemporary Chinese television. The ‗standard‘ here, as she 
later makes clear in the discussion, is sustained by the widely-accepted fact within China 
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that the television series remains a near-definitive adaptation of the original novel.  
 
One may argue that those who identify this ‗standard‘ take historical authenticity as the 
core cultural value of a classic historical drama. Standing from a critical stance on the 
commercialization of Chinese television industry, Wei, the 28-year-old self-employed male, 
criticizes the broadcasting practices of Chinese television that work to make possible the 
great popularity of the show. In Wei‘s opinion, the popularity of the show is largely 
attributed to its being repeatedly broadcast on Chinese television over a ten-year period. By 
that, he throws into question the classic-ness of The Princess Pearl put forward by Yang as 
a commercial television phenomenon in contemporary Chinese society. 
  
All in all, what can be learnt from this short but rather unexpected debate about classic 
historical drama from the Changsha young audience group, as I would argue, is the fact 
that, rather than dwelling on a serious/popular divide of the historical drama widely 
recognized by the television dramatist and the media scholar, these young audiences tend 
to evaluate the generic characteristics of both types of historical dramas according to far 
more diverse and flexible standards. These standards are generated and conditioned by the 
commercial demands of contemporary popular television in China. Nevertheless, it is by 
the adoption of a certain standard that they establish a certain relationship between the 
historical and the classical within the contemporary realm of Chinese popular. This, 
therefore, to borrow media scholar Joe Grixiti‘s (2009) argument in his study of consumer 
culture and contemporary screen adaptations of literary classics, produces the consequence 
that the notions of ‗high‘ and ‗low‘, canonical and popular, have become ‗inevitably and 
deeply implicated in the consumerist orientations of contemporary commercial culture‘ 
(p464). 
   
Across all my focus groups as well as in-depth interviews, it can be found that the 
respondents‘ consumerist orientation towards the classic-ness of the historical drama is 
characterised by the fact that they tend to keep two separate concepts in great tension - the 
idea of historical factuality and that of fictional style. Moreover, it is through articulating 
with this tension within a particular historical drama text that my respondents form their 
own opinions on the classic-ness of the text. The following two quotes, for example, well 




A classic historical serial like The Dream of the Red Chamber is expected to stick to 
important history and literary facts. No commercial-oriented artistic work should be 
done to it at the cost of distorting those important facts (male, aged 50, university 
teacher).                                                                                                                                                                             
   
I quite like Hong Kong costume dramas because there is a seamless and natural 
combination of classic Chinese old sayings and entertaining modern-style conversations 
in actors‘ dialogues in them. They may sound a bit too entertaining according to 
mainland Chinese standard, but for me that is a very classic style of scriptwriting! 
(female, aged 25, self-employed)         
 
These two quotes represent two main different approaches to the treatment of the classic-
ness of the historical drama text amongst my respondents. The 50-year-old male university 
teacher places more emphasis on the significance of truth claim than on artistic claims. In 
other words, he prioritizes the factual over the fictional in the formation of a classic 
historical drama text. For him, historical factuality forms the basis of the authentic viewing 
experience of the historical drama. On the other hand, the 25-year-old self-employed 
female, like many other young respondents involved in my interviews, pays greater 
attention to creative components of audio-visual effects within the historical drama text 
than most of their middle-aged counterparts. In her case, it is the style of the dialogue that 
lies at the heart of her affinity with Hong Kong costume dramas. She considers the 
dialogical style to be constitutive of the classic-ness of the dramas.  
 
Nevertheless, by using the words ‗seamless and natural‘ to describe her feelings about the 
dialogue, she in fact expresses a positive attitude towards a popular representation of 
classic Chinese culture texts within Hong Kong costume dramas. For her, the 
commercialization and trans-nationalization of China‘s television drama industry has 
transformed prominent historical figures and events of pre-modern Chinese history into a 
corpus of popular cultural resources that are available to be appropriated by the television 
dramatists in the Greater China region.  
 
 As far as I am concerned, these two competing views on the classic-ness of the historical 
drama prompt the very question of authentic historical representation from the perspective 
of the audience. It is worth noting here that British historian Jerome de Groot (2009), in his 
book Consuming History, proposes this assumption on how the audience would perceive a 
certain classic television historical serial. He argues that ‗a viewer is expected to be quite 
happy that this is a story or narrative occurring within the framework of authentic historical 
165 
 
representation‘ (ibid. p187). In a general sense, De Groot‘s assumption proves largely true 
in the answers given by my two respondents. Although they come to grips with the 
meanings of classic-ness from two different angles, both of the respondents appear to have 
received much viewing pleasure from the particular historical dramas that they mention 
respectively. At the same time, their viewing pleasure is largely derived from their 
treatment with the tension between the factual and the fictional that characterizes the 
particular historical drama text. From this, one can say that De Groot rightly establishes the 
relationship between viewing pleasure and authentic historical representation.  
 
Nevertheless, De Groot offers an explanation of the notion of authentic historical 
representation from a textual point of view. For him, the authenticity of a historical drama 
should be understood as an aesthetic quality of representing history to a viewer. This 
aesthetical quality, as he goes on to argue, has an impact on the viewer when the narrative 
of the drama gives ‗a flavor of the time‘ despite the fact that the drama is ‗self-evidently 
fictional‘ (ibid.). The concept of ‗a flavor of the time‘ is a highly inspiring one here. On the 
one hand, it is adopted by De Groot as a textual assumption referring to a viewer‘s popular 
conceptualization of the past, based on the narrative as well as the setting of a particular 
historical drama. On the other hand, also more importantly, the term ‗flavor‘ conveys a 
sense of fluidity and contingency, so the concept creates a great deal of interpretive 
opportunities for me to examine the authenticity of that drama text. 
  
At this point, I would like to link De Groot‘s concept of ‗a flavor of the time‘ with 
Couldry‘s mediation analysis on contemporary media rituals, which I mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter. As argued before, for Couldry (2003), media rituals are not 
something universal but social forms ‗which legitimate a fact that about the current 
organization of mediation, in most parts of the world, that is contingent, not necessary‘ 
(p135-p136). The current organization of mediation, as he goes on to remind us, is ‗the 
intense concentration of society‘s symbolic resources in centralized institutions that we call 
―the media‖‘ (ibid. p136). By treating contemporary media representations as a corpus of 
symbolic resources, Couldry provides a missing link between the cultural and the social by 
reexamining the symbolic dimension of social life in his work. Influenced by this approach 
of mediation analysis proposed by Couldry, therefore, I realize the analytical inadequacy of 
dwelling on my respondents‘ discussion on the classic-ness of the historical drama from a 
textual level. Instead, I suggest that one take the discussion as a point of departure to 
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interrogate the respondents‘ wider cultural concerns depending on their social and cultural 
status.  
 
This also quite well echoes one of the key gradual developments in international cultural 
and media studies in the last decade identified by the Finnish media scholar Pertti 
Alasuutari (1999). That development, which I introduced in my methodological discussion 
in Chapter 5, ‗has been to reflect upon and to take distance from the cultural concerns 
embedded in the way we conceive of contemporary society and its characteristic new 
phenomena‘ (Alasuutari, 1999, p9). By ‗reflect on‘ and ‗take distance from‘, Alasuutari 
suggests a renewed interaction between the individual and social reality. As far as a 
television programme or genre is concerned, according to Alasuutari, one ‗does not 
necessarily analyse the programme or genre ―itself‖ at all‘ (ibid. p16). Rather, one has to 
treat it as a historical phenomenon, around which public debate and discussion are 
developed and media policy decisions are made. Following upon this methodological 
guideline, I hence find two main strands of cultural concerns amongst my respondents; on 
the one hand, of course, there is an assessment about the rise of commercial culture in 
contemporary China‘s television industry; on the other hand, there is a contested yearning 
for transnational Chinese imagination.  
  
If I return to the two quotes mentioned above as an illustration of my point about the 
evaluative tension between historical factuality and fictional style and the classic-ness of 
the historical drama text, these two quotes exactly reflect those two strains of cultural 
concerns. In the first quote, that 50-year-old male university teacher criticizes the rise of 
commercial culture on Chinese television by re-emphasising the classic-ness of the 1986 
version of the literary serial The Dream of the Red Chamber. As previously mentioned, the 
1986 version of the Dream was produced by Chinese state broadcaster, CCTV, at a time 
when the Chinese television industry was yet to experience commercialization. Meanwhile, 
Chinese television dramatists were then required to dogmatically follow so-called Marxist 
literary and artistic principles, which basically advocated that artists and writers serve the 
people and the socialist system, adopting a social realism style in their work. For this 
middle-aged male, ‗commercial-oriented artistic work‘ that has been increasingly added to 
the historical drama since the early 1990s runs the great risk, in his words, of ‗distorting‘ 




In the second quote, that 25-year-old self-employed female respondent expresses her 
preference for Hong Kong costume dramas when it comes to historical dramas on 
contemporary Chinese television. By distinguishing ‗a mainland Chinese standard‘ from a 
Hong Kong one, she effectively challenges the ethos of mainland Chinese television drama 
productions as a whole. The fact that she uses the words ‗seamless‘ and ‗natural‘ to 
describe her viewing pleasure gained from a combination of classic Chinese old sayings 
and characters‘ dialogues within Hong Kong costume dramas suggests her positive identity 
with the artistic style in which traditional Chinese cultural elements are represented within 
those drama texts. For her, compared to the mainland Chinese one, the artist style of Hong 
Kong costume dramas represents less of a propagandist tone, and more of an entertaining 
and indeed, in her word, more ‗modern‘ representation.    
  
At the surface level, the fact that my respondents express these two strains of cultural 
concerns demonstrates their good awareness of the production context of the historical 
drama as a whole television genre. From their positions, commercialization and trans-
nationalization serve as two groups of cultural discourse that contribute to the discursive 
formation of the classic-ness of historical dramas on contemporary Chinese television. As I 
have introduced the three-stage development of China‘s television drama industry in 
Chapter 3, I shall not repeat here the commercial and transnational issues concerning the 
production of the historical drama from a media institutional point of view. Rather, in a 
response to the notion of ‗a flavor of the time‘ proposed by De Groot, I will consider the 
discourses of commercialization and trans-nationalization to be two categories of 
interconnected television experience; it is based on these two categories of television 
experience that my respondents manage to work through ‗a flavor of the time‘, make a 
value judgment on that ‗flavor‘ and, most importantly, take a reflexive attitude towards the 
classic-ness of the historical drama in contemporary Chinese context. It is this reflexive 
attitude that I shall continue to analyse in the next section.   
 
8.3 The new ‘classic’ discourse and the audience’s reflexive attitudes  
 
As I mentioned in Chapter 4 on the use of my research methods, each one of my focus 
group and in-depth interviews lasted for at least one and a half hours. Although they to a 
varying degree tend to appear either somewhat nervous or awkward in answering my 
questions or participating in the discussion in the first half an hour or so, most of my 
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respondents would behave relatively more relaxed and be more comfortable during the rest 
of the interviews. Because of that, when it came to the third question regarding the quality 
of historical television drama, my respondents became much more enthusiastic than when 
they dealt with the first two questions. Within quite a few focus groups, the discussion 
even started drifting away from the question itself and some respondents could not stop 
talking about ‗real‘ social problems until I began showing them another clip in order to 
direct the discussion back to my research questions. Methodologically speaking, this act of 
‗drifting away‘ offers me a wonderful opportunity to further my research. It is exactly in 
these moments where the atmosphere is lively and heated that my respondents would 
demonstrate a sense of cultural reflexivity at their best.  
 
In these moments, I strongly feel that, instead of addressing the issues of 
commercialization and trans-nationalization per se, my respondents would treat them as 
crucial aspects of contemporary cultural life in China. Nevertheless, respondents from 
different social and cultural backgrounds tend to hold different views on this 
‗contemporary cultural life‘. More importantly, these views are largely reflected in the way 
they re-evaluate and re-imagine the classic-ness of the historical drama. Next, I shall 
present my findings on how my middle-aged and young adult respondents critically 
evaluate the discourse of classic historical drama respectively.   
 
8.3.1 The middle-aged adults 
 
After they had several rounds of discussion of classic television drama, I asked this group 
of middle-aged respondents in Beijing (FG3) what the notion of classic means to them 
personally: 
 
INTERVIEWER: Now we‘ve talked quite a bit about classic television drama. Some say             
that The Great Emperor Hanwu is a classic historical series. Some others say 
that The Princess Pearl is a classic as well. From your personal point of view, 
what do think of the classic here? 
LENG: Well, I think that the meanings of classic-ness have changed a lot and they are 
still changing in China. The stuff like the 1986 version of the Dream of the Red 
Chamber is definitely outmoded according to today‘s standard.  
GUO: Exactly, time has changed! 
LENG (continue): Any television genre can be a classic these days. Not just historical 
stuff or revolutionary stuff. As long as it very well captures ordinary people‘s 
attention and conjures up their imagination, it is very likely to be a classic.   
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WU: Being a classic or not, a certain television drama has to be about and for ordinary 
people these days. 
GUO (continue): Agreed! I am not sure about how a television show can become a 
classic, but if it is a really good television show it has to be something that you 
find easy to relate to in the first place. The Bronze Teeth is a case in point!  
ZHAO: In my opinion, the Chinese people have become more and more individualistic 
and entertainment-oriented. This is very different from, say, how they were like 
in the Eighties. In that time, you had all this very serious, classic stuff on 
television. Nowadays people are just materialistic so they are only interested in 
watching realistic things. This is the spirit of the age, I am afraid.   
LENG (continue): Absolutely. Whatever subjects a television drama deals with, it should 
have its selling points!   
  … 
 
From this group interview, one can easily notice that the four respondents extend the 
discussion of classic historical drama from the mass media sphere to the wider socio-
cultural arena. By using such phrases and expressions as ‗outmoded‘, ‗time has changed‘ 
and ‗the spirit of the age‘, they comment on historical dramas on contemporary Chinese 
television with sharp social criticism. At the same time, although all of the four 
respondents belong to the middle-aged groups (40-55) as I broadly define, there exist not 
only similarities but also differences in terms of how they understand and value classic 
television drama among themselves. These similarities and differences, according to my 
observation, apply to the other middle-aged groups as well.  
 
As far as the similarities are concerned, all of the four respondents have come to terms 
with the fact that the nature of classic television drama has changed in China over the last 
two decades. They are also quite aware of the fact that this change happened as a result of 
the development of a market economy in the country since the early 1990s. Compared with 
their young adult counterparts, these middle-aged respondents have witnessed this cultural 
change on Chinese television for a longer period of time. They, therefore, tend to have 
stronger feelings about the changing nature of Chinese television drama since the late 
1980s. For them, differently from the classic television dramas in the 1980s, which were 
characterised by a serious educational and propagandist face, contemporary television 
dramas including the historical ones need to reflect ordinary people‘s concerns in an 
absorbing way. 
  
On the other hand, their critical attitudes on the discourse of classic television reveal 
differences. There are two main factors involved in the making of these differences. First, 
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there is the gender factor. As my focus group interviews are all mixed gender, I find that 
the male respondents are always more assertive in expressing their opinions on the classic-
ness of the historical drama than their female counterparts. Within this group, for instance, 
the two male respondents adopt quite a taken-for-granted attitude towards the discourse of 
classic television drama. This taken-for-granted-ness, as the quotes show, leads them to 
naturally accept that discourse and immediately link it with what they define as ‗the spirit 
of the age‘. That is, in their words, ‗materialistic‘ and ‗having selling points‘. The two 
female respondents, however, criticize the discourse of classic television drama in a less 
straightforward manner. Instead of directly commenting on it, they tend to approach the 
theme of classic-ness from a more personal position. Wu simply emphasises the 
importance of being ‗about and for ordinary people‘ for a contemporary television drama. 
Guo believes that a ‗good television show‘ has to be easy to ‗relate to‘ for its viewers.  
 
It is worth revealing here that, when it comes to how important the fact/fiction issues have 
to do with the social impact of the historical drama, which I discussed at great length in 
Chapter 7, Guo also belongs to one of the respondents that take a realistic attitude. This 
gender-based attitude difference reminds me of the fact that China‘s mainstream discourses 
of classic television drama were originally formulated in a dual ideological framework of 
socialist revolution and aesthetic Marxism in the 1980s; both of the mainstream classic 
sub-genres including classic literary adaptations and the Red Classics serve the main 
purpose of communicating nationalist and collectivist message to the general public. 
However, for Chinese female audiences, especially the middle-aged ones, one may argue 
that those classic discourses to a large extent operate within a male-dominated 
representational system. As a result, most of my middle-aged female respondents are either 
disinterested in or pragmatic about the classic-ness of the historical drama. 
  
Second, the factor of social position also influences the way a certain respondent evaluates 
the discourse of classic television drama. In Chapter 7, I established an important linkage 
between a certain respondent‘s social position and the extent to which he or she considers 
the importance of the fact/fiction debate of the historical drama in China‘s public realm. As 
far as my respondents are concerned, a striking finding is that those who occupy senior 
administrative positions in state-owned enterprises as well as those who are middle school 
or university teachers appear much more concerned with the debate than those who are 
self-employed or low-rank employers in state-owned enterprises. In other words, it is only 
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those respondents, who have accumulated a considerable amount of political and 
educational capital, are actively and consciously participating in the fact/fiction debate. 
When it comes to an evaluation of classic television drama, my respondents at different 
social positions also expressed different opinions. Those who occupy senior administrative 
positions in state-owned enterprises like Mr. Leng, a company manager shown in the 
example above-quoted, mainly take a welcoming and positive attitude towards the 
changing nature of the classic-ness due to the rise of television commercialization. For 
them, as long as it ‗conjures up ordinary people‘s imagination‘ and ‗has selling points‘, a 
certain television show has sufficient artistic qualities to become a classic.  
 
However, many respondents who are self-employers or low-rank employers in state-owned 
enterprises like Mr. Zhao, a bus driver shown in the example, tend to take a more critical 
stance towards the commercialization of the television industry. They demonstrate a sense 
of ‗socialist nostalgia‘ (Rofel 1999) about the quality of television production during the 
transitional period of the development of China‘s television industry (1978-1987). They 
would sing high praise for, as what they perceive to be, sincere and serious work ethics of 
the television dramatists in the 1980s in terms of how they dealt with adaptation issues of 
costume drama. At the same time, they would criticize a profit-driven logic that 
characterizes contemporary China‘s television production. For instance, in saying that 
‗people are just materialistic so they are only interested in watching realistic things‘, Zhao 
to some extent expresses negative feelings towards this profit-driven logic. Hence, from 
what has been discussed so far, I would argue that what distinguishes my respondents of 
different social positions on the debate of classic television drama lies in the fact that they 
hold different views on the status-quo of television production in contemporary China. 
Generally speaking, facing the status-quo of the television production, the more social and 
political power a certain viewer is able to exercise, the more optimistic he or she appears to 
be. 
   
8.3.2 The young adults 
 
Compared with their middle-aged counterparts, my young adult respondents have been 
under a heavy influence of the rise of television consumerism in China since the early 
1990s. This influence, as I pointed out previously, allows increasingly more space for a 
materialistic and individualistic reading of so-called ‗classic television‘. Referring back to 
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the quotes mentioned above where there are young adult respondents involved, one can 
easily find this materialistic and individualist reading.  
 
For example, within the young adult group that I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, 
Miao, a female university teacher and Wei, a self-employed male gave different answers to 
Yang‘s question of what they consider to be the most classical historical drama of the past 
decade on Chinese television. For Miao, the 1986 version of the literary adaptation the 
Dream of the Red Chamber is the most classical one. Here, the classic-ness, as argued 
previously, is sustained by the widely-accepted fact within China that the television series 
remains a near-definitive adaptation of the original novel. On the other hand, Wei puts 
forwards the 42-part series the Tales of Emperor Qianlong which debuted on China‘s cable 
television channels in 1992. As previously introduced, based on the well-known historical 
tale about the Qing Emperor Qianlong‘s visit to South China, the Tales tells a story of the 
Emperor‘s wish to pursue freedom and true love. It is worth noting that the Tales was one 
of the pioneering television series co-produced by Taiwanese and Chinese television 
production companies in the Post-Cold War era. For most of China‘s television dramatists, 
it marked the first appearance of the genre of popular historical drama on contemporary 
Chinese television.  
  
Miao and Wei‘s answers are typical of a consumerist evaluation of the classic-ness of the 
historical drama on contemporary Chinese television amongst my young adult respondents. 
For a critical understanding of this consumerist evaluation, I would suggest that the notion 
of consuming citizenship fulfill a good analytical function here. In Chapter 2, I introduced 
that the nature of Chinese citizenship has undergone a fundamental change in the past two 
decades. Although the concept of citizen still intends to modify social conduct to the 
Chinese socialist spiritual civilization template, contemporary citizenship and civic 
awareness in China need to be, as Keane (2001b) points out, ‗contextualized within the 
twin freedoms of property rights reform and consumerism‘ (p8).  
 
For example, unlike their middle-aged counterparts, for whom the traditional discourse of 
classic television drama represents a conscious endeavor by the Chinese state in the 1980s 
to create a revolutionary culture which would mold the socialist subject, they appropriate 
the classic discourse in a depoliticized manner. For Miao, the classic-ness of the Dream of 
the Red Chamber lies in its literary aesthetical values, whereas for Wei, the Tales of 
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Emperor Qianlong, initiated an innovative way of representing historical tales on mainland 
Chinese television with the introduction of Taiwanese television entertainment culture. In 
other words, as far as they are concerned, the political implications of the original idea of 
classic-ness have been eclipsed by aesthetical as well as innovative ones. Nevertheless, this 
ideological transformation is made possible by the rise of television consumerism in 
Chinese society. 
  
Despite the fact that the idea of classic television drama is depoliticized by my young adult 
respondents, the factor of social position also largely contributes to their evaluation on the 
classic-ness of the historical drama. More importantly, the young adult respondents are 
very critical of the factor of social position in the reproduction as well as legitimatization 
of the discourse of classic historical drama in China‘s public realm. As I discussed a bit 
earlier in this section, the way a certain middle-aged respondent evaluated the discourse of 
classic historical drama is largely determined by the social position he or she occupies. It is 
worth adding that, although there is this causal relationship between their social positions 
and their reflexive attitudes towards the classic discourse, my middle-aged respondents 
appear quite cautious in touching upon the social position issues as such. Their cautious 
attitudes, according to my observation, are mainly derived from the fact that most of the 
middle-aged respondents are more or less reserved about their own social and economic 
lives in the group discussion. Hence, they tend not to rush into a social hierarchy debate 
while commenting on a certain television programme.  
 
On the contrary, the young adult respondents generally demonstrate greater acuteness of 
the relationship between a particular generic evaluation of the historical drama and its 
sociological groundings. For example, Xiong, a young male local government worker from 
Beijing, expresses his likeness for The Great Emperor Hanwu in his group discussion. For 
him, The Great Emperor Hanwu has good potential of becoming a classic historical drama 
on Chinese television since the year 2000. His evaluation is mainly based on the fact that 
the series unprecedentedly presents a melodramatic style incorporating many spectacular 
realistic war scenes. However, Xiong‘s evaluation is challenged by the other three 
respondents within his group. The issue at stake here is the relationship between a 





  XIONG: What makes the Great Emperor Hanwu stand out as a classic historical drama, 
in my opinion, is its melodramatic style. Apart from those well-known battles 
between the Han army and the Xiongnu army, the series successfully represents 
political power struggles among characters, such as the one between the 
Emperor and the Queen Mother and that between the Emperor and his younger 
brother. Those political power struggles apparently narrate contemporary 
political and social situations in China as well! 
  LI: Oh yes! You definitely need to learn how to deal with all sorts of political power 
struggles on a daily basis because you work for a governmental organization 
[laugh]. 
  WENG: I cannot agree more with Li! I think the reason why Xiong ranks the series as a 
classic is mainly because that it addresses lots of similar human relationship 
problems as he may encounter from his daily work. In a governmental 
organization, you‘ve got to know how to play politics in a smart way. That is 
exactly what the Great Emperor Hanwu is all about, isn‘t it? 
  XIONG (continue): Come on, not necessarily! It depends on how you understand the 
idea of power struggle. After all, power struggle is human nature, isn‘t it? The 
classic-ness of the series is nothing but its vivid representation of human nature 
in a dynasty setting. It should not be confined to representation of actual politics, 
I think. 
  WANG: I kinda agree with Xiong! But I am not a big fan of the serious stuff like this 
anyway, although I know lots of people are. For me, be entertaining is key to a 
successful television drama whatever subject it concerns. 
 
It is widely acknowledged by Chinese television critics that The Great Emperor Hanwu 
presents a hybridized dramatic style of historical realism and family melodrama (see Li 
2007). In Chapter 5, I summarised the artistic characteristics of Chinese family melodrama 
compared with European one. Briefly speaking, the distinction between the two is apparent; 
it produces a tension between two different models of secular subjectivity, ‗one based on 
psychology and its expression and the other based on ethically defined social and kinship 
roles‘ (Berry, 2003, p186). At the same time, as discussed in Chapter 5, British media 
scholar Christine Geraghty (2006) observes that there has been a shift from traditional 
realist modes to melodramatic modes in the storylines of Eastenders over the last few years. 
By referring to Zygmunt Bauman‘s book (2002) on risk society, she argues that ‗the turn to 
melodrama (of Eastenders) can be understood as a way of trying to fill the vacuum created 
by the instabilities and lack of trust that Bauman describes‘ (Geraghty, 2006, p226).  
 
Although in quite a different social context, the melodramatic television culture discussed 
by Geraghty is compatible with the evolution of historical drama on Chinese television 
since the early 2000s when anti-corruption has become the main theme of the historical 
drama produced in Chinese mainland, The Great Emperor Hanwu being a perfect example 
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here. Featuring a melodramatic mode, the video clip that I chose to screen in the focus 
groups is one of the most intense scenes showing ethical conflicts among the characters in 
the series. It is a family gathering scene, where the Queen mother of the Emperor Wu tries 
to persuade the Emperor himself into making his brother his successor; because the 
Emperor distrusts his brother, he shows his disagreement and thus argues with his mother. 
This 10-minute scene ends with a furious verbal conflict between the Queen mother and 
the Emperor followed by the Emperor‘s kneel-down apology for his disobedience with 
respect to his mother‘s request.  
 
 The audience discussion mentioned above well illustrates the Chinese model of secular 
subjectivity represented in the series. The respondents involved in the discussion take the 
ethical conflict between the Queen mother and the Emperor Wu as the starting point for 
evaluating the melodramatic style of the series. They extend an interpretation of this 
political power struggle (zhengzhi quanli douzheng) within the royal family into that of 
contemporary political and social situations in China. Interestingly enough, through their 
interpretation of the text of The Great Emperor Hanwu, Li, a 24-year-old male accountant 
in a private company and Weng, a 25-year-old female English teacher even consider 
political power struggles to be constitutive of human relationships within China‘s 
governmental organizations. Somewhat extreme as it may be, Li and Weng‘s interpretation 
at least demonstrates their awareness of as well as negative impression on rampant political 
corruption in Chinese society. More importantly, their interpretation echoes Geraghty‘s 
discussion about contemporary melodramatic television culture in relation to instabilities 
and a lack of trust in contemporary British society.  
 
In the case of The Great Emperor Hanwu, it is deep concerns about political corruption 
within Chinese society that characterizes the interpretation of the historical drama by my 
young adult respondents. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that, for the young adult 
respondents from different social positions, this melodramatic television culture has 
different values. For example, Xiong, the young local government worker, positively 
identifies the message of fighting against political corruption embedded in the story of the 
Emperor Wu. For him, the melodramatic mode of the series successfully serves as an 
important purpose for criticising contemporary Chinese political culture and thereafter 
contributes to it becoming a potential classic television drama. As two members of non-
governmental organizations, however, Li and Weng challenge Xiong‘s positive reading of 
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the series. By ‗you definitely need to learn‘ and ‗you‘ve got to know‘, they identify an 
educational function of the melodramatic mode of the series instead. As far as they are 
concerned, this educational function is performed by the series less for those who work in 
the governmental organizations to criticize political corruption than for them to learn to 
survive in the current political climate. For them, Chinese historical dramas like The Great 
Emperor Hanwu, which are full of political implications, therefore offer the Chinese 
audience cultural resources which they can turn to for strategies to lead a political life.  
 
Of course, it is worth noting that Xiong disagrees with Li and Weng‘s highly-politicized 
way of interpreting the series. Rather, he emphasises a humanist expression of the political 
power struggle shown in the series. He suggests that one draw a line between an 
understanding of the historical drama and that of, in his words, ‗actual politics‘. Unlike all 
of the three respondents, Wang, a 23-year-old female tourist guide, goes to the other 
extreme of the spectrum of the interpretations. Staying away from a political interpretation 
of any kind, she prioritizes entertainment as the most important criterion for a successful 
television drama. 
 
8.4 Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter, I find that there are different ways of evaluating the discourse of classic 
historical drama according to the audience‘s generation, gender and most importantly 
social position. It is mainly due to different social positions of the respondents that those 
different evaluative modes continue to be sustained. In dealing with these cultural and 
social differences, I would suggest that one refer back to American anthropologist Lisa 
Rofel‘s study of Chinese nationalism in the era of popular culture, which I have discussed 
in Chapter Two.  
 
In her critique of using Benedict Anderson‘s theory of imagined community to studying 
Chinese nationalism in the era of popular culture, Rofel (1994) argues that ‗his 
(Anderson‘s) theory can explain the origin of imagined communities but not plots, 
climaxes, or denouement‘ (p701). She goes on to claim that a simple description of the 
administrative structure of the party-state China is inadequate for an understanding of how 
official power works in the post-Mao era. Rather, she suggests that we need to take a close 
look at how state power in China operates, not merely through its institutions, but ‗through 
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the way the state creates itself as an imagined entity‘ (ibid. p704).  
 
Inspired by Rofel‘s argument, I would argue that the audiences‘ different modes of 
evaluating the discourse of classic historical drama reflect their different modes of cultural 
imagination. Furthermore, this mode of cultural imagination can be also seen as a way that 
the audience negotiates with the cultural power that the state exerts over the production and 
regulation processes of the historical drama. It is within this negotiation process that the 
audience manages to make his or her own judgment on the public and private values of the 




































As discussed at the beginning of this thesis, media scholars in China have long interpreted 
historical dramas produced for contemporary Chinese television mainly by using textual 
analysis, but little academic effort has been made to look at the meaning of these dramas 
from a sociological perspective. With the primary aim of filling this knowledge gap, this 
study attempts to explore how historical dramas are understood and socially and culturally 
valued in Chinese society, taking into account personal, social, historical and cultural 
issues that relate to viewers‘ engagement with this television genre. It is worth emphasising 
that a critical sociological study of the reception of Chinese historical drama within China 
can contribute in a distinctive way to an understanding of contemporary television culture 
and social changes in China. For the last decade, the historical drama genre has topped the 
list of Chinese audiences‘ favourite television genres, as well as the highest selling prime-
time programmes on China Central Television. It cannot be denied, therefore, that 
historical dramas serve as a perfect case study for examining important factors that 
constitute the status quo of contemporary Chinese television. On the other hand, the 
production and consumption process of the historical drama text involves a series of 
contradictions and negotiations between state interventions, popular historical 
representation as well as television consumerism, so that the historical drama can be seen 
as a popular cultural forum where the process of modern Chinese identity formation is 
revealed and can be evaluated. Bearing in mind these two potential areas of original 
contribution to knowledge, in this chapter I shall provide a summary of the key findings of 
this study. 
  
The findings are summarised in three parts. The first part reviews the major cultural and 
political forces behind the generic production of the historical drama. It points out that, the 
Party-state apparatus remains the ultimate power in historical drama production and 
broadcasting, as the commercial and transnational management of the Chinese television 
drama industry is one of the driving forces behind the evolution of the genre. Part Two 
focuses on how my respondents understand and evaluate the selected historical drama texts. 
Based on the two interpretive frameworks adopted by my respondents discussed in 
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Chapters 7 and 8, I argue that the interaction between the audience agency and the state 
power means that history becomes a body of popular cultural knowledge itself to be 
challenged and subverted. The third part extends the Chinese audience‘s response to the 
historical drama to a wider Chinese popular cultural arena. It identifies new tendencies in 
contemporary Chinese television culture that go beyond Confucianism-influenced 
totalitarian nostalgia. Finally, taking this study as a starting point, I shall propose a number 
of further research directions. 
 
9.2 Political and cultural forces at work in the production of historical dramas  
 
Since the early 1990s, Chinese historical drama has experienced an enormous 
transformation in both its content and artistic style. In terms of content, Chinese historical 
drama produced since the early 1990s has been distinctive for the vivid narration of 
contemporary political and social issues in the guise of historical representation. When it 
comes to sub-genres, these historical dramas can be mainly grouped into three categories: 
emperor drama, anti-corruption satirical costume drama and period drama. As far as artistic 
style is concerned, ‗serious history‘ versus ‗popular history‘ remains the most common 
dichotomy within the Chinese television industry and academia in relation to the broad 
genre of historical television. This study uses American media scholar Jason Mittell‘s 
(2004) cultural genre approach as the analytical tool to examine the genre. Compared to 
traditional genre studies, which consider textual assumptions to be the key to an 
understanding of the formation and operation of a given genre, Mittell‘s approach argues 
for an open rather than a closed analytical attitude towards a given television genre and its 
generic function. By adopting this cultural genre analysis to examine the evolution of the 
historical drama since the mid-1980s, this study has identified three major political and 
cultural influences that are influencing their production. 
 
Firstly, the Party-state apparatus still plays a dominant supervisory role in the production 
and broadcasting of historical dramas. Through its regulatory policies implemented by 
China‘s top visual-audio regulatory body, the State Administration of Radio, Film and 
Television (SARFT), the Chinese Communist Party forcefully determines whether a 
certain historical figure or event can be represented within a particular drama text or not. 
Chapter 5 gives a detailed account of the generic changes within the historical drama genre 
from its inception on Chinese television in the mid-1980s until the present. Although, as it 
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is widely acknowledged, China‘s television drama industry has undergone a 
commercialization process since 1987, the Communist Party would argue that the role of 
the nation-state remains critical in regulating China‘s national television production and 
broadcasting practices and this role cannot be left to the market alone. As the latest 
consequence of this state supervision over historical drama productions, there have been 
less and less mentions of the dichotomy between ‗serious and popular‘ drama within 
Chinese popular press since 2004, when the incident of Towards the Republic occurred 
(see 5.3). Because of the incident, Chinese television dramatists became more cautious in 
dealing with serious historical events and figures. Faced with this degree of state control, 
one can argue that Mittell‘s cultural genre analysis, which considers media power as 
diffused and discursive, is inadequate for a proper understanding of the Chinese context, 
where the government still occupies the dominant position in supervising the media and 
organizing media-based symbolic resources. 
 
Second, as rigid as the state control may seem in China‘s television drama industry, the 
cultural function of the historical drama goes beyond simply propagating government 
ideologies. Rather, the nature of the historical drama since the mid-1990s has been shaped 
by the interplay between official culture, mass culture and elite culture in Chinese society. 
When analysing the generic changes within historical dramas since the early 1990s in 
Chapter 5, this study has explained those three strands of cultural forces as well as their 
manifestations within the historical drama text. Official culture, promoted and sustained by 
Chinese government, serves as a mainstream ideology embedded in popular historical 
representation. Here, ‗mainstream‘ in essence means a quality of maximizing the influence 
of positive state ideology in the logic of popular communication. The rise of mass culture 
resulted from the commercial management of the Chinese cultural industry. As 
commercialization of China's television industry continued, content production within the 
state-owned television studio system was unable to satisfy demand. Independent television 
companies subsequently appeared in China and the practice of outsourcing production 
flourished from the early 1990s. Today, independent production companies are the main 
content providers for China‘s television market including that of the historical drama.  
 
The influence of elite culture is largely attributable to those Chinese novelists, literary 
critics and historians who pursue historical re-enactment and artistic creation through 
popular communication. The historical drama provides them with a means of expression 
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and certain rhetorical strategies. For them, using the past to mirror the present and drawing 
upon the past to satirize the present are part of a complementary historiographical tradition 
in China. The outcome of the interplay between these three cultural forces is well 
demonstrated by the distinctions between serious and popular historical drama. Briefly 
speaking, a serious historical drama text is expected to narrate certain officially recognized 
pre-modern historical facts and express their contemporary symbolic meanings. On the 
contrary, not based on official historical records, a popular historical drama addresses such 
issues as corruption, romance, tradition and identity in the guise of historical events and 
characters. 
 
Thirdly, increasingly more frequent co-production of television drama in the Greater China 
region since the early 1990s has given a new impetus to the evolution of the historical 
drama. The end of the Cold War not only greatly eased the political and military stand-off 
between China and the western world; it also witnessed increasing Chinese-related human, 
cultural and economic mobility at both regional and transnational levels. Early in the mid-
1980s, popular television drama produced by Hong Kong television organizations, 
comprising mainly of martial arts programmes, started to be shown on mainland Chinese 
television. Immediately after the lifting of martial law in Taiwan in 1987, television co-
productions, mainly romance costume dramas, between Taiwan and mainland China took 
off and achieved huge success on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. The mid-1990s 
witnessed the coming of a golden age for the co-production of historical drama within the 
Greater China region (also see 5.3). There are two main reasons why historical drama 
became the most popular choice for co-productions in the region, one being commercial 
and the other ideological. Commercially, Taiwanese television producers sought alliances 
beyond the island of Taiwan in order to respond to their local market pressures. 
Ideologically, it suggested to television producers in mainland China, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan that despite the fact that there exists intense ideological tension between 
contemporary Chinese politicians and their counterparts in Hong Kong and Taiwan, pre-
modern Chinese history provides them with opportunities for much less sensitive and 
culturally specific artistic inspiration. More important, the co-production practices in the 
region have challenged the ethos of mainland Chinese television drama productions as a 
whole. In general, compared to the mainland Chinese style, the artistic style of historical 
dramas in Hong Kong and Taiwan has less of a propagandist tone, and offers more of an 
entertaining historical representation. Nevertheless, this has triggered a yearning for 
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transnational Chinese imagination among China‘s viewing public. It is at this point that I 
shall move on to summarise my findings concerning the audience response. 
 
9.3 The historical drama and its audiences: articulating and disarticulating state 
power 
 
As I have proposed in Chapter 2, the paradigm of television audience research in China has 
shifted from an Encoding/Decoding model (see 2.4.1) to a reflexive sociological approach 
that addresses issues concerning the question of cultural citizenship of particular social 
groups (see 2.4.3). This paradigmatic shift suggests a crucial trend in conducting critical 
television audience research in contemporary China. That is, moving beyond Lull‘s use of 
the Encoding/Decoding model, which was based on the thesis of cultural resistance on the 
part of Chinese television audiences, we now adopt a more nuanced and multidimensional 
approach to examine the articulation and disarticulation of contemporary China's 
authoritarian politics and their interpretation by Chinese audiences. It needs to be pointed 
out that the theories of cultural citizenship, first developed in the field of Anglo-American 
and Nordic media studies, face some challenges when applied to Chinese situations. A 
large proportion of discussion on television and cultural citizenship studies has yet to be 
formulated in the context of Chinese television studies. This, in my opinion, is explained to 
an extent by the debate on the ways that ‗the Foucault effects‘ may happen in the Chinese 
context, where the state apparatus remains the ultimate power in cultural production (see 
2.2). In recent years, however, there has been a boom in the study of youth culture and 
fandom in Chinese media and communication research (e.g. Chang, 2007; Fung, 2003, 
2009); these scholars have made great critical efforts to analyse the liberal values and 
public discourses generated by the rise of popular culture and consumerism. As Keane 
(2001b) argues, although the concept of citizenship still intends to modify social conduct to 
the Chinese socialist spiritual civilization template, contemporary citizenship and civic 
awareness in China need to be ‗contextualized within the twin freedoms of property rights 
reform and consumerism‘(p8).  It is with an aim to contextualize the idea of cultural 
citizenship in the Chinese context that I conducted this Grounded Theory-informed 
empirical study on the reception of the historical drama in two urban settings in China. 
 
This study analysed three important issues concerning historical representations within the 
drama texts from the point of view of the audience. These issues, including the significance 
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of historical accuracy, totalitarian nostalgia and contemporary use of historical 
representations, are drawn from a long-standing debate of historical dramas that can easily 
be found both within the Chinese television drama industry and academic debates. Through 
the use of a focus group and in-depth interview research, I found that the way that the 
audience engages with historical representations is far more complex than generally 
thought; rather than insist on a literal interpretation of the dramatic text, the audience 
engages with the historical television drama in quite a divergent way due to his or her age, 
gender, life stage and socio-cultural status. In order to examine this relationship between 
generic knowledge of the historical drama and audience agency, I suggest using the theory 
of cultural competence developed by Bourdieu (1984). For Bourdieu, a work of art has 
meaning and interest only for someone ‗who possesses the cultural competence, that is, the 
code, into which it is encoded‘ (Bourdieu, 1984, p2). By the same token, I argue that to 
what extent an audience understands a certain television genre is determined by the extent 
that he or she possesses relevant cultural competences. Guided by the theory of cultural 
competence, I identify two main text-based interpretive frameworks that are adopted by 
my respondents across all the focus groups and in-depth interviews in their understanding 
and evaluation of the historical drama text. They include the framework of fact/fiction and 
that of ‗classic-ness‘. According to my study, these two interpretive frameworks constitute 
the two most important cultural concerns that challenge and subvert the legitimacy of the 
historical as a cultural category as far as the historical drama is concerned. At the same 
time, I realize that the ways that these two cultural concerns are expressed by my 
respondents largely depend on how state power in China operates on their social and 
personal lives. As summarised earlier in this chapter, the Party-state apparatus plays a 
dominant supervisory role in the production and broadcasting of the historical drama. 
These two cultural concerns that emerge from my audience research, therefore, offer clues 
to help explore the extent that my respondents are aware of and perceive that dominant 
supervisory role played by the Party-state.     
 
There are two main observations that I would like to make about my respondents‘ 
awareness and perception of state power. First, those who occupy senior administrative 
positions in state-owned enterprises appear much more concerned with as well as pay 
much more serious attention to the Chinese historiographical traditions inherent in the 
historical drama, compared with those who are self-employed or low-ranking employees in 
state-owned enterprises. For example, within the fact/fiction debate, nearly all my 
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respondents who are working in senior administration in China‘s state-owned enterprises 
would address China‘s Confucianism-related political cultural issues in a more active 
manner than others. Quite a few of them would coincidentally associate the emperor 
figures in the Qing emperor dramas with China‘s current leading political authority, the 
Hu-Wen Administration. They acknowledge that the Qing emperor dramas provide the Hu-
Wen Administration with inspiration and lessons in maintaining China‘s national 
unification and social stability in the present day. On the contrary, those respondents who 
are self-employed or low-ranking employees in state-owned enterprises would normally 
choose to approach the historical drama from a contemporary perspective. Instead of 
dwelling on actual and solid historical facts, they tend to focus on their personal interests in 
historical knowledge and the entertainment values of a particular historical drama text.  
 
Secondly, there is a much stronger oppositional reading of the serious historical drama 
from those who work in non-governmental organizations than those who work in 
governmental ones. My respondents‘ discussion of the ‗classic-ness‘ of contemporary 
Chinese historical drama well reflects this. For most of the respondents who work in state-
owned enterprises in my research, the melodramatic mode of the historical drama, 
especially the serious dramas, serves a purpose of criticising contemporary Chinese 
political culture and thereafter contributes to it becoming a potential classic television 
drama. They would easily, and, in most cases, positively identify the message of fighting 
against political corruption embedded in those historical drama texts. Most of the 
respondents affiliated with non-governmental organizations, however, tend to undermine 
and even oppose an educational function of the melodramatic mode of the historical drama. 
As far as they are concerned, this educational function performed by the historical drama is 
less for those who work in the governmental organizations to criticize political corruption 
than for them to learn to survive in the current political climate. For them, Chinese 
historical dramas like The Great Emperor Hanwu, which are full of political implications, 
therefore offer those Chinese audiences who develop careers in state-owned organizations 
cultural resources which they can turn to for strategies to lead successful political lives 
within those organizations. It is worth noting that the dichotomy of the so-called ‗inside the 
state institution‘ (tizhi nei) and ‗outside the state institution‘ (tizhi wai) is frequently 
mentioned and widely accepted by those respondents who are self-employed and employed 
by private firms when they try to challenge the legitimacy of the serious historical drama 




In sum, my respondents‘ awareness and perception of the state power in their cultural 
practices of watching the historical drama to a large extent confirm Lisa Rofel‘s theoretical 
model (1994) of studying how official power works in the past-Mao era. Basically, she 
suggests that we need to take a close look at how state power in China operates, not merely 
through its institutions, but through the way the state creates itself as an imagined entity. 
My study demonstrates that the battle of historical interpretation between state institutions 
and non-state ones emerges as a result of a widespread suspicion and mistrust of the Party-
state in China mobilizing the Chinese public through the medium of historical dramas. In 
other words, the relationship between the historical drama genre and its audiences 
represents imaginative conflicts and ideological clashes in the treatment of the state as a 
totalitarian entity in China‘s television culture sphere.            
 
9.4 Towards Chinese television culture beyond totalitarian nostalgia and future 
research directions  
 
As introduced at the beginning of this study, many Chinese media culture scholars have in 
the past made the association between contemporary Chinese historical television drama 
and a wave of totalitarian nostalgia within China's popular cultural sphere, which began 
from the late 1980s. The most notable scholar holding this opinion has to be US-based 
Chinese media scholar Ying Zhu (2008a, 2008b). In a series of discussions on the 
popularity of the Qing drama, she points out, what she phrases as, ‗the symbolic link 
between Neo-authoritarianism's justification of the Tiananmen crackdown and the drama 
genre's ideological positioning‘ (Zhu, 2008a, p30). She reminds us that, the revisionist 
Qing drama emerged at a time when Chinese society was undergoing rapid economic 
growth due to the Deng Xiaoping-led economic reforms in the aftermath of the Tiananmen 
Square protests of 1989. At that time, the Chinese people were fed up with corruption and 
society's perceived loss of its moral grounding along with the economic development. 
These dynasty dramas attempted to present exemplary emperors from bygone dynasties 
and ‗capitalize on the popular yearning for models of strong leadership‘ on Chinese 
television (ibid. p32). Although scholars like Zhu have interpreted the popularity of 
television historical dramas as a revival of Confucianism, virtually no empirical research 
has been done to explore how Chinese audiences relate their viewing experiences to the 
revival of Confucianism according to their own social and cultural conditions. Media 
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scholars have failed to closely investigate how these television historical dramas are 
perceived, discussed and criticised by the audiences.  
 
Faced with the chronic lack of empirical study of the historical drama genre and its social 
and cultural impact on Chinese society, I chose to examine the theme of totalitarian 
nostalgia from a critical sociological approach. Nick Couldry‘s concept of symbolic power 
in his book Media Rituals: A Critical Approach (2003) provides a useful critical 
sociological approach. For him, media rituals are not universal; they are social forms 
‗which legitimate a fact that about the current organization of mediation, in most parts of 
the world, that is contingent, not necessary‘ (Couldry, 2003, p135). The current 
organization of mediation, as he goes on to remind us, involves ‗the intense concentration 
of society‗s symbolic resources in centralized institutions that we call ―the media‖‘ (ibid.). 
To apply Couldry‘s concept in the Chinese context, the embedded discourse of 
authoritarian nostalgia within the Chinese historical television drama text can be 
understood as a corpus of symbolic resources provided by the drama production and 
broadcast organization; its connections with symbolic power cannot be ignored, as these 
connections exist in two territories. Firstly, the very heart of the drama production and 
broadcast organization, and secondly, their social consequences, which I am mainly 
concerned with in this study. As shown, the Chinese audience‘s response to historical 
drama goes beyond the literal, political sense of totalitarian nostalgia. Instead, the 
audience's responses are characterised by an increasingly more liberal, diverse and indeed 
open-ended engagement with the historical drama text due to their age, gender, life stage 
and socio-cultural status. Nevertheless, a critical re-evaluation of Maoist revolutionary 
classic literary works is manifested within that engagement process.  
 
The historical drama offers Chinese audiences a dramatised account of the past and 
traditional Chinese society at a time when major change is taking place in contemporary 
China. As the process of cultural globalisation continues, this provides the Chinese viewing 
public with a televised forum to reflect on their rich cultural traditions and spiritual 
heritage as well as reconsider their orientation in a future order of global culture. Echoing 
the Harvard professor Wei-ming Tu‘s influential essay Cultural China: the Periphery as 
the Centre published in 1991, one can say that Chinese historical drama, as an important 
part of Chinese cultural industry, remains an unfinished project for modern Chinese 
identity formation. It is thus worth making continuous effort in investigating and 
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evaluating this ongoing identity-formation process by treating the future development of 
the historical drama as a changing cultural phenomenon. Looking beyond this study I now 
wish to push my research agendas related to the historical drama into two main areas.  
 
The first of these is to carry out a constant critical review of the content and artistic style 
changes within the historical drama, as a broadly defined television genre. For example, 
there is currently a new wave of so-called ‗time-travel television series‘ (chuanyue 
dianshiju) on Chinese television. This deserves much more academic attention than it has 
done so far. The last few years have seen the emergence of these television series on 
Chinese cable and satellite systems. By situating their plots between contemporary and 
historical or imaginary settings, this newly emerged television drama genre represents a 
hybridisation of a contemporary subject, costume drama and science fiction. This time-
travel television phenomenon can be seen as the latest development in Chinese historical 
drama. A new round of public debate and discussion has developed and media policy 
decisions are being made around this phenomenon from an early stage. For instance, in 
response to the rise of the time-travel television series, the SARFT has expressed its own 
concerns. In 2011, some senior officials from the SARFT publicly accused those television 
series of misrepresenting traditional Chinese culture and thus playing a negative role in 
Chinese audiences formulating their historical understanding. In the same year, the SARFT 
even banned turning well-known ancient Chinese classic novels into time-travel television 
series; this was done with the aim of avoiding any potential impacts of the time-travel 
television phenomenon on those classic literary works. A critical examination of these 
television series would contribute to a deeper understanding of contemporary China‘s 
televisual nostalgia culture in all its forms, which this study has tried to address.  
 
Secondly, moving beyond audience research in relation to historical dramas, I shall 
examine a broader field of historical television programme production and consumption in 
the Greater China region. Both fictional and non-fictional history programming in the 
region will be considered, with an emphasis on looking at how particular cultural and 
television polices are adopted in relation to this. As well as programmes that deal with pre-
modern Chinese history, televisual art work that concerns events and figures in modern 
Chinese history since the early twentieth century will also be treated as the object of 
further study. As previously reviewed in this chapter, although there exists intense 
ideological tension between contemporary Chinese politicians and their counterparts in 
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Hong Kong and Taiwan, pre-modern Chinese history provides television producers in these 
three Chinese societies with much less sensitive and culturally specific artistic inspiration. 
In the last five years, however, a rewriting of modern Chinese history since the May Fourth 
Movement
35
 (wusi yundong) has emerged in China‘s popular culture scene. At the same 
time, themes such as the Chinese Civil War between 1945 and 1949 and the coalition of the 
Nationalists and the Communists during the Anti-Japanese War between 1939 and 1945, 
previously regarded as political taboos during the Maoist Period, have frequently been 
represented in popular television dramas. A wide range of fictional and non-fictional 
television programmes that deal with prominent Chinese historical subjects since the early 
twentieth century can also be found in the television programming of Taiwan and Hong 
Kong. Given these changes within television culture taking place in the Greater China 
region, I propose that a comparative production and policy study of historical television 
programmes across the region will reveal differences and similarities of contemporary 
Chinese historical and cultural identities within television productions. Most importantly, 
such a study would be expected to provide insight into the increasingly more complicated 
question of what it means to be Chinese in the 21
st















                                                        
35
 The May Fourth Movement is known as an anti-imperialist, cultural, and political movement growing out of student 
demonstrations in Beijing on May 4, 1919. It protested against the then Chinese government's weak response to the 
Treaty of Versailles, especially the sovereign authority issues that relate to the Shandong Peninsula. These demonstrations 
sparked national protests and marked the upsurge of Chinese nationalism, a shift towards political mobilization and away 
from cultural activities, and a move towards populist base rather than intellectual elites. It is widely considered to be the 
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FG1: BEIJING YOUNG ADULTS   FG2: BEIJING YOUNG ADULTS   
Date: 14 October 2007 
Location: Tea house in Beijing 
Duration: 99 minutes 
Date: 25 November 2007 
Location: Communication University of        
China 
Duration: 153 minutes 
1. Chang (m), assistant mechanical 
engineer, 24 
2. Fang (m), electronic technician, 
35 
3. Li (m), accountant, 25 
4. Lin (f), accountant, 24 
1. Xiong (m), office worker, 25 
2. Li (m), accountant, 24 
3. Weng (f), middle school teacher, 
25 
4. Yu (f), middle school teacher, 27 
5. Wang (f), tourist guide, 23 
FG3: BEIJING MIDDLE-AGED 
ADULTS   
FG4: BEIJING MIDDLE-AGED 
ADULTS   
Date: 16 February 2008 
Location: Office building in Beijing 
Duration: 91 minutes 
Date: 2 December 2007 
Location: Tea house in Beijing 
Duration: 147 minutes 
1. Leng (m), company manager, 55 
2. Zhao (m), bus driver, 48 
3. Wu (f), civil clerk, 47 
4. Guo (f), accountant, 42 
   
1. Wu (m), civil clerk, 47 
2. Liu (m), factory worker, 50 
3. Zhai (m), technician, 48 
4. Zhang (f), shop assistant, 47 
5. Wang (f), office worker, 50 
6. Huang (f), medical secretary, 51 
FG5: CHANGSHA YOUNG ADULTS   FG6: CHANGSHA YOUNG ADULTS   
Date: 1 March 2008 
Location: Tea house in Changsha 
Duration: 137 minutes 
Date: 24 February 2008 
Location: Domestic parlour, Changsha 
Duration: 120 minutes 
1. Wei (m), self-employed, 28 
2. Ho (m), office worker, 28 
3. Miao (f), university teacher, 26 
4. Fang (f), bank clerk, 24 
5. Yang (f), college teacher, 25 
 
1. Tan (m), self-employed, 35 
2. Chen (m), engineer, 24 
3. Liu (m), engineer, 24 
4. Zhang (f), university student, 22 
5. Yuan (f), technician, 24 



























FG7: CHANGSHA MIDDLE-AGED  
ADULTS   
FG8: CHANGSHA MIDDLE-AGED  
ADULTS   
Date: 2 March 2008 
Location: Demostic parlour, Changsha 
Duration: 130 minutes 
Date: 9 March 2008 
Location: Office building in Changsha 
Duration: 86 minutes 
1. Cai (m), university instructor, 44 
2. Peng (m), primary school teacher, 
45 
3. Wu (m), primary school teacher, 
40 
4. Lei (f), hospital nurse, 44 
5. Li (f), senior manager, 40 
6. Xiang (f), bank clerk, 40 
1. Liu (m), university teacher, 50 
2. Li (m), self-employed, 45 
3. Kuang (m), mechanical engineer, 
53 
4. Guan (f), office worker, 43 
5. Peng (f), administration officer, 
52 
 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS: BEIJING 
FANS ANTI-FAN 
1. Chen (m), company manager 55 
2. Li (m), professional dancer, 25 
3. Yu (m), self-employed, 26 
4. Wang (f), college teacher, 23 
5. Liu (f), self-employed, 27 
Guo (f), accountant, 42 
 
 
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS: CHANGSHA 
FANS ANTI-FAN 
1. Xia (m), surgeon, 55 
2. Peng (m), administration officer, 
45 
3. Wu (f), bank clerk, 27  
4. Zhao (f), hospital nurse, 32 







GLOSSARY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS 
 
This glossary contains all the simplified Chinese characters given in the thesis in pinyin 
romanisation. Phrases and names are listed according to English alphabetical order of the 
first character. 
 
A, Cheng                                                                                                                           阿城 
A, Nuo                                                                                                                              阿诺 
Ba Ba Ba                                                                                                                       爸爸爸 
Baijia Jiangtan                                                                                                          百家讲坛 
Beijing                                                                                                                              北京 
Ben Sheng Ren                                                                                                             本省人 
Cao, Xueqin                                                                                                                  曹雪芹 
Cha Guan                                                                                                                          茶馆 
Chen, Baoguo                                                                                                               陈宝国 
Chengdu                                                                                                                            成都 
Chongbai Lishi Yizhi Shenhua                                                             崇拜历史，抑制神话 
Chou, Shucheng                                                                                                            丑述成 
Chiung, Yao                                                                                                                      琼瑶 
Chuanmei yu Wenhua Lingdaoquan                                                        传媒与文化领导权 
Chuantong Wenhua Re                                                                                         传统文化热 
Chuantong Zhongguo Wenhua                                                                         传统中国文化 
Chuanyue Dianshiju                                                                                             穿越电视剧 
Chun Yule                                                                                                                     纯娱乐 
Cui, Zhiyuan                             崔之元 
Dabing                                                                                                                              大兵 
Dai, Houying                                                                                                                戴厚英 
Dan Ben Ju                                                                                                                   单本剧 
Daxue Wuhen                                                                                                           大雪无痕 
Dazhongguo Xiangxiang                                                                                      大中国想象 
Deng, Xiaoping                                                                                                            邓小平 
Dianshi Lishiju                                                                                                     电视历史剧 
Dianshi Piping                                                                                                          电视批评 
Diwang Jiangxiang                                                                                                   帝王将相 
Er, Yuehe                                                                                                                      二月河 
Fa Jia                                                                                                                                 法家 
Falun Gong                                                                                                                   法轮功 
Fan Fubai                                                                                                                      反腐败 
Fan Geming Fengjian Canju                                                                         反革命封建残余 
Fan Tanwu Dianshiju                                                                                        反贪污电视剧 
Fansi Ju                                                                                                                         反思剧 
Fang, Yulin                                                                                                                   方雨林 
Feng, Jicai                                                                                                                     冯骥才 
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Fu, Le                                                                                                                                傅乐 
Gan Bu                                                                                                                              干部 
Gaige Ju                                                                                                                        改革剧 
Gongqingtuan                                                                                                               共青团 
Guangzhou                                                                                                                        广州 
Guanyin                                                                                                                            观音 
Guojia Yishu Shiye                                                                                           国家艺术事业 
Guo Xue Re                                                                                                                  国学热 
Hairun                                                                                                                               海润 
Haizi Wang                                                                                                                   孩子王 
Hai Run                                                                                                                             海润 
Han                                                                                                                                       汉 
Han, Shaogong                                                                                                             韩少功 
Hanwu Dadi                                                                                                              汉武大帝 
He, Shen                                                                                                                           和绅 
Hong Lou Meng                                                                                                           红楼梦 
Hong Qi                                                                                                                            红旗 
Hong Xue                                                                                                                         红学 
Hongse Niangzijun                                                                                               红色娘子军 
Hongse Jingdian                                                                                                       红色经典 
Hu, Mei                                                                                                                            胡玫 
Hu, Jintao                                                                                                                      胡锦涛 
Hu-Wen                                                                                                                           胡-温 
Hu, Yaobang                                                                                                                 胡耀邦 
Hualu Baina                                                                                                              华录百纳 
Huangdi                                                                                                                            皇帝 
Huangdi                                                                                                                            黄帝 
Huangtaiji                                                                                                                     皇太极 
Huanzhu                                                                                                                           环珠 
Huanzhu Gege                                                                                                          环珠格格 
Hunan                                                                                                                               湖南 
Ji, Xiaolan                                                                                                                     纪晓岚 
Jiang, Zemin                                                                                                                 江泽民 
Jiao, Huang                                                                                                                       焦晃 
Jiating Lunli Ju                                                                                                     家庭伦理剧 
Jiechu Jieyan                                                                                                             解除戒严   
Jiemi                                                                                                                                 解密 
Jinde                                                                                                                                  金德 
Jingdian                                                                                                                            经典 
Jingdian Dianshiju                                                                                                经典电视剧 
Jingji Xiaoyi                                                                                                             经济效益 
Jing, Ke                                                                                                                             荆轲 
Jun                                                                                                                                        郡 
Kangde                                                                                                                              康德 
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Kang-Qian                                                                                                                        康乾 
Kang-Yong-Qian                                                                                                          康雍乾 
Kangqian Shengshi                                                                                                   康乾盛世 
Kangxi                                                                                                                              康熙 
Kangxi Dadi                                                                                                             康熙大帝 
Kuei, Ya-Lei                                                                                                                 归亚蕾 
Langman Ouxiang Ju                                                                                            浪漫偶像剧 
Lao She                                                                                                                             老舍 
Li, Dingxing                                                                                                                 李定兴 
Li, Shengli                                                                                                                    李胜利 
Li, Si                                                                                                                                 李斯 
Li, Xiangnan                                                                                                                 李向南 
Lianxu Ju                                                                                                                      连续剧 
Liao, Hongyu                                                                                                                廖红雨 
Liaozhai Zhiyi                                                                                                          聊斋志异 
Ling, Jiefang                                                                                                                 凌解放 
Ling, Li                                                                                                                             凌力 
Linhai Xueyuan                                                                                                        林海雪原 
Lishi Zhenshi                                                                                                            历史真实 
Liu, Yong                                                                                                                          刘墉 
Luotuo Xiangzi                                                                                                         骆驼祥子 
Ma, Ning                                                                                                                           马宁 
Makesi Zhuyi Wenyiguan                                                                         马克思主义文艺观 
Makesi Zhuyi Wenyi  Meixue Yanjiu                                           马克思主义文艺美学研究 
Meng, Fanhua                                                                                                               孟繁华 
Meng, Zhuo                                                                                                                      孟琢 
Ming                                                                                                                                     明 
Minjian                                                                                                                             民间      
Minjian Chuanshuo                                                                                                  民间传说 
Minjian Shenhua Chuanshuo                                                                            民间神话传说 
Minzu Wenhua                                                                                                          民族文化 
Modai Huangdi                                                                                                         末代皇帝 
Mugu Chenzhong                                                                                                     暮鼓晨钟 
Nankai                                                                                                                              南开 
Nishi                                                                                                                                 拟史 
Nu Nu Nu                                                                                                                     女女女 
Pinzhi                                                                                                                                品质 
Pu, Songling                                                                                                                 蒲松龄 
Pu, Yi                                                                                                                                溥仪  
Qi Wang                                                                                                                            棋王 
Qianlong                                                                                                                           乾隆 
Qin                                                                                                                                        秦 
Qin Shi Huang                                                                                                              秦始皇 
Qing                                                                                                                                      清 
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Qing Shi Gao                                                                                                                清史稿 
Qiushi                                                                                                                               求是 
Qiye                                                                                                                                  企业 
Qizhi                                                                                                                                 奇志 
Qu, Bo                                                                                                                              曲波 
Ren ah Ren                                                                                                                   人啊人 
Renmin                                                                                                                             人民 
Renmin Qunzhong                                                                                                    人民群众 
Rujia Sixiang                                                                                                            儒家思想 
Sanfan Zhiluan                                                                                                         三藩之乱 
Shajiabang                                                                                                                    沙家浜 
Shandong                                                                                                                          山东 
Shanghai                                                                                                                           上海 
Shanghen Ju                                                                                                                  伤痕剧 
Shangxing                                                                                                                         上星 
Shaonian Tianzi                                                                                                        少年天子 
Shawujing                                                                                                                     沙悟净   
Shehui Xiaoyi                                                                                                           社会效益 
Shehui Zhuyi Gaige                                                                                          社会主义改革 
Shenmei                                                                                                                            审美 
Shenmei Hua                                                                                                                审美化 
Shenzhen                                                                                                                          深圳 
Shi, Anbin                              史安斌 
Shi, Tongyu                                                                                                                   时统宇 
Shiguan                                                                                                                             史观 
Shiji                                                                                                                                  史记 
Shiren Zhisi                                                                                                              诗人之死 
Shishi Ruyan                                                                                                             世事如烟 
Shiye                                                                                                                                 事业 
Shu Wang                                                                                                                          树王 
Shunzhi                                                                                                                             顺治 
Sichuan                                                                                                                             四川 
Sima, qian                                                                                                                     司马迁 
Sige Xiandaihua                                                                                                   四个现代化 
Siji Ban Guangbo Dianshi                                                                            四级办广播电视 
Sishi Tongtang                                                                                                          四世同堂 
Sun, Se-Wen                                                                                                                 孙式文 
Sun, Wanning                                                                                                               孙皖宁 
Sunwukong                                                                                                                   孙悟空 
Tang                                                                                                                                      唐 
Tang, Haoming                                                                                                             唐浩明 
Tian, Fen                                                                                                                           田蚡 
Tiananmen                                                                                                                    天安门 
Tianjin                                                                                                                               天津 
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Tiechi Tongya Jixiaolan                                                                                铁齿铜牙纪晓岚 
Tizhi Nei                                                                                                                       体制内  
Tizhi Wai                                                                                                                      体制外 
Tongdao                                                                                                                            同道 
Tongsu                                                                                                                              通俗 
Tong Ya                                                                                                                             铜牙 
Tu, Wei-ming                                                                                                                杜维明 
Wang, Der-wei                                                                                                              王德威 
Wang, Gang                                                                                                                      王刚 
Wang, Hui                                                                                                                         汪晖 
Wang, Jing                                                                                                                        王瑾 
Wangshi yu Xingfa                                                                                               往事与刑罚 
Wenchuan                                                                                                                         汶川 
Wen, Jiabao                                                                                                                   温家宝 
Wenjian                                                                                                                             文件 
Wenxue Gaibian                                                                                                       文学改编 
Wenxue he Dianying Yanjiu                                                                         文学和电影研究 
Wenyipian                                                                                                                     文艺片 
Wenyizaidao                                                                                                             文以载道 
Wu                                                                                                                                        武 
Wu, Chengen                                                                                                                吴承恩 
Wu, Tianming                                                                                                               吴天明 
Wusi Yundong                                                                                                          五四运动 
Xi You Ji                                                                                                                       西游记 
Xian                                                                                                                                      县 
Xi‘an                                                                                                                                 西安 
Xiandaihua                                                                                                                    现代化 
Xiangsheng                                                                                                                       相声 
Xiao, Jinghong                                                                                                              肖惊鸿 
Xiao Yanzi                                                                                                                    小燕子 
Xiaozhuang                                                                                                                       孝庄 
Xin Lishi Xiaoshuo                                                                                              新历史小说 
Xin Tian                                                                                                                            新天 
Xin Xing                                                                                                                           新星 
Xin Zuo Pai                                                                                                                  新左派 
Xing, Fensi                                                                                                                   邢贲思 
Xinwen Chuanbo Xue                                                                                          新闻传播学 
Xiongnu                                                              匈奴 
Xishuo Ju                                                                                                                      戏说剧 
Xishuo Lishi                                                                                                             戏说历史 
Xishuo Qianlong                                                                                                       戏说乾隆 
Xuantong                                                                                                                          宣统 
Xuanzang                                                                                                                          玄奘 
Xue Ren                                                                                                                            学人 
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Xungen Yundong                                                                                                      寻根运动 
Yahuan                                                                                                                              亚环                                          
Yan                                                                                                                                       燕 
Yang Ban Xi                                                                                                                 样板戏 
Yehuo Chunfeng dou Gucheng                                                                    野火春风斗古城 
Yeshi                                                                                                                                 野史 
Yi He Quan                                                                                                                   义和拳 
Yi Jiu Bai Liu Nian                                                                                                     1986 年 
Yi, Zhongtian                                                                                                                易中天 
Yibairen de Shinian                                                                                          一百人的十年 
Yin, Hong                                                                                                                         尹鸿 
Ying, Zheng                                                                                                                      赢政 
Yishi Xingtai Hua                                                                                                 意识形态化 
Yishu Zhenshi                                                                                                           艺术真实 
Yongzheng                                                                                                                        雍正 
Yongzheng Huangdi                                                                                                 雍正皇帝 
Youxiao Guojia Yishixingtai Kongzhi                                              有效国家意识形态控制 
Yu, Hua                                                                                                                             余华 
Zaixiang Liuluoguo                                                                                              宰相刘罗锅 
Zeng, Guofan                                                                                                                曾国藩 
Zeng, Qingrui                                                                                                               曾庆瑞 
Zhao, Wei                                                                                                                         赵薇 
Zhao, Yuezhi                                                                                                                 赵月枝 
Zhao, Ziyang                                                                                                                赵紫阳 
Zhang, Guoli                                                                                                                 张国立 
Zhang, Tielin                                                                                                                张铁林 
Zhang, Xun                                                                                                                       张勋 
Zhengshuo Ju                                                                                                                正说剧 
Zhengshuo Lishi                                                                                                       正说历史 
Zhengzhi Quanli Douzheng                                                                              政治权利斗争 
Zhongguo Gudian Xiaoshuo                                                                            中国古典小说 
Zhonghua Shiji Tan                                                                                              中华世纪坛 
Zhongwen                                                                                                                         中文 
Zhong Xuan Bu                                                                                                            中宣部 
Zhou, Baohua                                                                                                               周葆华 
Zhubajie                                                                                                                        猪八戒 
Zhu, Ying                                                                                                                          朱影 
Zhun Shichanghua                                                                                                    准市场化 
Zhuzi Baijia Sixiang                                                                                         诸子百家思想 
Zouxiang Gonghe                                                                                                     走向共和 
 
 
